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Chapter I The Dynamic and the Boundaries 
The defining shapers of the 'arms dynamic' in the SE Asian 
context are not specific to that region: they are, ratKer, 
characteristic of the international system as a whole. In other 
words, they are general and systemic. These defining 
shapers, Buzan has identified, lie in the conditions of 
international anarchy and technological progression which 
affect all states, making arms acquisitions a more or less 
permanent feature of state behaviour. ' 
The basic characteristics of international anarchy (to which 
Buzan draws attention) are the absence of a single authority 
throughout the international system as a whole and the 
concomitant one of states having to pursue 'self-help' policies 
to ensure their continued existence in such a system. 2 Such 
1 See Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and 
International Relations, (London: Macmillan/ International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1987), pp. 6-7. At this point Buzan is contending that these are the two 
11 variables" which determine the "subject matter" of Strategic Studies. The 'arms 
dynamic' itself, he goes on to say, arises from changes in the "quantity and quality of 
military technology" possessed by states in conditions of international anarchy. See 
ibid. p. 10. 
The thesis will draw extensively on Buzan's work on the 'arms dynamic'; a 
descriptive term and analytical tool which he has been responsible for the 
development of. Buzan's work on the 'arms dynamic', moreover, represents arguably 
the most comprehensive and systematic coverage of the general process by which 
states acquire arms and effectively represents a distillation of the other major works 
on the subject. This is especially so with regard to his analysis of the concept of 'arms 
racing'. 
* Since completing the main body of the thesis, Buzan (with Eric Herring) has 
revisited the idea of the 'arms dynamic' in a successor book to An Introduction to 
Strategic Studies. Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics 
(Boulder/ London: Lynne Reinner, 1998). The new book seeks to adapt the theory, and 
its application, to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era and the current trends 
in international relations and security studies theory. In the main, however, the 
basic theory remains unchanged although the technological imperative is no longer 
categorised as a distinct model and its deterministic aspects are played down. Other 
changes, including the addition of "internal repression and civil war" (p. 103) to the 
range of factors in the domestic structure model and an increased emphasis attached to 
'secondary' arms dynamics, reinforce the importance attached to these issues in the 
thesis. In view of the post-Cold War nature of the new book and the fact that it does 
not invalidate any of the theoretical approaches pursued here, no attempt has been 
made to retrospectively amend those points or ideas derived from An Introduction to 
Strategic Studies (where, indeed, any changes have occurred). The exception to this 
is that the concluding chapter to the thesis introduces one of the terms from the new 
book's attempt to refine the description of where particular dynamics fit on the 
overall pattern of behaviour. 
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characteristics, and the potential therein which exists for 
conflict between states in a range of "political, economic, and 
social" issue areas, gives rise to the possibility that 
occasionally "these conflicts will result in the use of force. " 3 
Technological progression, on the other hand, is uncontested 
and its role in defining the arms dynamic is striking. The 
more so, perhaps, because of its seemingly accelerating 
nature: a nature which is widely recognised in much of the 
writing on arms. 4 Technological progression in the field of 
weapons and weapons systems is, of course, inextricably 
linked with that in the civil sector. "Despite its distinctive 
elements, the revolution in military technology needs to be 
seen, not as a thing apart., but as an integrated element of a 
broader revolution in science, technology and the human 
condition as a whole. "5 This has meant that as civilian 
technology has, almost inevitably, advanced, then so too has 
that in the military sphere. 
The process of continous technological "advance" in the 
military sector leads to ever-improving military hardware 
and, Buzan contends, to the emergence of 'leaders' and 
'followers' (the transfer of technology, and hardware, from 
the former to the latter occurring through so-called 
"diffusion"). 6 This division, in turn, being influenced by the 
anarchic and hierachical nature of the international system. 
As McKinlay argues, states will seek to "maintain and develop 
their power capabilities" (one of the components of which is 
military strength) in an uncertain, hierachical, international 
system. 7 If they can improve their position in the hierachy, it 
1-0 1" 
t, 
iv 
C, I-r 
r 
2 These characteristics of international anarchy determined by Kenneth Waltz are 
not, of course, uncontested. See Fei- Ling Wang, "Four Cheers For International 
Political Anarchy", Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1995, 
pp. 73-84. 
Buzan, op. cit. p. 6. 
4 Sheehan, for example, recognises the continuous process of technological 
improvement in weapons, and draws attention to the magnitude and pace of change in 
the Cold War era. Michael Sheehan, The Arms Race (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1983), p. 11. 
5 Buzan, op. cit. p. 26. For an exploration of the linkages between civil and military 
technology, and their evolving 'revolution', see Libid. pp. 26-29. 
Ibid. p-9. 
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"will enhance the prospects of autonomy of a state and 
increase the margins of safety within which it can move. "8 
Front rank, or leading,, states,, are those arms producers who 
have the resources to pursue high-levels of R&D (research 
and development) to keep themselves at the 'leading-edge' of 
the constant process of military technological revolution. 
They thus maintain a "qualitative" edge over the following 
states. 9 Indeed, they have to retain such an edge if they are 
to preserve their "power position and/or their security" in the 
prevailing international system. 10 
The following states (that is, those not at the leading-edge of 
technology), which are usually only 'non-' or 'part-producers', 
"have either to upgrade the quality of their weapons or else 
decline in capability relative to those who do. " 11 The desire 
to avoid a technological capability gap will be especially 
evident in cases where some form of inter-state rivalry exists. 
The ability of such following states, whether producers or 
non-producers, ý,, to upgrade, will be facilitated by the fact that 
the leading states (in this case acting as suppliers) will often 
have rationales for "pumping qualitative advances back into 
the pipeline through the mechanism of arms aid and sales. " 12 
In other words, 'diffusion' occurs. Indeed, the arms trade, 
Buzan recognises, "sets a high, and continuously rising, global 
standard of military technology. " 13 The "global standard" is 
high, he contends, "because it is set by the quality of the 
leading edge" and it is rising "because it is driven along at the 
pace of qualitative advance in the top-rank military 
producers. " 14 
Robert McKinlay, Third World Military Expenditure, (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 22. 
8 Ibid., p. 21 
9 Buzan, op. cit. p. 37. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 38. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. 39. 
14 Ibid. 
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The conditions of technological progression and an anarchic (and hierachical) international system are inter-related and, 
when combined, lead states to develop and improve their 
military capabilities. Arms acquisitions are a significant 
aspect of such development and improvement. 
Under the conditions of technological progression and an 
anarchic international system,, therefore, the process of arms 
acquisition can be regarded as a regular, or 'normal', pattern 
of state behaviour. This regularity, or normality, is, Buzan 
recognises, evidently distinct from the irregular, or 
I abnormal', situation of 'arms racing': a situation which 
involves unusually intensive military competition. Indeed, 
for Buzan, 'arms racing' means a "notably intense process of 
military competition that contrasts with whatever passes for 
normality in military relations between states not at war with 
each other. "15 
It is the search for an all encompassing term which includes 
the two aspects of normality and abnormality which gives rise 
to Buzan's idea of the'arms dynamic. The'arms dynamic 
then, represents "the whole set of pressures that make states 
both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality 
of the armed forces they already possess. " 16 The focus of this 
thesis, implicit in much of the above discussion, will be on the 
armaments dimension of the dynamic, although this cannot be 
entirely separated from that of armed forces' size and combat 
capabilities. 
15 Ibid., p. 72. Buzan derives his definition from, in particular, the work of Colin 
Gray who highlights the element of rapidity in military improvements in such cases 
of inter-state military competition. For Gray, the "minimal condition" for an arms 
race relationship to exist is "that there should be two or more parties perceiving 
themselves to be an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their 
armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a 
general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political 
behavior of the other parties. " Colin Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World 
Politics XXIV 1971, p. 40. 
Similar thinking (again influenced by Gray's work) is displayed by Sheehan who 
contends that "the process of arms acquisition is the normal state of international 
relations", whereas an arms race requires abnormality. Sheehan, o12. cit. p. 9. 
16 Buzan, Qp. -cit, p. 
73. 
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Within this 'whole set' there is an appropiate spectrum with 
the normal and abnormal situations at either end. These 
normal and abnormal situations are represented, 
respectively, by the terms "maintenance of the military status 
quo" and "arms racing". 17 The area in the middle of the 
spectrum, Buzan notes, is a difficult one in which to place 
particular cases, in which event it is the "direction of changell 
in behaviour which is important. 18 
If both 'maintenance of the status quo' and 'arms racing' are 
part of the same whole 'arms dynamic', then an important 
question arises: how are distinctions to be made between the 
extremes of the spectrum? Inter-related to this question is 
another one: if the 'arms dynamic' represents the 'whole set of 
pressures' influencing states to acquire and develop armed 
forces, then what are the individual pressures or factors 
which make up this whole set? 
Buzan contends that one way of seeking to determine whether 
it is maintenance or racing which is occurring is, in fact, to 
explore the "processes that induce states to increase their 
military strength". 19 This exploration, in turn, requiring and 
enabling the identification of individual pressures or factors. 
Buzan, drawing on the wider theoretical literature derived 
from the Cold War experience, explores these pressures in 
regard to three models: first, the 'action-reaction' model; 
secondly, the 'domestic structure' model; and thirdly, the 
'technological imperative' model. 20 
The 'action-reaction' model is engendered from the Cold War 
strategic nuclear rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. At its core is the belief (which rests on the 
assumption that the international system is anarchic ) that a 
17 "Maintenance of the military status quo" refers to "the general process by which 
states create armed forces and keep their equipment up to date". Ibid. p. 72. 
18 Ibid., -p. 73. 
19 Ibid., p-74. 
20.1bid., p-74- What follows is a necessarily brief, introductory, outline of the main 
features of these models. The models will be returned to in subsequent chapters on the 
various individual pressures as they can 
help to provide the basis of a general 
analytical approach for an assessment of these. 
Buzan pursues an extensive critique 
of the models in Chapters 6-9. 
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state will determine its military requirements with reference 
to the military capabilities of another state (or states), one 
which poses an actual, or potential, threat to it. "States to a large extent assess their military needs with the power of the 
most likely opponent clearly in mind. Therefore, 
developments in the military power of one state are likely to 
affect those in the other. " 21 
An increase in military strength by one state (action) will heighten the level of threat perceived by other states which, in 
turn, will expand their military strength (reaction). Such an 
'action-reaction' process can occur irrespective of the 
underlying motivation for a state to initially increase its 
military strength. As Buzan notes: 
It is difficult for an state to distin uish between y 
measures other states take to defend themselves and 
measures they may be taking to increase their 
capability for aggression. Because the consequences 
of being wrong may be very severe, the dictates of 
prudence pressure each state to adjust its own 
military measures in response to a worst-case view of 
the measures taken by others. Since each adjustment 
is seen by other states as a possible threat,, even a 
system in which all states seek only their own defence 
will tend to produce competitive accumulations of 
military strength. 22 
The effects of the 'action-reaction'model on the position of 
particular cases on the dynamic's spectrum will, of course, 
depend on the level of military competition. Buzan notes that 
high levels of competition will usually result in 'arms racing', 
21 Sheehan, pp,.. cit., p. 12. 
22 Buzan, pp. cit, p. 78. Underpinning the inclination of states to behave in this way, 
Buzan recognises, are the workings of the so-called 'security dilemma'. The "security 
dilemma" exists when"the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable 
uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether these preparations are for 
'defensive' purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether 
they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)". Nicholas 
J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma", in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger 
(eds. ), Dilemmas of World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 30. 
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whereas low levels of competition will see status quo 
maintenance. 23 
The basic model of action-reaction, Buzan summarises, is fairly straightforward, though he qualifies this with the 
caveat that the "only thing that may be clear is the general fact that the behaviour of states is driven by their sense of 
external threat. The specific details of the action-reaction 
process between states may be difficult to identify-" 24 
Problems with the utility of 'action-reaction' as an analytical 
tool and explanatory model arose from the actual patterns of behaviour displayed by the superpowers and led to the 
development of the 'domestic structure' model. It was 
thought "that the process of the arms dynamic has become so 
deeply institutionalized within each state that domestic 
factors largely supplant the crude forms of action and 
reaction as the main engine of the arms dynamic. " 25 In effect, 
therefore, action-reaction is not 'automatic' because states 
acquire and expand military capabilities for reasons "not 
affected by what the potential enemy may or may not be 
doing. " 26 Having said this, though, it is still the existence of 
inter-state rivalries (and thus the idea of external threat) 
which provides the underlying motivation, 27within the 
context created by the logic of an anarchic international 
system. 28 
23 Buzan, op. cit. p. 78. 
24 
ýIbid., p. 
79. Buzan goes on to examine some of these details in terms of the variables 
of 'magnitude' 'timing' and 'awareness', having outlined the basic types of action- 
reaction which can occur. These are, primarily, "weapons-based" and "armed forces- 
based". 
'Weapons-based' competition can occur over a single weapons system, a set of weapons 
systems, or entire arsenals, whilst 'armed forces-based' competition can entail both 
11 quantitative" and ''qualitative" factors. Ibid., p. 80. 
Significantly, it is also possible that political and economic factors can influence the 
arms dynamic action-reaction: for example, changes in foreign policy increasing 
feelings of hostility, and the use of force by an opponent. Ibid., pp. 82-83. Thus, a 
"political 'action' may ... trigger a military 'reaction' ". Ibid. p. 83. 
. p. cit, 
p. 94. 25 Buzan, 9 
26 Sheehan, pp. cit., p. 13. 
27 See Buzan, pp. cit., p. 94. 
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The 'domestic structure' model, Buzan recognises, is, of 
course, based on the experience of the superpowers in general 
and the United States in particular. Much of the work on the 
model, therefore, applies "only to states that are major 
producers of arms"; little work having been done on the model in relation to 'part-' and 'non-Producers'. 29 (This point about 
producers, or otherwise, is a crucial one to which we shall 
return later) 
The 'domestic structure' model derived from the US 
experience provides a range of factors explaining the I arms 
dynamic': "institutionalization of military research, 
development, and production"; "bureaucratic politics"; 
it economic management"; and "domestic politics". 30 The net 
effect of these factors, it was contended by some analysts, was 
the formation of a coalition of the interests of the R&D 
establishment, producers, the armed forces and government, 
encapsulated in the idea of a 'military-industrial complex I. 
The existence of a military-industrial complex thus suggested 
that "the process of arms acquisition had a logic of its own. " 31 
Whilst many of these factors, and the specfic mechanics of 
them, are particular to the American experience, they do 
establish the idea that internal,, or domestic, pressures or 
factors are important in terms of the "generation" of the 
'arms dynamic' in both part- and non-producers, although the 
exact form will obviously vary from state to state. 32 
28 In the context of developing countries (within which the SE Asian experience can be 
included, with reservations) the primacy of the 'external' aspect has been disputed, 
however. Acharya, for example, argues that the centrality of "domestic factors in 
the security concerns of developing countries (in relation to inter-state or external 
threats) on the one hand, and their dependence on external security guarantees on the 
other, ... 
[means] that the primary explanation for arms acquisitions by these states 
has to be found outside the realm of inter-state power relationships. " Amitav 
Acharya, An Arms Race in Post- Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control, 
(Pacific Strategic Papers No. 8), (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1994), p. 4. 
29 Buzan, pp. cit., p. 95. 
30 Ibid. For a detailed explanation of these see pp. 95-101. 
31 Ibid., p-101. 
32 Ibid., p. 104. 
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With regard to the applicability of the components of the US 
derived 'domestic structure' model in other cases, Buzan 
contends that the "most generally applicable elements ... are the existence of organizational pressures from the military 
establishment on weapons procurement, and the domestic 
insecurity logic of autism. " 33 The latter entails that the 
governments of 'weak' states will pursue military expansion 
in response to an external threat which they have created, or 
magnified, in order to ameliorate internal divisions. 34 In the 
case of 'part-' or 'non-producers', where arms industries are 
small or non-existent, the role of R&D, production, and 
electoral factors will either be small or equally non-existent. 35 
Finally, there is the 'technological imperative' model which is 
based on one of the overall shapers of the 'arms dynamic'. 
namely, the ongoing process of technological innovation. In 
developing and explaining this model Buzan expands upon 
the inter-relatedness of civilian and military technology and 
highlights how this inter-relatedness affects the 'arms 
dynamic' in two important ways. First, "a large element of 
the pressure for qualitative technological advance is not 
located in the military sector". 36 Secondly, the "military 
sector cannot escape the implications of a relentless 
qualitative advance over which it has only partial control. " 37 
In other words, the civil sector often pursues autonomous 
technological advance which has unavoidable consequences 
for, and spin-on effects on, the military one. A notable 
example of this spin-on effect would be the miniaturisation of 
electronic equipment. 
For Buzan then, the underlying process of technological 
advance on which the 'technological imperative' model rests, 
represents an "independent variable" which is not fully 
explained by either of the other two models 38and which has a 
33 Ibid. 
34 See ibid. p. 102. 
35 Ibid., p. 104. 
36 Ibid. , p. 106. 
37 Ibid. 
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profound role in the 'arms dynamic '. Given the uncertainty inherent in an anarchic international system, states are 
concerned that their rivals may gain a technological edge and thus they seek to keep up with (or lead) the process of technological change "by continuously modernizing their 
armed forces. " 39 Such modernisation, of course, merely 
exacerbating the 'security dilemma' where it is operative. 
The 'technological imperative' model is evidently useful in 
terms of identifying another of the pressures or factors which 
make up the 'arms dynamic', but it can complicate the attempt 
to determine whether it is 'maintenance of the status quo' or 
'arms racing' which is occurring. Buzan notes that the 
"technological imperative 
... forces states to behave in a way that looks like arms racing, but where the principal motive is 
as much keeping up with the leading edge of technological 
standards as it is keeping up with other states. " 40 Where 
there are high levels of 'technological innovation, therefore, ix, 
the boundary between 'maintenance' and 'racing' will be far 
from clear. 41 
Implicit in much of the above discussion is the fact that all the 
models are inter-related, within the context of an anarchic 
international system, with no one model being able to provide 
a full and comprehensive explanation of the'arms dynamicl. 
42 A comprehensive understanding of the 'arms dynamic', 
therefore, necessitates analysis of inter-state, domestic, and 
technological pressures, factors, or variables. These 
pressures effectively represent sub-sets of the 'arms dynamic' 
whole. 
Although these central areas of analysis, and the associated 
models, are derived from the experience of the US (especially) 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. p. 109. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. Technological innovation can result in self-sustaining, qualitative, 'arms 
racing' where rivalries are intense. "Both sides attempt not merely to match and 
improve technologies, but to develop counters to them, creating pressures for the 
continued development of the initial technology. " Colin McInnes, "Technology and 
Modern Warfare", in Baylis and Rengger, op. cit. p. 155. 
42 See Buzan, op. cit. pp-108-112 for a summary of these inter-relationships. 
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and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it is evident that 
they also comprise the 'arms dynamic' of developing states 
too. There is, however., an important distinction between the 
I arms dynamic' of the superpowers (and other high-ranking 
states in the military pecking order) and that of developing 
states; one already intimated in the discussion of the wider 
applicability of the 'domestic structure' model. The former 
can be classified as "primary" (involving only major arms 
producers) and the latter as "secondary" (concerning only 0 
part- or non-producers). 43, j 
The distinction is highly significant for an understanding of 
the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' because it introduces another 
important pressure or factor into the equation. 
The'arms dynamic'in SE Asia during the Second Cold War 
can be described as secondary in nature. This secondary 
nature is based on the premiss that all the states under 
consideration (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam) are either part- or non-producers. 
Attributing such a designation to them, of course, requires an 
examination of the demarcation between producers and part- 
or non-producers which, in turn, necessitates the 
identification of what can be termed 'major' weapons. It is 
these categories of major weapons which will also be the 
focus of the thesis in terms of the dynamic's outcomes: the 
thesis focussing on the arms acquisition component of the C, 
arms dynamic' through both production and transfers. 
In demarcating between producers and part- or non- 
producers the objects of attention are major, conventional (as 
distinct from nuclear, biological or chemical), weapons. The 
issue of which weapons are major, however, is somewhat 
problematic with a range of categorisations being used by 
different sources (some of which vary over time): 
categorisations which are often too broad for meaningful 
purposes or narrow for manageable ones. 44 
43 Ibid., p. 128. 
44 For example, Ross refers to "four types of major conventional weapons - aircraft, 
armoured vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels" in 
his work on arms production in 
developing and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states. Andrew L. 
Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in 
ASEAN", in Chandran Jeshurun (ed. ), Arms And Defence In Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 26- Wulf, on the other 
16 
This thesis will utilise an amalgam of the various 
categorisations and attendant sub-divisions and 
qualifications. The major weapons which will be included 
are: tanks (main battle and light); armoured fighting and 
support vehicles; heavy artillery (towed and self-propelled of 100mm. calibre or above, including unguided rocket launchers); 
I guided' missiles and launchers; combat aircraft (including 
combat capable advanced jet trainers); transport aircraft; 
training and reconnaissance aircraft; combat helicopters 
(including anti-submarine warfare); transport and training 
helicopters; submarines; warships (all surface vessels, 
including mine warfare, over 100 tonnes); support ships; and 
hand, provides a more detailed categorisation of major weapons with ten, expansive, 
ones: "Fighters, light fighters, let trainers"; "Light planes, transport planes"; 
"Helicopters"; "Guided missiles"; "Major fighting ships, fast attack craft"; "Small 
fighting ships"; "Submarines"; "Main Battle Tanks"; Artillery"; and "Light tanks, 
APCs". Herbert Wulf, "Arms Production in the Third World", in SIPRT Yearbook 
1985: World Armaments-and Disarmament (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), Table 
10.1. pp. 332-333. Whilst Mak, in his more recent work, utilises later SIPRI (post- 
1991) statistics which reflect the UN Conventional Arms Register's "seven major 
categories of offensive weapons" ("main battle tanks"; "armoured fighting vehicles"; 
heavy artillery"; "combat aircraft"; "attack helicopters"; "naval vessels"; and 
11 missiles /missile launchers"). J. N. Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975 -1992: 
The Dynamics Of Modernisation And Structural Change, (Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence No. 103), (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
1993), Appendix: ASEAN Armed Forces Statistics, 1975 -1992, pp. 175-176. 
To complicate matters further, the SIPRI categorisations have become more detailed 
over time, changing in the late 1980s. In 1984 their data on major weapons had four 
categories; "aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships" (SIPRI Yearbook 
1985 p. 440): and, in 1988 it covered "five categories of major weapons: aircraft, armour 
and artillery, guidance and radar systems, missiles and warships. " SIPRI Yearbook 
1988: World Armaments and Disarmament, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1988), p. 256. 
Although, to be more accurate, they effectively sub-divided these broad categories by 
providing a detailed list of inclusions (and exclusions) within each category (for 
example, the 'armoured vehicle' category in 1985 also included artillery); and they 
employed the criterion of 'military applicability' which meant transport aircraft 
and supply ships were included. 
Finally, of course, there is the very comprehensive breakdown of weapons systems 
provided in The Military Balance. In the post - Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
era this leads to fifteen categories, with further sub-divisions: "Battle Tank"; 
"Armoured Personnel Carrier"; "Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle"; "Heavv 
Armoured Combat Vehicle"; Artillery"; "Submarines"; "Principal Surface 
Combatants"; "Patrol and Coastal Combatants"; Mine Warfare"; "Amphibious"; 
"Support and Miscellaneous"; "Weapons Sytems"; "Aircraft" [maritime]; "combat 
aircraft"; and "helicopters" ("attack", "combat support", and "transport"). The 
(London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies/ Brasseys, 1993), pp. 6-8. 
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a miscellaneous category (including anti-aircraft guns of 20mm calibre or above). 
If these constitute major weapons., then the demarcation between producers and part- or non-producers is fairly 
straightforward. Producer states are those which have the domestic capability (allowing for the importation of selected 
components) to produce and design all, or nearly all, of the 
major weapons outlined above. Part-producers, on the other hand., are those states who can domestically produce (but 
usually not design) most, or just a few, of them. The description part-producer can, in fact, be sub-divided 
according to which 'stage' in the development process of an indigenous design and production capability a state has 
reached in terms of a particular weapon type. 45 The 
designation non-producer is self-explanatory, meaning those 
states whose productive capability is limited to small arms 
and ammunition or no munitions at all. Employing his ten 
categories of major weapons, in tandem with the five stages 
of development., Wulf classifies the states under consideration 
as follows: Burma ("limited production"), Indonesia 
("production in several categories"), Malaysia ("limited 
production"), Singapore ("production in several categories"), 
and Thailand ("limited production") as part-producers; and 
Vietnam as a non-producer, it only being capable of small 
arms production. 46 
The part-, or non-producer,, status of these states., and thus 
the secondary nature of the SE Asian 'arms dynamic', means 
that that dynamic automatically includes arms suppliers 
45 There are essentially five stages in the weapons development process according to 
Wulf. These are: stage one (the "repair, maintenance and overhaul of imported 
weapon systems"); stage two (the "assembly of imported weapons"); stage three 
(where "simple components are produced locally under licence"); stage four (where a 
"major portion of the weapon system is licence-produced"); and stage five (the 
capacity to locally design and produce weapons). Wulf, op. cit. p. 330. Ross also 
provides details of the various stages, although he describes the first one as the local 
assembly of imported weapons and divides stage five into two and includes in it 
"manufacture based on domestic R&D but still incorporating foreign-designed or 
-produced components". Ross, o12. cit. p. 26. 
46 Wulf, U. cit. Table 10.1, pp. 332-333; and note 4, pp. 342-343. These classifications 
with regard to the four ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand) are supported by Ross who noted that "No ASEAN country has yet 
developed an across-the-board defence production capability. " Ross, oJ2. cit. p. 29. 
(Ross provides details of the extent of ASEAN states' productive capabilities on 
pp. 29-34) 
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(usually extra-regional powers) whose role can be highly influential. "External suppliers affect secondary arms dynamics by determining the amount and the quality of the 
weapons supplied. " 47 They can thus influence the "rate,, 
volume and quality of supply" which makes for greater 
unpredictability as regional military balances can be changed 
very rapidly by sudden infusions of hi-tech weapons. 48 
The role of extra-regional powers (the suppliers) goes beyond 
the provision of weapons alone, however, as this is 
inextricably linked with the wider issue of the security policies 
of these states and thus of their whole security relationship 
with the SE Asian states under consideration (where 
appropiate). The broad role of extra-regional powers, 
therefore, is one of the individual pressures or factors in the 
SE Asian'arms dynamic'. 
We have then, clearly identified one of the elements which 
makes up the SE Asian'arms dynamic'during the Second 
Cold War. What other pressures or factors are there which 
might go to make up the'whole'of the 'arms dynamic'? 
It was noted above that the central areas (or sub-sets) of the 
'arms dynamic' (inter-state, domestic and technological), 
derived from the three models, also comprise the 'arms 
dynamic' of developing states tpo. The work on the 'arms 
dynamic' of developing states '/ 
(altho gh that term is not jm-p--loyed, rather, the work 
focu. es on the arms trade and defence expenditure49)poin s 
to a Oumber of individual pressures or factors which are 
suitable for analysis. 50 These factors can also be seen as 
members of the three sub-sets. 
47 Buzan, oj2. cit., p. 129. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Though defence expenditure is, quite clearly, not arms acquisition, they are both 
part of the same equation; particularly if the 'arms dynamic' is taken in its broader 
sense of military forces as a whole. In any case, a proportion of defence spending in 
most, if not all, developing states is devoted to arms purchases even if that 
proportion is small (that is, in relation to that on more routine items such as wages, 
accornodation and training). 
50 The suitability of the wider experience of developing states in general for 
understanding the SE Asian experience 
has been queried. Acharya, for example, 
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in its 
1975 study The Arms Trade With The Third World, put forward the argument that states purchasing arms will do so in order to fulfil three main "requirements". 51 First, the 
military requirements of internal and external defence; 
secondly, to affirm national identity through building-up 
armed forces; and thirdly, to gain the support of the armed V_ý 
forces. 52 These three factors, the Institute pointed out 
though, are, of course, often inter-linked. Furthermore, and 
this both suggests another pressure or factor and confirms the 
important role of suppliers, SIPRI argued that the "three 
factors alone do not represent conditions sufficient for the 
acquisition of weapons: they are all present in varying 
degrees in the Middle East, S. E. Asia and Africa, but the 
differences between these regions might be ascribed to their 
financial resources and to the attitude of the supplying 
countries. " 53 
With regard to defence and security expenditure in developing 
states, Nicole Ball identifies five broad groups which act as 
determinants of expenditure: external conflicts; internal 
(regime) security; bureaucratic and budgetary factors; the 
influence of the armed forces; and the role of major powers. 54 
contends that "while Southeast Asia is widely regarded as part of the developing 
world, it is not self-evident that the determinants of defence policy in the region are 
reflective of the security predicament of developing countries in general (as opposed 
to specific regional circumstances in Southeast Asia and the distinctive security 
concerns of regional actors). " Acharya, op. cit. p. 2. 
While there are circumstances and factors which may may have a greater (or lesser) 
impact and emphasis at particular times in SE Asia, and there is always a danger of 
over-generalisation, there is also, perhaps, a danger of searching for a regional 
uniqueness which may not necessarily make matters clearer. Acharya's own list of 
factors determining procurement decisions (bearing in mind it incorporates the post- 
Cold War period too) - including internal security concerns, defence 'self-reliance', 
concerns over the prevailing regional balance of power, economic growth and the 
influence of the military (see pp. 27-40) - is, ultimately, very similar to those derived 
from the 'general' experience of developing states. 
51 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade With 
The Third World, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975), p. 33. 
52 See Lb-id. 
53 Ibid., p. 34. 
54 Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), p. 33. 
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Such groups are also fairly similar to those determinants of 
military expenditure which McKinlay explores in his study of 
military expenditure in the Third World (power capabilities; 
budgetary behaviour; international interaction - which 
incorporates the ideas of supplier policy and the technological 
imperative; domestic conflict; interstate conflict; and national 
security). 55 
At this stage,, we can now draw on the sub-sets derived from 
the three models and those elements outlined above which are 
thought to be responsible for determining the general pattern 
of arms acquisitions and defence expenditure in developing 
states,, to establish a list of the individual pressures or factors 
which need to be analysed for their possible inclusion in the SE 
Asian'arms dynamic'. This list, accordingly, includes the 
following: external threat; defence policy and strategy; 
internal security; the role of the military; and technological 
factors. To this list must also be added the already clearly 
important pressure of the role of the suppliers, or, more 
broadly, relations with extra-regional powers. 
It is an analysis of these pressures or factors for their 
relevance and significance in the 'arms dynamic' of the SE 
Asian states under consideration during the Second Cold War, 
which constitutes the substance of the thesis. It is already 
clear from the existing literature that the relevance and 
significance of these pressures or factors will vary from state 
to state. So, therefore, within each essentially thematic 
chapter, the focus will be on those states to which that theme 
applies most; following a more detailed examination of the 
analytical nature of the pressure or factor itself. 
Having outlined those elements which are to be analysed for 
their potential role in the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' during the 
Second Cold War, all that remains, by way of an introduction, 
is to delineate and explain the geographical and historical 
boundaries of the thesis. This is not necessarily as entirely 
straightforward as it may appear for the geographical 
boundary (that is, the choice of states which are to be analysed 
for the operation of the 'arms dynamic' and its various 
elements) and the historical one both influence each other. 
55 See Mckinlay, Qp-. cit. 
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Beginning with the geographical boundary, it was mentioned in the discussion of the 'secondary' nature of the 'arms dynamic' that the states under consideration are to be Burma, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. As 
'SE Asia' is commonly regarded as containing ten states (these 
six, plus Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines) 56 there 
is an evident need to explain and justify the exclusions and, 
concomitantly,, one of the inclusions in particular. Buzan's 
concept of a SE Asian regional 'security complex' can be used 
to begin to provide such an explanation and justification. 
For Buzan, a regional security complex constitutes a "group 
of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another. " 57 In 
other words, there is a high degree of security 
interdependence between the states in the region. 
In the case of SE Asia, the prevailing security 
interdependencies since the communist victories in Indo- 
China in 1975 led, Buzan contends, to a SE Asian security 
complex of nine states: one "sharply divided into two groups: 
a communist-led, Soviet-aligned, and Vietnamese-dominated 
group of three (Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea); and a non- 
communist, Western-oriented group of six, organized since 
1967, in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
since 1984, Brunei). " 58 
Although Burma is also a SE Asian state, it is not included in 
the nine member complex because of the weak security 
interdependencies which it has with all the other states except 
Thailand (the Thai exception resulting from the cross-border 
activities of ethnic insurgents opposed to the Burmese state). 
Burma, therefore, is described as a "buffer state, or zone of 
56 See D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia. Past & Present (3rd ed. ), (London: Macmillan, 
1994), p. 3, for a brief discussion of the states which comprise SE Asia. 
57 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear , (2nd ed. ), 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 190. 
58 Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex", Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 10, No. 1, June 1988, p. 4. 
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relative security indifference" between the SE Asian and the South Asian regional security complexes. 59 
Why is Burma included in the analysis of the SE Asian'arms 
dynamic' then, if it is not a member of the regional security 
complex? It is included, paradoxically, precisely because of 
this. It can act as a 'control' case due to its isolation from the 
inter-state elements of the 'arms dynamic' which affect the 
other states,, particularly those resulting from the 
'polarisation' of the SE Asian security complex into two 
distinct groups. 
If Burma is not a member of the security complex and is 
included in the choice of states,, then why are Cambodia, Laos, 
Brunei and the Philippines, who are all members, excluded? 
Their exclusion rests on the issue of the extent of external 
involvement in their military affairs: in effect, they do not 
display a comprehensive, active, 'arms dynamic'of their own. 
As already intimated above with regard to the Vietnam 
dominated group in the security complex, during the Second 
Cold War in SE Asia Cambodia and Laos were part of a 
putative Indo-China federation and thus subject to Vietnam's 
hegemony. In the case of Cambodia, of course, Vietnam 
installed a regime in keeping with its own regional strategic 
objectives and excersised a considerable degree of influence 
over it. Thus, the People's Republic of Kampuchea did not 
function as a sovereign state throughout this period: a status 
which was further called into question by the ongoing civil 
war. Laos, on the other hand, was not subject to the same 
direct political control, but its defence and security was subject 
to Vietnamese control by virtue of the large numbers of 
Vietnamese troops which were stationed there. 
The stationing of foreign troops (British and American, this 
time) also affects Brunei and the Philippines, our other two 
exclusions, as it is a manifestation of the close security 
relationships which they both had with their former imperial 
rulers, Britain and America respectively. For Brunei, it did 
not actually attain full independence until 1984 (halfway 
through the Second Cold War) and thus for a crucial part of 
59 
-Ibid. 
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the period under consideration its external security was Britain's responsibility. The Philippines, on the other hand, had the presence of major US' forces at Clark Air Force Base 
and Subic Bay - acting as practical upholders of US security 
guarantees under the 1951 US - Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty - which meant that it too was relieved of the 
responsibilities of external defence. 
This level of security dependence on external powers by 
Brunei and the Philippines meant that the 'arms dynamic' was 
effectively suppressed in both cases: a suppression evinced by 
the very limited arms acquisitions which both states made 
between 1979 and 1989.60 
The years from 1979 to 1989 represent the period of the 
Second Cold War in SE Asia: a Second Cold War generated, 
and symbolised, by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 
Why set these years as the historical boundaries of the thesis? 
It could be argued that as the origins of the SE Asian security 
complex, in terms of its polarisation into two groups., lay in 
the communist victories in Indo-China in 1975, that should be 
the beginning of the period of analysis. At that time,, 
however, Vietnam was pre-occupied with the practical 
problems of re-unifying the two halves of the country with 
little interest in any Indo-China federation. Moreover., the 
intense hostility between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia precluded effective Vietnamese hegemony over the 
A - Indo-China sub-region. 
For the ASEAN states, the communist victories in Indo-China 
in 1975 were deeply disturbing. They overturned the 
prevailing regional balance of power and, in some cases, 01- 
heightened senses of vulnerability to externally supported 
domestic communist insurgencies. It is Possible to contend,, 
though, that the years 1975 - 1978 constituted a distinct phase 
as the ASEAN states effectively came to terms with the 
communist victories and, indeed, sought to reach an 
accomodation with Vietnam over the changed regional power 
balance. 
60 See Mak, Qp-. cit,. Table 26 (p. 262); and Tables 33,34 and 35 (pp. 273-274, p. 275, and 
p. 277) for details of these. 
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Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 (and 
subsequent occupation) shattered such efforts, and changed the regional strategic situation overnight, making the 
polarisation of the regional security complex complete. Moreover, in view of the close defence ties between Vietnam 
and the Soviet Union resulting from the 1978 25-year Treaty 
of Friendship and Co-operation between them, Vietnam's 
invasion had wider consequences. It introduced directly into 
the SE Asian region the "higher-level security complex" 61 of 
superpower rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
This factor is of crucial importance for our analysis of the I arms dynamicbecause 1979 marked the beginning of the Second Cold War between the two superpowers brought 
about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 
and the subsequent Reagan defence build-up in the US. The 
onset of a new Cold War had major implications for the 
prevailing rate of technological change in weapons (and thus 
the technological imperative element of the 'arms dynamic') 
and for the arms supply and security policies of the two 
superpowers (the relations with extra-regional powers 
element). 
1989 represents our end year because of the realisation of 
further major changes in the SE Asian regional, and higher- 
level, security complexes bringing the Second Cold War to an 
end. In SE Asia, this was characterised by the final 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia which 
occurred in September 1989; whilst in terms of the 
superpower complex, it was characterised by the fact that 
Soviet forces were finally withdrawn from Afghanistan in 
February 1989, and the process of negotiation over reductions 
in conventional forces in Europe had begun. At the same 
time, the beginning of the outflow of East Germans into 
neighbouring countries heralded the imminent collapse of the 
whole Cold War edifice. 
The thesis then, will seek to explore the various elements of 
the 'arms dynamic' in relation to Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
61 Buzan, People, States and Fear p-195. 
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Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam in the period 1979-1989 and 
to provide a conclusion which addresses two important 
questions. Is it possible to establish a general pattern of 
behaviour in the SE Asian'arms dynamic, or, is the relative 
significance of the individual elements over time in each state 
so varied that this is impossible? Lastly, to the extent that any 
general pattern is discernible, does the 'arms dynamic' in SE 
Asia during this period correspond more closely to 
'maintenance' or 'racing"? 
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Chapter Il Assessing the External Threat 
Implicit in the preceding discussion of the 'arms dynamic's' 
models, or sub-sets, and the various individual pressures or factors., was the idea of the dynamic's bifurcation into 
external and internal dimensions. Indeed, this external- internal division is a traditional feature of much of the writing 
on arms procurement and arms races, with the action- 
reaction model effectively being regarded as representing the 
external dimension and the domestic structure model the fl, internal one. ' 
There is, though, no commonly accepted primacy accorded to 
either the external or internal dimension. The debate over 
the analytical precedence of either of them, and thus of the 
attendant models, is a long-standing one in the field of the 'arms dynamic' and arms races as Buzan recognises 
throughout his analysis of the 'arms dynamic' in An 
Introduction to Strategic Studies, It has also been contended 
that neither dimension can automatically be assumed to take 
precedence. Gray, after noting the limited study of arms race 
behaviour up to that point,, argues that "we cannot reasonably 
assume the dominance of either action-reaction or of 
domestic process explanations. "2 Moreover, Buzan, in his 
opening comments on the domestic structure model, 
acknowledges that the fundamental issue is not whether one 
model is "better than the ... [other] in some general sense, but 
1 Matthew Evangelista, for example, explores the basis of this external-intemal 
division in the context of the arms race between the superpowers, after noting that 
such a division is a common feature of attempts to explain international relations 
behaviour. Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, NY: 
Comell University Press, 1988), pp. 6-14. Interestingly, Evangelista notes that there 
is a debate over technology and whether its role in the arms race is best explained by 
external or internal explanations: a debate which he contends "remains unresolved". 
Ibid. p. 15. 
Marek Thee also recognises that what he terms "primary armaments determinants 
can be roughly divided into two categories" - internal and external. Marek Thee, 
Military Technology Military Strategy and the Arms Race, (London: The United 
Nations University & Croom Helm, 1986), p. 102. Significantly, however, in terms of 
the debate over the role of technology, he contends that "technological momentum" 
(one of the five general 'theorems' of arms races which he considers) should be 
included amongst the "internal determinants" of arms races. Ibid. p. 101. 
Gray, Qp -. c-i--t,. p. 
78. 
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what proportion of observed behaviour each model explains for any given case. "3 
However, there is a need to provide a starting-point for an 
assessment of 'observed behaviour' and thus to determine 
which of the individual pressures or factors to begin an 
assessment of the SE Asian'arms dynamic' 
-_ with. 
With due 
regard, therefore, to the need to avoid automatic assumptions 
about the dominance of dimensions, or models, and of the 
importance of the proportional relevance of all three models, 
it is the intention here to begin with the external dimension: in 
this case, with the individual pressure of external threats. 
The essence of the external dimension underpinning the 
action-reaction model was that within the context created by 
the logic of an anarchic international system the existence of 
inter-state rivalries provided the underlying motivation - the basis - for arms acquisitions by states. The anarchic system, 
according to Buzan, creates "a form of political relations that 
tends to produce military competition between states along 
action-reaction lines. "4 In other words, as one of the defining 
shapers of the general 'arms dynamic' the external dimension 
can be accorded some precedence, or primacy, over the 
internal one. This order of precedence, it could be contended 
with reference to the general'arms dynamic', might also exist 
in the temporal sphere in the sense that the identification of 
an external threat would usually come before the 
development of internal pressures for arms acquisitions. 
It is,, therefore,, with the idea of inter-state factors that we 
begin our analysis of the SE Asian'arms dynamic': factors 
which are evident both in terms of external threat assessment 
and in terms of elements of the requirements of defence policy 
and strategy. 
With regard to the SE Asian experience, however, the 
conventional wisdom suggests that the idea of inter-state 
factors - indeed, the external dimension as a whole - would 
not only be the wrong starting-point for a consideration of the 
pressures or factors leading states to acquire arms, but would 
3 Buzan, ; trategic Studies p-94. 
ibid. . 77. -, p 
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only be of limited relevance at all. For example, Acharya 
does not accord inter-state factors any primacy (see Chapter 
1, footnote 28) and., instead., contends that the "primary 
explanation" lies elsewhere; presumably in what he terms 
I non-interactive' and 'semi-interactive'. as opposed to 
'interactive'. factors. 5 
Underlying the belief that the external dimension is of limited 
relevance, and thus the emphasis on 'non-interactive' (that is, 
domestic) factors, is the very idea of 'security' in the SE Asian 
context. 6 This idea has seen a particular focus on the internal 
aspect: a focus which is derived from the characteristic 
attributed to these post-colonial states (in which Thailand can 
7 be included) of 'weakness', or, 'ineffectiveness'. Their 
weakness, or ineffectiveness,, resulting from the very high 
5 The 'interactive' element occurs when arms procurement decisions "are linked to the 
desire of the buyer to enhance its capabilities vis-a-vis other states", whereas the 
'semi-interactive', or 'non-interactive', element occurs when procurement decisions are 
"not primarily related to the capabilities of the neighbours" and acquisitions will 
occur "irrespective" of others' purchases. Acharya, op. cit. p. 27. Amongst the'semi- 
interactive' and 'non-interactive' factors which he identifies are internal security 
concerns (including insurgencies and geographic make-up) and concerns over the 
prevailing regional balance of power. See flIbLid. pp. 27 and 31. 
6 'Security 'in the SE Asian context has been recognised to have both an external and 
an internal aspect and to be comprehensive in nature, encompassing a number of issues 
(military, political, social, economic and environmental). Comprehensive security 
has been defined by the CSCAP (Council on Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific) 
Working Group on Comprehensive and Co-operative Security as follows: 
"Comprehensive security is the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, 
political, economic, social, cultural, military , environmental) in 
both the domestic 
and external spheres". David Dickens (ed. ), No Better Alternative: Towards 
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, (Wellington, NZ: 
Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997), Appendix CSCAP Memorandum No. 3: The 
Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, p-163. 
The writing on security in the SE Asian context is legion. It includes, for example, 
Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-anan Samudavanija (eds. ), LeadershiP Percej2tions and 
National Security. The Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Stephen Chee (ed. ), Leadership And Security in 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991); and F. 
Weinstein, "The Meaning of National Security in Southeast Asia", Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, Vol-34, No. 9, November 1978. 
7 The term 'weak' state, based on low levels of socio-political cohesion, is employed 
by Buzan in his analysis of the concept of national security in relation to the nature of 
the state. See Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 96-107. 
The same phenomenon of 
"inadequate societal cohesion" leads Ayoob to'describe Third World states as 
ineffective ones. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State 
onflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner, 1995), p. 28. 
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levels of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity within these 
states, and the difficulties the state (or, more aptly, regime) faces in establishing control over its territory and creating a 
national identity. It has been contended, therefore, that weak 
states' "principal distinguishing feature is their high level of 
8 concern with domestically generated threats to security". 
Thus, their "sense of insecurity ... emanates largely from within their boundaries rather than from outside. t19 
This internal focus, however, does not preclude an external 
dimension -a concern about external threats - rather, it is the 
case that internal and external concerns have often been 
inextricably interconnected. jeshurun, for example, argues 
that SE Asian states have tended to: p 
place such a fundamental value on the sheer need for 
regime survival that they are possessed of an almost 
paranoic concern for their security and defence, in 
which there is no conceptual distinction drawn 
between external as opposed to internal threats. 10 
i JA 
c- 
r 
It 
Put another way, in the context of the Third World as a whole, 
external threats "often attain prominence largely because of 
the conflicts that abound within Third World states. "" If this 
latter point is taken to an extreme,, then the aforementioned 
idea of the 'domestic insecurity logic of autism' would apply M 
which states were pursuing military expansion in response to 
an artificially created, or magnified, external threat. - ",; - , P, 4 
From the above discussion of weak states and the linkages 
between internal and external threats in SE Asia and the 
developing world, a number of important points emerge 
which could affect our consideration of the relevance and 
Buzan, People, States and Fear p. 99. 
Ayoob, The Ihird World Security Predicament p. 7. 
10 Chandran jeshurun, "Threat Perception and Defence Spending in Southeast Asia: 
An Assessment", in Chin Kin Wah (ed. ), Defence Spending in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p-11. The most obvious 
manifestation of this interconnectedness for many SE Asian states during the Cold 
War was in the external sponsorship of domestic communist insurgencies by extra- 
regional communist powers. 
11 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament p. 7. 
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significance of external threat assessment as an individual 
pressure or factor in the SE Asian 'arms dynamic First., 
internal threats may be so significant that external ones are of little or no relevance. Secondly, to the extent that external threats are perceived to exist then these owe more to intra- 
state factors than inter-state ones. Thirdly, and closely inter- 
related to the second point, if those external threats which are 
perceived to exist are essentially internally driven, they may 
not necessarily entail any inter-action with other states at all. 
There are elements of validity to these points, but they are insufficient to negate the importance of external threat 
assessment as an individual pressure worthy of analysis. In 
particular, their validity appears to be greater in the years 
prior to those under consideration here. 
The Second Cold War period, it can be argued, constituted a 
changed set of regional circumstances and, essentially, a 
transition phase from the weak states of the short-term post- 0 
colonial period into incipient conventional,, states. In effect, 
and with the obvious exception of Burma,, these states began 
to focus less on internal security concerns and to a greater or 
lesser extent more on external ones. 12 
This shift in focus occurred not just because of a partial 
strengthening of the states., or at least a sense of less acute 
weakness. 13 More significantly, it occurred because of 
changes in the regional strategic environment; including the 
abrupt one brought about by Vietnam's invasion (and 
subsequent occupation) of Cambodia. For several of the 
states, including Vietnam itself, this abrupt change led to the 
creation of 'real', as opposed to 'artificial', threats: threats 
which were independent of, though not completely 
12 Even where states are preoccupied with internal security concerns, the anarchic 
nature of the international system, Buzan argues, means that they cannot wholly 
ignore the external dimension. "Domestic insecurities may or may not dominate the 
national security agenda, but external threats will almost always comprise a major 
p. 22 element of the national security problem. " Buzan, People, States and Fear 
13 The point here is that these states were less weak in comparison with either their 
formative years (Singapore in 1965, and a re-unified Vietnam in 1975), or, periods of 
acute political crisis (Indonesia in 1965; Malaysia in 1969; and Thailand in the mid- 
1970s). 
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disconnected from, intra-state factors, and thus took on an 
inter-state form. 14 
In the case of the ASEAN states, Vietnam's invasion also gave 
the external dimension another plane because of Vietnam's 
ties with the Soviet Union. These ties effectively linked the 
regional and international security complexes and saw at 
least some of the ASEAN states become concerned about an 
increased Soviet military prescence in the region. 15 
Concurrently, the links between Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union and the effect of these and the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia on China,, meant that the sponsorship by China of 
the most pressing communist insurgencies (in Malaysia and 
Thailand) ended and, in tandem with other factors, led to the 
decline in the internal security threats they posed. 
If the idea of external threat is an important component of the 
SE Asian strategic environment in the Second Cold War 
period, then how is the individual pressure of external threat 
assessment as an influence on states' arms acquisitions to be 
assessed for its relevance and significance? Is there a general 
analytical approach which can provide a useful starting-point 
for such an assessment; one which explains the relationship 
between external threat assessment and arms acquisitions? 
From our earlier discussion it is clear that the relationship 
between external threat assessment and arms acquisitions lies 
at the heart of the action-reaction model of the superpower 
derived 'arms dynamic', with the model's "basic proposition ... [being] that states strengthen their armaments because of the 
threats they perceive from other states. " 16 In its most 
14 The ASEAN states under consideration had, in any case, traditionally sought to 
play down and minimise any external threats; particularly those which may be posed 
by a fellow member, or members. Far from their weakness leading them to create, or 
magnify, external threats, therefore, their weakness had led them to do the opposite 
as part of the process by which the states sought to limit competition between them in 
order to ensure their survival. See Mark G. Rolls, "ASEAN: Where from or Where 
to? ", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No. 3, December 1991, pp. 324-325. 
15 Nicole Ball, making reference to Weinstein, describes this concern about an 
increased Soviet military presence as essentially being one about "indirect aggression 
from abroad": a term in which she also includes the external support of communist 
party insurgency. Ball, op. cit. p. 33. 
16 Buzan, An introduction to Strategic Studies p. 76. 
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elementary form, therefore, the model posits that an increase in military strength by one state (action) will heighten the level of threat perceived by other states who, in turn., will increase their military strength (reaction). 
Such a 'systemic' relationship, to borrow from Gray, 17 is Most 
evident when there is a clearly identifiable threat and a high 
level of military competition between the parties involved, as 
was the case with the superpowers during the Cold War. It 
is, however, Buzan contends, also evident when the threat is 
less clear-cut and the level of competition is lower: 
Even where there is no specific power struggle, or 
only a weak one, the action-reaction process still 
works at the level of maintenance of the military 
status quo. States will always have some sense of 
who they consider to be possible sources of attack 
even when they see the probability of war as being 
low. This perception will ensure an element of 
action-reaction in defence policy, albeit of a much 
more subdued kind than in an arms race. 18 
The distinction between an action-reaction process with a 
high level of competition and one with a low level, it is 
evident, is crucial to an understanding of where the dynamic 
fits on the spectrum of behaviour. It also provides a useful 
way of delineating between the inter-state factors of external 
threat assessment and strategic requirements. Thus, external 
threat assessment will consider to what extent clearly 
identifiable threats and a high degree of competition have 
influenced arms acquisitions, whilst strategic requirements 
(to be discussed in the subsequent chapter) will, partially, 
consider to what extent possible threats at a lower level of 
competition have influenced arms acquisitions. 
The action-reaction process, beyond the basic proposition, is 
fairly complex, of course. The type, or "idiom" (to use 
Buzan's term), of the process in the military sphere can take a 
number of forms: weapons-based, armed forces-based, in 
17 Gray, P-p--cit. p. 71. 
18 Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies p. 78. 
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overall military strength and in terms of deployment and 
strategic doctrine. 19 Moreover, the type of reaction may not be the same as (that is, consistent with) the action. 20 
Broadly speaking, however, there are two main categories of 
action which can cause a reaction - military and political. Gray sub-divides these into four types of action, or 
"triggering events": "a military-technological trigger internal 
to the arms race system"; "a political trigger internal to the 
arms race system"; "a military-technological trigger external 
to the arms race system"; and "a political trigger external to 
the arms race system. "21 Gray's sub-division is particularly 
significant because it recognises the inclusiveness of the 
technological aspect in any consideration of military actions 
and introduces the idea that actions external to the system can 
bring about reactions within it. 
The action-reaction process, according to Buzan, also 
contains a number of "variables" ("magnitude", "timing" and 
1 'awareness "). 22 These variables can be affected by the 
"motives" of the states involved: motives which can be divided 
into two pairs relating to the "military balance" (the desire to 
"change" or "preserve" a position) and the "military 
objectives" (the desire to create a fighting or deterrent 
capability) of the states involved. 23 The significance of the 
idea of states' motives, and of the variable of timing, lies in 
the fact that they may provide some indication as to whether 
the dynamic corresponds more closely to that of 
'maintenance' or 'racing'. 
19 See Ibid., pp. 80-82. 
20 See Ibid., p. 83. 
21 Gray, op. cit. p-72. 
22 'Magnitude' refers to "what proportion the reaction bears to the triggering action"; 
'timing' to "the speed and sequence of interaction"; and 'awareness' to "the extent to 
which the parties involved in the process are concious of their impact on each other, 
and whether they govern their own behaviour in the light of that conclousness. " 
Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies p. 84. Buzan explores these in detail, and 
outlines some of the problems associated with them, on pp. 84-90. 
23 ibid.., pp. 90-91. 
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There are, however, difficulties with assessing timing and the 
motives of states, as, indeed, there are with applying the if specific ideas" of the model to "Particular cases. "24 Indeed 
this was one of the reasons for the development of the other 
models of the 'arms dynamic'. It is also a reason for not 
seeking to apply the model too rigidly to our consideration of the relevance and significance of external threat assessment (or strategic requirements for that matter). 
The model's use here is to provide a general analytical 
approach as a starting-point, based on its basic proposition 
and recognising that it can provide a way of helping to 
distinguish the nature of the 'arms dynamic' itself. Our 
interest,, therefore, is in identifying where an action (of 
whatever type) heightens a state's sense of threat and leads to 
a reaction in terms of the acquisition of a major weapon, or 
weapons. Amongst the various actions, however, some 
emphasis will to be given to weapons-based ones as 
generators of a sense of threat. 
The basic concept of threat is traditionally broken down into 
capabilities and intentions. 25 It has been contended, though, 
that given that capability can be "inherently threatening" 
because it creates the possibility of threat, especially as 
intentions can change and capability may actually signal 
hostile intent,, the main component of threat is actually 
capability. 26 Of course, capabilities can change too as they 
24 Ibid. p. 93. 
25 Military capabilities constitute both "force structure" (equipment, manpower and 
command and control) and "preparedness for operations" (which includes training, 
doctrine, logistic support and maintenance). Bob Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy 
and the Indonesian Armed Forces (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 99), 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1993), p. 2. For the purposes of this 
study, however, capability will be taken to be synonymous with the weapons element 
of force structure as that is the quantifiable dimension with which we are most 
concerned. 
26 Joh Jacob Nutter, "Unpacking Threat: A Conceptual and Formal Analysis", in 
Norman A. Graham (ed. ), Seeking Security and Development: The Impact of Military 
Spending and Arms Transfers, (London: Lynne Reinner, 1994), pp. 34-35. McKinlay 
also makes the point that the military capabilities of other states constitute "very 
real potential threats. " McKinlay, op. cit. p. 111 
The intentions-cap ability 'dilemma' (Gray), or 'distinction' (Pearton), is an 
important one in threat assessment and defence decision-making. Pearton notes the 
pioneering work of Richard Cobden in'The Three Panics'which introduced the 
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have a "dynamic" nature, particularly in view of technological 
changeS,, 27and thus states also need to try and assess 
potential threats resulting from any changes in capability. In 
particular,, states are especially concerned about any 
"capability gap" that may increase (or decrease) rapidly over a 
short period of time. 28 
To constitute a meaningful threat to a state's security, 
however, the capability possessed by a potential opponent 
must be able to be brought to bear in some way. In effect, 
there must be a "force interface" whether through 
geographical proximity or a power projection capability. 29 
Indeed, Nutter contends that a "threat only exists between 
actors if one or both of these conditions pertains. "30 
Given., then,, that the individual pressure of external threat 
assessment constitutes an action-reaction process in which 
there is a clearly identifiable threat (with capabilities being the 
crucial component) and a high level of military competition, it 
is readily apparent in which states this pressure might be of 
particular relevance and significance: Thailand and Vietnam. 
This is not to say, however, that they were locked into the 
same sort of symmetrical (or 'spiral') action-reaction process 
that characterised the superpower larms dynamic'. Indeed., 
the relationship between them was essentially asymmetrical 
in the sense that though Thailand saw Vietnam as a threat 
and a competitor, for Vietnam its threat and competitor was 
China. China, interestingly, by virtue of its support for the 
Khmer resistance in Cambodia and its interests in the South 
China Sea (plus the legacy of its links with communist 
insurgents in SE Asia), effectively straddled the boundary of 
the SE Asian security complex and was both internal and 
external to the system. 
"operational distinction ... between taking the 
declared or inferred intentions of other 
states and taking what their resources allow them to do as a datum for policy- 
making. " Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State, (London: Burnett Books, 1982), 
P. 90. 
27 Nutter, op. cit., p. 39. 
28 Ibid. p. 41. 
29 bid_, p. 47. 
30 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Thailand, 
Thailand's concerns about Vietnam did not suddenly 
materialise with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 
December 1978. Thai concerns had already been made more 
acute by the Communist victories in Indo-China in 1975 
which, initially at least, had appeared to portend the 
establishment of Vietnamese hegemony over Indo-China. 
What the 1978 invasion did mean, however,, was that the 
Vietnamese threat was now on Thailand's doorstep. In other 
words, there was a heightened sense of "the presence of this 
threat. "31 Thailand, already concerned about Vietnam's 
dominance over, and stationing of troops in, Laos, had now 
lost its remaining traditional 'buffer' of Cambodia giving 
substance to long-standing Thai fears of a land-based threat 
to the central plains and Trans-Mekong areas. 32 In effect, 
there was, for the first time, a 'force interface' between 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
The Thai-Vietnamese force interface also had an additional 
dimension because of Vietnam's close military relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Soviet support for Vietnam not only 
took the form of massive military aid, but also occurred in the 
form of the regular deployment of Soviet air and naval forces 
to Vietnam: deployments which were often a source of 
concern for the Thais. Thailand, therefore, was not only 
concerned about Vietnamese capabilities but, albeit to a lesser 
degree, Soviet ones too. 33 
31 Robert 0. Tilman, Southeast Asia And The Enemy Beyond. ASEAN Perce42tions of 
External Threats (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 72. 
32 The importance of these areas to Thailand has been widely recognised. See, for 
example, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Defence Spending and Threat 
Perceptions", in Chin, oj2. cit. p. 77; and Sarasin Viraphol, "National Threat 
Perceptions: Explaining the Thai Case", in Charles E. Morrison (ed. ), Threats to 
Security in East Asia-Pacific, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 147. 
33 The Soviet Union was, in any case, widely regarded as a threat because of its links 
with the Vietnamese aggressor. See Tilman, op. cit. p. 72- 
Sarasin Viraphol goes as 
far as saying that Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, combined with its 
introduction of the USSR into the region, 
"inevitably invoked memories of the 
Vietnamese intentions allegedly contained in the Ho Chi Minh Testament. It has 
given credence to the widespread assumption that 
Vietnam is bent on creating its own 
empire in Indochina. " Sarasin 
Viraphol, op cit. p. 151. 
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The general Thai concerns about Vietnamese ambitions in the 
aftermath of the communist victory in 1975, in conjunction 
with what this might mean for the CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) insurgency, had already led Thailand in 1976 to 
embark on a plan for the modernisation of the armed forces 
over a six-eight year period. 34 Elements of this plan were included in the 1977 paper 'Military Policy of the Ministry of Defence Buddhist Era 2520'. This policy had, as one of its 
objectives the ability to "defend and fight against external 
military threats": an objective to be achieved through 
(amongst other things) the "Rapid improvement and 
development of the standing military force ... on the principle of self-reliance, equipped to undertake 'forward defence 
operations' if necessary. "35 
Prior to the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978, the Thai 
Prime Minister Kriangsak had called, with some prescience, 
for the speeding up of this modernisation,, stating that the 
Thai government "must quicken the pace of improving and 
building up the army, both with respect to arms and general 
capability, with the objective of bringing it to maximum 
defence efficiency and preparedness. "36 The subsequent 
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, and 
especially their attempts to suppress the Khmer resistance to 
that occupation., provided not only an "impetus" for the 
continuation of the modernisation programme, 37but also a 
need to expand that programme and a clear sense of direction 
in arms acquisitions. 38 In essence, Thailand primarily sought 
34 See FEER, 1 June, 1979, p. 14. 
35 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op. cit., -D. 85. I ±- I. 
36 Cited FEER, I June, 1979, p. 14. 
37 Randolph cites the comments of Richard Armitage to this effect. "Thailand 
continues a gradual military modernization given day-to-day impetus by events along 
her eastern border. " 'Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Armitage Before the East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 8,1982" "U. S. 
Policies and Programs in Southeast Asia, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, (97th 
Congress, 2nd session, p. 10), in R. Sean Randolph, The United States and Thailand: 
Alli ince Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1986), p-225. 
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to acquire particular types of major weapons as a reaction to 
the deployment of weapons, and their subsequent utilisation, 
by Vietnam; rather than as a reaction to any changes in 
Vietnam's overall capability. 
Thailand could not, in any case, seek to shift the military 
balance with Vietnam more to its favour, let alone seek to 
attain any form of military parity with it. The cost of this was 
prohibitive given the existing capability gap between the 
tWo. 39 Moreover,, at the time of the Vietnamese invasion., the 
still pressing nature of the CPT insurgency meant that both 
defence resources and regular forces could not be directed 
solely towards the defence of Thailand's eastern border. 
Indeed, during the first few years of the Vietnamese 
occupation, Thailand's border defences appeared 
38 This point about a sense of direction is not uncontested, however. Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra, in his analysis of the "pattern" of Thai arms procurement, contends that it 
"has been unchanging since 1976-77 even though the nature of perceived threats has 
changed somewhat. The emphasis was and still remains overwhelmingly on building 
up conventional capabilities for all three armed forces at the same time. " 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op. cit. p. 99. Thus, the mid-1980s, a time he argues when 
the land threat from Vietnam was most prominent, saw "most of the capital outlay ... 
concentrated on advanced weapons which... [were] primarily not for use in land-based 
operations [for example, F-16s and air defence systems]. " Ibid. 
His argument, however, seems to fail to appreciate that although the Vietnamese 
occupation posed primarily a 'land' threat, the ramifications of that occupation 
meant that the threat was not solely land-based. Moreover, it also fails to take 
account of the 'combined' nature of modern conventional warfare and of the 'multi- 
role' capabilities of many modern weapons platforms. 
39 As a rough guide, for example, in 1978 the Vietnamese possessed ratios of 4: 1 for 
army manpower; 6: 1 for tanks; and 2: 1 for combat aircraft. Derived from The 
Military Balance 1978-79. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra notes that in the planning stages in 1980-81 for the 5th 
'Economic and Social Development Plan' (1982-86), it was estimated that to attain 
military parity with Vietnam c. 9% of Gross Domestic Product per annum. would 
have 
to be devoted to defence expenditure. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op. cit. p. 89. The 
appropiate "ceiling" for defence spending, however, was deemed to 
be "up to 4.4 per 
cent of the national income or 24 per cent of the government 
budget, and for defence 
loans from allies of up to 4.4 per cent of the government's budget, throughout the 
period of the Fifth Plan. " Ibid. p. 88. These expenditure constraints on 
developing 
the standing force, he observes, were an important 
factor in the decision to develop 
the 'Total Defence' strategy which began to be implemented in 1981. Ibid. 
it is arguable that Thailand did not actually need to attain an overall military 
parity with Vietnam anyway 
because Vietnam could not bring all its military 
strength to bear against 
Thailand due to its other preoccupations. What was required 
from the Thai point of view was that the imbalance should not 
be excessive at the 
crucial 'force interface' 
between them - the Thai-Cambodian border. 
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comparatively thin in terms of the number of Vietnamese 
troops they faced. 40 
Significantly, there appears to have been no expectation on the part of the Thais that Vietnam would mount a full-scale invasion. Vietnam gave early pledges that its troops would 
not cross the border in pursuit of the Khmer resistance and, initially at least, maintained an unstated buffer zone by keeping its forces some 15km away from the Thai border. 41 
Nor was there any expectation that Thailand would have to 
be self-reliant if this eventuality occurred. Thailand had both 
the assurance of Chinese support in the event of any major 
aggression againstit42and the hope that, despite doubts, the 
US would stand by its stated adherence to the security 
guarantees given to Thailand under the auspices of the 1954 
Manila Pact. 
Thailand's procurement strategy,, therefore, for most of the 
period of the Vietnamese occupation, was to build up its 
capability to the extent that it could act as a partial deterrent 
to Vietnamese incursions into Thailand and, if that failed, to 
have the fighting capacity to repulse limited incursions. 43 In 
the latter respect, and bearing out the earlier argument about 
the significance of where any military imbalance was located, 
Thailand was especially concerned that the capability gap was 
40 It is worth noting here that although there may have been pragmatic reasons for 
this intially, it subsequently seemed to be an unstated policy to maintain relatively 
light defences. The Thai military was anxious to avoid any major clashes with the 
Vietnamese right up to the mid-1980s, fearing that these could stretch its forces' 
operational capabilities (already limited by lack of spares and ammunition) and 
cause unacceptable casualties. 
41 See FEER, 30 November, 1979, p. 15, and 25 July, 1980, p. 8. This pledge, however, 
was essentially conditional on Thailand not assisting the Khmer Rouge. Even after 
cross-border clashes in April 1983, Hans Indorf observed that "Thai estimates 
categorically reject any possibility of a Vietnamese invasion. " Hans Indorf, 
"Thailand: A case of multiple uncertainties" (The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific 
Region No 6), Pacific Defence Reporter September, 1983, p. 23. 
42 "Direct assurances of Chinese military support for Thailand were ... offered during 
a visit to Beijing by Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila in August 1980. " 
Randolph, o12. cit. p. 211. The Chinese had, of course, by this stage already sought to 
teach the Vietnamese a Iesson'; one whose main effect was probably to divert 
Vietnamese troops away from operations in Cambodia to the defence of Vietnam's 
northern border with China. 
43 This Thai strategy is also referred to by Mak. See Mak, op. cit. p. 81. 
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not going to be too great at the point of confrontation with 
the Vietnamese in tactical engagements. 
In the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 
Thailand's immediate priority was to rapidly strengthen its 
capacity for territorial defence against Vietnamese armour 
and to improve the mobility of the army. Increased mobility 
was deemed important in view of the fact that those units 
tasked with the defence of the strategically important 
Watthankorn Pass at Aranyaprathet were located some way 
to the rear. 44 Although the Thais had already been concerned 
by the reported build-up of the PAVN's (People's Army of 
Vietnam) armoured forces prior to the invasion, the nature of 
the tactics employed by Vietnam during the invasion made 
these concerns acute. The PAVN, Pike notes, "employ[ed] a 
highly visible Soviet-type attack: tank-led infantry plunged 
suddenly across the border, drove to the Thai frontier, then 
fanned out, and within days had occupied Kampuchea. "45 
In addition, therefore, to seeking to speed up the deliveries of 
weapons already ordered (for example, 'TOW' anti-tank 
missiles ordered prior to the invasion), the Thai Prime 
Minister Kriangsak's visit to the United States in February 
1979 saw the Thais request the sale of a number of major 
weapons - not all of which were approved. In particular, 
Thailand requested the sale of M60A3 tanks to augment the 
army's existing inventory of ageing (and often inoperable) 
M41s and to enable the RTA (Royal Thai Army) to engage the 
better armed Vietnamese T-54/55s and T-62s. 
The request for M60s was turned down, however, with the 
US regarding the tank as being both too expensive for the 
Thais and "not appropiate to Thai logistical conditions. "46 
Instead, the Americans agreed to supply a limited number of 
M48A5s (with more to follow later)47and a number of M41s 
44 See FEER, 2 February, 1979, p. 8. 
45 Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), 
p. 69. 
46 Randolph, gp--cit,, p. 215. It may also have been the case that as the 
M60A3 was 
still the mainstay of the US Army, it was 
deemed to be too sophisticated for sale to 
Thailand. 
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which could be cannibalised to provide spares for the RTA's 
existing M41s. Additionally, and influenced by both US 
concerns that Thai purchases should be cost effective and the 
nature of US tactics in Europe, the Thais ordered a large 
number of 'Dragon' ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons). 48 
To improve the army's mobility additional M113 APCs 
(armoured personnel carriers) were ordered to further the 
process of upgrading elements of the infantry into mechanised 
units, whilst its firepower was enhanced somewhat with 
orders for 105 and 155mm howitzers: the need for long-range 
artillery being attributed with particular importance because 
of the PAVN's inventory of Soviet 130mm guns. 49 The RTAF's 
(Royal Thai Air Force) airlift capability was also to be 
enhanced with an order for three C-130 'Hercules' transport 
aircraft. 
Although the priority for Thailand was to strengthen its 
capacity for territorial defence against the PAVN, the 
Vietnamese invasion had also generated anxieties about the 
paucity of Thailand's air defences. These were effectively 
limited to less than two squadrons of F-5s which was a legacy 
of the RTAF's primary role hitherto having being in support of 
counter-insurgency operations. During its invasion of 
Cambodia "the Vietnamese [had] used aircraft for the first 
time for tactical close support", 50 with one MiG-21 having 
apparently strayed into Thai air space and dropped its bombs 
47 The deliveries of the M48s were undoubtedly staggered because of the difficulties 
the US had in obtaining any which it could supply to Thailand, given the US Army's 
existing shortage of MBTs (main battle tanks). See Ibid. p. 216. 
48 In view of the superiority the Warsaw Pact enjoyed in tanks, the US had devloped 
the concept of a layered anti-tank defence based around helicopters armed with 
'TOW'missiles and infantry equipped with 'Dragon' ATGWs and short-range M72 
light anti-tank weapons. As the Thais already possessed M72s and had 'TOWs' on 
order, the 'Dragon' was a logical choice to allow the replication of the concept. See 
FEER 1 June, 1979, p. 15. 
49 See FEER, 1 June, 1979, p. 15. The Soviet 130mm gun appears to have been a 
particularly formidable artillery piece. Commenting on its earlier use during 
exchanges between the North Vietnamese Army and the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam, Thompson states that it "outranged the American 105mm and 155mm 
howitzers in the fire bases by more than six miles .... [and] was also extremely 
accurate". Sir Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1974), p. 98. 
50 FEER, 1 June, 1979, p-15. 
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on Thailand. 51 To counter the threat posed by the capability 
of the MiG-21s possessed by the Vietnamese air force, Thailand requested approval from the US to purchase F-16s. This request was also turned down, however, with Thailand instead ordering an additional squadron of the F-5E 'export' fighter which was thought by the Americans to be a "more 
economical and practical alternative to the ... F-16s". 52 
These four main areas (anti-tank defence; mobility; artillery; 
and air defence) continued to be at the centre of the expanded 
modernisation programme: a programme which was given impetus by the day to day deployment and utilisation by Vietnam of its forces in Cambodia and which came to acquire 
greater emphasis as the CPT insurgency became less of a 
concern after 1981. The impetus was greatest., of course., 
when Vietnam's attempts to suppress the Khmer resistance in Cambodia led to the PAVN mounting cross-border operations 
into Thailand, especially if they showed up deficiencies in the 
Thais' capacity to respond to these incursions. 53 
The major Vietnamese incursions which occurred up to, and 
including, the one in 1985, can all be seen to have had the 
effect of either accelerating the delivery of weapons already 
ordered, or, creating a requirement for additional ones. In 
response to the first major incursion by PAVN units into 
Thailand in June 1980, for example, the US agreed to 
immediately expedite the deliveries of small arms, artillery, 
51 See FEER, 26 January, 1979, p. 12. 
52 Tim Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-1981: Military Responses 
To Indochina? (Working Paper No. 88), (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1984), p. 32. 
The decision to turn down Thailand's request for F-16s was also undoubtedly a result of 
the controls on arms transfers contained within Presidential Directive 13. For details 
of this directive and its various controls see Joanna Spear, Carter and Arms Sales. 
Implementing the Carter Administration's Arms Transfer Restraint Eolicy, (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 86-95. Rather oddly, Spear makes no reference at all to US 
arms transfer policy towards Thailand during the Carter administration. 
53 Although the Thai military was anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with the 
PAVN where possible, particularly in view of the fear of any escalation, it was 
committed to a policy of 'resisting pusuit by force'. If this should occur, then it would 
prefer to rely on the use of artillery and air strikes. See FEER, 11 May, 1979, p. 8 and 8 
August, 1985, p. 12. 
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and the remaining 35 M48A5 MBTs. 54 Symbolically, 12 
months after this incursion the Vietnamese threatened to 
repeat it (if the Thais tried to repatriate Khmer refugees 
without Phnom Penh's approval) and, more ominously, the 
Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister stated that PAVN 
commanders were "now authorised to cross the border into 
Thailand in pursuit of resistance forces. "55 
It was not until April 1983, however, when a large Vietnamese 
offensive (the culmination of a major build-up of forces in 
Western Cambodia) was mounted against Khmer Rouge 
bases along the Thai-Cambodian border, that the explicit 
threat to Thailand's territorial integrity was realised. The 
PAVN attack on the Khmer Rouge saw artillery fire directed 
into Thailand, with a subsequent gound attack by tank-led 
infantry crossing the border in some places and Vietnamese 
units taking up positions in Thai territory to cut off Khmer 
Rouge escape routes. 56 The Thais responded to these attacks 
with artillery fire and, for the first time, used aircraft to carry 
out strikes on PAVN positions inside Thailand. 57 In terms of 
weapons acquisitions the US again expedited the deliveries of 
weapons already ordered including 'Redeye' SAMs (surface- 
to air missiles) and the newer M-198 155mm howitzers. 58and 
subsequent to this clash, during which the Thais had been at a 
disadvantage during artillery exchanges with the PAVN's 130 
and 155mm artillery pieces, the Thais placed an order for 
more of the M-198s. 59 
54 Randolph, ol2. cit. p. 222. 
55 FEER, 12 June, 1981, p. 12. 
56 See FEER, 12 June, 1981, pp. 14-15. 
57 These aircraft, according to the Far Eastern EconomicReview, were 
F-5Es, although 
Indorf states that OV-10s were also involved. See ýibid. p. 15 and Indorf, op. cit. p. 
27. 
Hitherto, during the operations after the 1980 incursion, helicopter gunships had 
been 
used to provide air support. See FEER 4 July, 1980, p. 
15. 
58 Randolph, gp-cit,., p. 226. An earlier refusal by the Americans to supply 
'Redeyes' 
had led Thailand to order 100 (? ) 'Blowpipe' SAMs in 1981. See Michael Brzoska 
and Thomas Ohlson, Arm-, Transfers To The 
Third World, 1971-1985, (Oxford: 
SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1987), Appendix 1, p. 260. A further 50 
'Blowpipes'were ordered in 1982. 
59 The M-198s had a longer range (18,150m) and a higher rate of 
fire (4 rounds per 
minute) than the older M-114s 
(14,955m and I rpm). See Ian V. Hogg, Artillery 2000 
(London: Arms & Armour Press, 1990), Current Artillery 
Equipment, p. 153. 
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The need for this longer range artillery was clearly 
demonstrated during the Vietnamese operations against the 
Khmer Rouge Base 1003 (some two miles inside Thai territory) 
a year later, when Thai forces were hampered in their efforts 
to dislodge PAVN units from hills inside Thailand by 
Vietnamese long-range artillery fire. 60 
The Vietnamese dry season offensive in 1985 saw cross-border 
activities at their highest level recorded, with frequent 
Vietnamese attacks on Thai forces, villages and aircraft 
occurring and PAVN units occupying positions up to a mile 
inside Thailand in the Trat salient. 61 This high level of 
activity would certainly have influenced the decision by the 
Chinese to supply Thailand with Type 69 MBTs and Type 59/1 
130mm guns (although the actual timing of their supply 
cannot be confirmed). The Chinese also played a more 
proactive role in Thailand's defence at this time. They 
mounted cross-border raids into northern Vietnam to exert 
pressure on the Vietnamese to desist from their activity across 
the Thai-Cambodian border, which was in keeping with the 
past Chinese practice of shelling Vietnamese positions across 
the Sino-Vietnamese border in response to Vietnam's 
incursions into Thai territory. 62 Moreover,, the intensity of 
Vietnamese aggression was also of increasing concern to the 
US and it undoubtedly influenced the decision by Congress not 
to place obstacles in the way of the sale of F-16As and 
AN/TPQ-36 counter battery radars to Thailand. 63 
The intensity of Vietnamese activity in 1985, when added to 
the fact that the CPT insurgency was rapidly approaching its 
denouement, appeared to bring about a change in Thailand's 
60 See FEER, 19 April, 1984, p. 15. 
61 See FEER 4 July, 1985, p. 36 and 23 May, 1985, p. 56. 
62 See FEER, 5 May, 1983, p. 42 and 21 March, 1985, p. 50. 
63 Although, for the purposes of this study, they are not included in major weapons 
acquisitions, the three AN/TPQ-36s ordered 
by Thailand were a significant 
acquisition because of their ability to enhance 
the effectiveness of the M-198s the 
Thais had ordered. With an ability to cover an area along the 
border of some 10-12 
km, the radars would be able to calculate the positions of 
Vietnamese guns from the 
incoming rounds and then "provide [Thai] gunners with six-digit coordinates" of 
those 
positions. FEER, 17 
October, 1985, p. 43. 
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perceptions of the Vietnamese threat and in the modus 
operandi for responding to incursions. Towards the end of the year,, the Thais were reported to have it changed their rules 
of engagement to ensure a more effective response to any [future] Vietnamese cross-border strike it / 64and according to one Thai military source the Thais were developing plans for 
a "substantial counterattack". 65 This more robust posture fitted in with the increasing attention which was being paid to Vietnamese intentions. In the planning stages for the 6th 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991) the threat 
from insurgencies was played down and that from external 
sources highlighted, particularly the likelihood of Vietnamese border incursions "motivated by a desire to suppress 
Cambodian resistance activities or to hold pieces of Thai 
territory for bargaining. "66 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the announcement by the 
Army Commander, General Chaovalit, in February 1987 of a future modernisation programme for the army (based around 
the desire to develop a 'deterrent' capability through a 
capacity for offensive operations entailing cross-border 
strikes) was predicated on the belief that Vietnam would not 
pose a serious threat for the next five years due to its current 
economic problems. In other words, the modernisation 
programme was more to deal with a future threat than an 
existing one. 67 
64 FEER 12 December, 1985, p. 26. 
65 Cited Ibid. p. 27. 
66 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op. cit. p. 90. 
Thai fears were partially realised in 1987, which saw a three month campaign over 
Chong Bok, when the Vietnamese displayed a new tactic of seizing strategic high 
ground on Thai territory in order to stop Khmer resistance infiltration into Cambodia 
(and possibly as a preparation for "deeper probes " into Thailand). FEER 30 April, 
1987, p. 28. One RTA Regional Commander even went so far as to state that the PAVN 
campaign at Chong Bok was part of an attempt by the Vietnamese to annex 
Thailand's 17 (sic) north-eastern provinces for part of an Indo-China Federation. See 
FEER 9 July, 1987, p. 35. 
67 See FEER, 19 February, 1987, pp. 26-27. As events turned out, this assessment was 
correct in one sense: by December that year Vietnam had begun to withdraw its forces 
from along the Thai-Cambodian border, partly as a result of its increasing economic 
difficulties. 
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At the heart of the modernisation programme, and in order to 
create an offensive capability, was the plan to upgrade two of 
the infantry divisions tasked with the defence of the eastern 
border into mechanised units, and to provide additional tanks 
for the two cavalry divisions. In 1987, therefore, Thailand 
ordered Chinese Type 69-11 MBTs and YW531H APCs, and 
American 'Stingray' light tanks and M48A5 MBTs. 68 followed 
with a further order for Type 69s in 1988. The strengthening 
of Thailand's offensive capability was also evident in the 1988 
order for AH-1G attack helicopters, which were to be armed 
with 'TOW-2' anti-tank missiles. 
Although the modernisation programme was meant to be a 
response to concerns about future Vietnamese capabilities, in 
the short-term,, as Tim Huxley notes, it was actually made 
imperative by the poor showing of Thai forces in their 
attempts to dislodge Laotian forces from a disputed mountain 
area near Ban Rom Klao in late 1987-early 
1988.69 
By late 1988, however, the relevance of external threat 
assessment as a significant influence on Thai arms 
acquisitions was rapidly diminishing as the evolution of the 
Cambodian peace process occurred and the force interface 
with Vietnam was effectively ending with the withdrawals of 
Vietnamese troops. Moreover, there was also a shift in Thai 
security policy vis-a-vis Indo-China as part of a reorientation 
of security policy towards the economic sphere. 70 The 
rationale for the ongoing modernisation programme, 
therefore, in terms of the external dimension, was 
subsequently to shift into the realm of strategic objectives. 
A major factor underlying the Vietnamese decision to 
withdraw from Cambodia was the pressure put upon it to do 
68 The 'Stingrays' met both the RTA's existing requirement for a manoeuvrable light 
tank more suited to Thai terriain than the heavier M48s and the growing need to 
replace the increasingly obsolescent M41s in the Ist 
Cavalry Division's inventory. 
See FEER 12 July, 1984, p. 14 and 30 March, 1989, p. 19. 
69 Tim Huxley, "The ASEAN States' Defence Policies: Influences and Outcomes", in 
Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolls (eds. ), Post-Cold War Security Issues In The Asia- 
Paci fjc-ýý 
(London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 149. 
70 See Mark G. Rolls, "Thailand's Post- Cold War Security Policy and Defence 
Programme", in McInnes and Rolls, op. cit. p. 98. 
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so by the Soviet Union as the latter sought to re-establish 
Sino-Soviet ties and, after 1986 especially, build new 
relationships with the non-Communist SE Asian states. 
Associated with the shift in Soviet policy towards Vietnam 
and the wider region was a reduction in the Soviet military 
presence which had been centred around deployments to 
bases in Vietnam. 71 By late 1989, therefore, Thai concerns 
about Soviet capabilities had more or less dissipated, with the 
Thai Foreign Minister, Siddhi Savetsila, stating that the 
Soviet withdrawals "would help ease our suspicions and 
reduce tension in the region". 72 
Prior to the shift in Soviet policy and the associated 
withdrawals, however, and particularly in the years 
immediately following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 
the Thais had been concerned about Soviet capabilities too. 
This was not just because of Soviet backing for Vietnamese 
expansionism: the Thai National Security Council Chief, 
Squadron Leader Prasong, stating in 1981 that "the Soviet 
Union is making use of Vietnamese expansionism... to further 
its own goals in the area .... "73 Thai arms acquisitions, therefore, in certain cases, can also be seen as a reaction to the 
deployment by the Soviet Union of its capabilities in the 
region. It is, though, difficult to disentangle reactions to 
Soviet air and naval deployments from reactions to the 
broader nature of the Vietnamese threat itself, especially 
when this enters the domain of Thai maritime security. 
As will be explored in more detail in the context of the 
influence of strategic requirements on the various states' arms 
acquisitions, the Second Cold War period coincided with an 
increasing focus by SE Asian states on the various aspects of 
maritime security. In particular, these aspects centred 
around "the protection of offshore resources, [the] 
71 The Soviet ambassador to the Philippines stating in a speech in Manila in 
February 1990, that between 1984 and 1987 Soviet naval forces in the Pacific had been 
reduced by some 57 ships and submarines and that MiG-23 fighters and Tu-16 
bombers 
had now been withdrawn from Vietnam. Reuter Textline I February, 1990. 
72 Cited Michael Richardson, "Major changes in power balance as Soviets withdraw 
from Cam Ranh", Pacific Defence Reporter, March, 1990, p. 14. For details of the 
Soviet withdrawals from Vietnam see ibid. pp. 13-14. 
,6 March, 
1981, p. 15. 73 Cited FEER 
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demarcation of maritime boundaries and [the] defence of claims over disputed islands. "74 Furthermore, as Acharya 
notes, these aspects were inextricably interconnected with the 
wider issue of the security of vital SLOCs (sea lines of 
communication)75: an issue which was clearly affected by the Soviet naval presence. 
Thailand was no exception to this pattern of an increasing focus on martime security. The security of the Gulf of Thailand, especially, was accorded greater significance because of its resource potential and because of the existence 
of disputes with Vietnam over maritime boundaries. These 
boundary disputes having their inherent conflict potential 
magnified by the Vietnamese behaviour displayed towards 
Thailand during operations in Cambodia. Thai concerns 
about the Gulf were also exacerbated by the rapid naval build-up pursued by Vietnam between 1979 and 1983 
(particularly in terms of fast attack craft) which threatened to 
create a capability gap where previously a rough parity had 
existed. Moreover, any concerns about a capability gap were 
clearly aggravated by the increasing numbers of Soviet 
warships in Vietnamese (and Cambodian) waters after 1979 
which also had the potential to threaten Thai security in the 
Gulf of Thailand. 76 
The Thai response to the need to protect its interests in the 
Gulf of Thailand, and the attendant reaction to the threat 
posed by Vietnamese and Soviet naval capabilities, was 
twofold. First, to develop its naval capabilities. Secondly, to 
develop its aerial maritime reconnaissance capabilities 
74 Amitav Acharya, "Arms Proliferation Issues in ASEAN: Towards a More 
'Conventional' Defence Posture? ", Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 10, No. 3, 
December 1988, p. 245. 
75 Ibid. p. 247. 
76 In the wake of a visit in late October 1980 by the Soviet carrier Minsk to the 
Cambodian port of Kompong Som, during which it sailed close to the Thai coast, there 
were fears expressed by the Thais that the Gulf of Thailand "could become a focus of 
future Soviet attention if there was a perceived need to apply more pressure on the 
Thais over the Cambodian issue. " FEER, 9 October, 1982, p. 28. 
In 1982, US intelligence sources noted that Soviet vessels "including one attack cruise- 
missile submarine, one major and two minor surface combatants, an oiler, an 
intelligence gatherer, a buoy tender, a repair ship and a stores vessel, currently use 
Cam Rai-ih Bay on ... a continual 
basis. " Ibid--, p. 27. 
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(although this also has to be seen in the context of the inter- 
related problems of the continuing exodus of refugees from Vietnam and the increasing incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Thailand). 77 
In terms of naval capabilities, a limited build-up was pursued 
centred around the acquisition of more fast attack and patrol 
craft (MV-400s and 'Sattahip' class patrol vessels) and, 
notably, two missile corvettes. These corvettes were., 
significantly, capable of both surface and sub-surface warfare 
which was an indication that they were, partially, a reaction 
to Soviet capabilities (the Vietnamese navy not possessing a 
submarine warfare capability). 78 Although the build-up was limited, mine warfare capabilities were also bolstered with 
two West German minehunters being ordered in 1984-85 and 
the amphibious side of naval operations was not neglected 
either with orders in the same period for two LSTs (landing 
ship, tank) - these ships being ordered at a time when Thai 
defence planners were concerned about the threat which 
Vietnamese amphibious forces might pose to the "vulnerable" 
Trat salient. 79 
Aerial maritime reconnaissance capabilities, representing a 
cost effective response, were expanded considerably with 
77 Richardson notes the comments of UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) 
officials who "said piracy in the Gulf of Thailand first became a serious problem in 
1978 as the number of refugees leaving southern Vietnam in small boats grew. " 
Michael Richardson, "ASEAN and Indo-Chinese Refugees", in Alison Broinowski 
(ed. ), Understanding ASEAN (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 110. The UNHCR's 
concerns were subsequently to see it fund the acquisition by Thailand of a'Nomad 
Searchmaster' maritime reconnaissance aircraft specifically to conduct anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf. 
78 The Thai reaction to the deployment of Soviet submarines can also be seen in the 
order placed in 1984 for advanced 'Stingray'torpedos to arm the 'Makut Rajakumarn' 
frigate (previously not equipped for anti-submarine warfare); although it has also 
been suggested that this order was not unrelated to concerns at this time about the 
possible future development of a Vietnamese submarine capability. These concerns 
arose from the presence of a Russian Whisky' class submari-ne at Cam Ranh Bay 
whose purpose appeared to be "to provide initial training for potential Vietnamese 
submariners" and the arrival of more of the type to apparently provide "sea training" 
opportunities. Desmond Wettern, "Soviet submarines for Vietnam, but wither 
Admiral Gorshkov? ", Pacific Defence Reporter March 1985, p. 14. 
,8 
August, 1985, pp. 12-13. The Thai Marines received additional LVTP7 79 FEER 
amphibious vehicles in 1984 when units were positioned in the salient to combat 
Vietnamese cross-border incursions there. 
50 
orders for Model 337 'Skymasters', F27-200 'Maritime 
Enforcers' (which were eventually armed with 'Harpoon' 
anti-ship missiles) and F27-40OMs, plus the receipt of four N24A 'Nomad Searchmasters' from Australia under the Defence Co-operation Programme between the two states. 
Thai concerns about Soviet capabilities in the Gulf of 
Thailand also extended to air operations. Most notably, 
those by Tu-95D reconnaissance aircraft which were reported 
in early 1981 as having been flying "electronic eavesdropping 
missions" over the Gulf from their base at Da Nang. 80 In 
addition to their role in monitoring the movements of the US 
7th Fleet, the Thais were concerned that they were capable of 
"monitoring insecure land-based military transmissions" 
too. 81 The Israeli IAI-201 aircraft acquired by Thailand in the 
early 1980s, with their capacity for electronic 
countermeasures,, could assist in countering this, although 
their primary function was gathering intelligence in the 
border area between Thailand and Cambodia. 
Soviet air capabilities in Vietnam were not just limited to 
reconnaissance aircraft, but also included combat aircraft. By 
1983 a squadron of Tu-16 bombers was based at Cam Ranh 
Bay and in 1985 a squadron of MiG-23 fighters was 
operational there too. 82 The MiG-23 deployment is 
particularly interesting because it encapsulates the nexus of 
Soviet and Vietnamese capabilities in Thai threat perceptions 
and because it is thought, erroneously, to represent a clear At-v\ 
example of an action-reaction process over a single weapons J 
system (that is, advanced combat aircraft). 
80 FEER 6 March, 1981, p. 14. These Tu-95s were seen in their 11 most northerly 
overflight", in the northern Gulf, in late July 1984. EEt=LE*=iRM/ 23 August, 1984, p. 11. 
81 FEER 6 March, 1981, p. 14. 
82 There were Thai claims, based on radar observations of Vietnamese airspace, that 
the MiG-23s were operational as early as the beginning of 1984, although the 
Americans did not concur with this. See FEER 5 April, 1984, p. 43. It seems more 
probable that whilst the aircraft may have arrived in Vietnam at the end of 1984, 
they were not actually fully operational until the following year. In February 1985 
it was reported by a Royal Thai Air Force spokesman that a 
MiG-23 "had been 
detected on radar landing at Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport". Michael 
Richardson, "The F-16 for South-East Asia: Arms Race or strategic balance? ", Pacific 
pefence Reporter, May 1985, p. 17. 
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The deployment of Soviet MiG-23s to Vietnam, at a time of heightened Vietnamese activity across the Thai-Cambodian border, was effectively the triggering action which led the US finally to approve the supply of F-16As to Thailand (Thailand having made a second request for the aircraft in December 1983). Significantly, and this is indicated in the date of the Thai request -which was well before the arrival of the MiG- 23s, the actual deployment of the MiGs was not the action 
which led the Thais to order F-16s. Instead., it represented 
the culmination of more long-standing Thai fears about the imbalance between the RTAF and the VPAF (Vietnamese 
People's Air Force) and about the presence of Soviet aircraft in Vietnam. The arrival of the Soviet MiG-23s in Vietnam, it 
was thought by the Thais, was a prelude to the Soviet Union 
making the aircraft available to Vietnam and thus a further increase in the capability gap. Their arrival also meant that 
the Soviets would be able to enter Thai airspace virtually 
unchallenged because the RTAF's F-5s (of which more had 
been ordered in 1984 (? )) would not be capable of intercepting 
them. 83 
The decision to acquire the F-16, therefore, an aircraft which 
was well regarded for its multi-role capabilites, resulted from 
Thailand's need for it to meet a number of requirements. 
First, in terms of air defence, the F-16 was intended to act as a 
deterrent to Soviet air incursions and any potential ones by 
the VPAF. Secondly, in its ground attack role, the F-16 was 
meant to reduce the imbalance somewhat by providing the 
RTAF with the capacity to mount "offensive counter-air" 
operations against Vietnamese aircraft on the ground. 84 
Thirdly, and this reinforces an earlier point about the multi- 
role nature of many modern conventional weapons, the F-16 
was also able to fulfil the RTAF's long-standing requirement 
for a close ground support aircraft capable of operating in a 
'conventional' warfare environment (unlike the T-33s and 
83 See FEER, 30 May, 1985, p. 45. The RTAF had drawn attention to the numerical 
imbalance in aircraft between Thailand and Vietnam during its lobbying of the 
Americans in 1984: an imbalance which was also of concern to the US. See 
Richardson, The F-16 for South-East Asia p. 17 and Michael Richardson, "F-16As for 
Thailand? ", Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1984, p. 52. 
84 FEER, 25 October, 1984, p. 50. The requirement for such a capability was clearly 
indicated by the related order for 'Maverick' missiles to arm the F-16s with. 
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OV-10s designed for a counter-insurgency one). 85 It is also 
evident that the extended range of the F-16A meant it was 
well suited for air patrols over the Gulf of Thailand too. In 
this regard, Khatharya Um has gone as far as saying that the 
need to provide improved "air security" over the Gulf (and the 
Andaman Sea) was an "objective" which the acquisition of the 
F-16 was meant tofUlfil. 86 Although maritime security was 
becoming increasingly important,, the more pressing need at 
the time Thailand requested the F-16 for an improved air 
defence and ground support capability would suggest that this 
was only a subsidiary requirement. 
Vietnam 
One of the arguments put forward in the US by the opponents 
of the sale of F-16s to Thailand (or any other ASEAN state) 
was that their sale could have a triggering action leading 
Vietnam to request the supply of MiG-23s from the Soviet 
Union: a view which appeared to be lent substance by a 
commentary in the Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan which stated 
that their acquisition would be taken as a signal of Thailand's 
'hostility' towards Indo-China. 87 Supporters of the sale, 
however, argued that it would have no such triggering 
effects. Richard Armitage, for example, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated 
in his testimony to a Congressional committee that: "It is our 
conviction that MiG-23 aircraft would be available to 
Vietnam whether or not Thailand or other ASEAN countries 
procured an FX or an advanced aircraft. Therefore, a 
decision to sell ... 
(advanced) aircraft to ASEAN countries 
would not necessarily be a catalyst to an escalation of the 
arms race. "88 
85 See FEER, 29 December, 1983, p-16. For a ground support role the F-16 could be 
fitted with a number of armaments including a Vulcan 20mm cannon, rockets, and a 
variety of bombs. 
86 Khatharya Urn, "Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex in 
Mainland Southeast Asia", Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 13, No. 3, December 
1991, p. 265. 
87 See Richardson, F-16As for Thailand? p. 50. 
88 Cited, jb)-i-d-L, p. 52. 
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The thinking behind Armitage's statement contains an 
element which is crucial for our analysis of the relevance of 
external threat assessment as an influence on Vietnam's arms 
acquisitions: namely, that Vietnamese arms acquisitions were 
often influenced by the policy of its patron,, the Soviet Union. 
The statement also implies that Vietnam did not take 
Thailand's capability (or that of any of the other ASEAN 
states) into account in its threat calculations. 
Indeed, for Vietnam, Thailand constituted neither a clearly 
identifiable threat nor a state with which it was engaged in a 
high level of military competition. There was, therefore, no 
action-reaction process with Thailand, irrespective of any 
changes in Thai capability. It is also arguable that even if 
Thailand had entered into Vietnamese threat calculations,, the 
overwhelming military superiority which Vietnam enjoyed for 
most of the Second Cold War period meant that it "may [have] 
be[en] able to tolerate some disproportion in the magnitude of 
the measures taken by itself and its rival. "89 
For Vietnam, it goes without saying, any concerns at all about 
a threat from Thailand in the west were presumably almost 
completely overshadowed by the threat from China in the 
north, especially after the punitive invasion of Vietnam by the 
PLA (People's Liberation Army) in February 1979. 
This invasion, and the subsequent cross-border fighting which 
occurred in the years thereafter, was the direct result of the 
competition between China and Vietnam for influence over 
Cambodia and Indo-China as a whole. The competition was 
underpinned by historical antagonisms and unresolved border 
disputes, and aggravated by the introduction of the Soviet 
Union into the regional power equation as a result of its ties 
with Vietnam. 90 
The Chinese invasion, in Vietnamese eyes, not only 
demonstrated that China was a clear threat and military 
competitor, but also the readily apparent danger of the force 
89Buzan, An ntroduction to Strategic Studies p. 85. 
90 For analysis of these various issues see Charles McGregor, The 
Sino-Vietnamese 
ie Soviet Union Adelphi Paper 232, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988). 
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interface between them across their shared land border (an interface existing in the South China Sea too). It highlighted 
too, the large, quantitative,, capability gap between them and brought about a clear reaction in terms of the strengthening of Vietnam's conventional warfare capabilities in preparation for any future war with China; although it was not expected 
that China would actually repeat its first 'lesson 
Subsequent changes in China's capability, one of the 'lessons' 
for the PLA from the invasion being the need to modernise its 
own major weapons., 91 however, elicited little or no response 
after the initial build-up of Vietnam's own capabilities. 
The major reason, it appears, for this limited response lay in 
the changing policy of the Soviet Union - on whom Vietnam 
was totally dependent for its major weapons - towards China in the mid-1980s and, by implication, towards Vietnam too. 
Thus, we return to the earlier point about the significance of 
the policy of its Soviet supplier for Vietnam's arms 
acquisitions. 
A convincing case can be made, in fact, that although the 
pressure of the external threat from China is relevant to 
Vietnamese arms acquisitions, this has to be considered in 
conjunction with Soviet policy. In effect, the Vietnamese 
reaction to the Chinese threat was contingent upon the Soviet 
Union's assessment of China and that the arms transfers that 
the Soviet Union made to Vietnam were determined as much 
by the Soviet Union's requirements as by Vietnam's. This was 
particularly so, Pike notes, in the areas of air defence and 
naval capabilities. 92 In other words, Soviet arms to Vietnam 
for the purposes of defence against China were meant to fulfil 
both Vietnamese and Soviet requirements. In this respect, 
Pike goes as far as to contend that: 
Analysis of -the kinds of weapons the USSR supplies 
to Vietnam suggests a dual purpose - to increase 
91 Details of the various lessons for the PLA from the invasion are given 
by Harlan 
W. Jencks, "Lessons of a 'Lesson': China-Vietnam, 1979", in Robert E. Harkavy and 
Stephanie G. Neuman (eds. ), The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume 
L (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 148-153. 
92 See Douglas Pike, Vietnam And The Soviet Union. Anatomy Of An Alliance 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p-197. 
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Vietnam's defensive capability against China and to increase the USSR's offensive capability against China. Soviet generals, seemingly determined to 
pass on to the Vietnamese some of the burden of 
containing China, have assigned them specific 
missions and given them the military hardware 
required to perform such missions. 93 
In terms of our analysis of the pressure of external threat 
assessment, therefore, this nexus between Vietnamese and 
Soviet requirements would appear to make it more 
appropiate to assess the major weapons acquired by Vietnam 
in the context of the later chapter on the role of the suppliers. 
For the remaining states under consideration the relevance of 
external threat assessment is not so clear-cut as in the cases of 
Thailand and Vietnam. It is of either indirect relevance, 
essentially being limited to a short-term catalyst (Singapore 
and Malaysia), or, not relevant at all (Indonesia and Burma). 
On first appearances, though, Singapore and Malaysia, 
according to conventional wisdom, are usually grouped with 
Thailand in the sense that the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia provided a clearly identifiable threat which led to a 
reaction in terms of arms acquisitions. Such thinking is 
implied by Mak, for example, when he contends that the 
invasion "was arguably the single most important factor 
which triggered the first big conventional ... arms 
build-up 
within ASEAN because of the perceived need to at least deter 
any overland Vietnamese attack. "94 And it is made more 
explicit by Denoon who states that "interviews with 
government officials and strategists from the three countries 
confirm that military decisions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s were designed to deal specifically with potential 
Vietnamese aggression. "95 
93 Ibid. p-199. 
94 Mak, Qp-. -ci-t--, p. 
4. 
95 David B. H. Denoon, "Defence Spending in ASEAN: An Overview", in Chin, QP. 
cit., pp. 66-67. 
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More appropiately, perhaps, Singapore and Malaysia should 
be compared with Thailand in the sense that the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia provided an impetus (albeit of a 
shorter duration) to ongoing processes of modernisation. 
External threat assessment, therefore, as an individual 
pressure cannot easily or usefully be clearly separated from 
the broader requirements of defence policy and strategy. 
Singapore 
In terms of Singapore's threat perceptions, following the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia "Singapore's leaders ... 
emphasized the external threat to the country's national 
security as emanating from Vietnam. "96 Moreover, in a 
similar vein to Thailand, for Singapore the Vietnamese threat 
had also to be seen in conjunction with the Soviet Union's 
increased role in the region and its search for global 
dominance. Thus, in the minds of the Singaporean 
leadership, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a year later were part of "the 
same overall pattern of aggression. "97 According to Tilman, 
the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's view on this 
was that: "The USSR [was] ... intent on world 
domination, 
and the invasions of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and 
Kampuchea and Laos by Vietnam, [were] ... part of this 
strategy. "98 
Vietnam's invasion, and its ties with the Soviet Union, were 
essentially an actualization of long-standing Singaporean 
concerns about the threat to its survival that would be posed 
by any regional instability: instability which could result from 
disruption, or military confrontation near its borders, brought 
about by its neighbours and/or external powers. 99 
Singapore's security thinking after the invasion, therefore, 
saw the defence of Thailand as crucial for Singapore's 
96 Lau Teik Soon, "National Threat Perceptions of Singapore", in Morrison, op. cit. 
p. 122. 
97 FEER, 26 September, 1980, p. 12. 
98 Tilman, W-. cit_, p. 71. 
99 lbid_., p. 48. 
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security. 100 In effect, it could be contended that despite the 
absence of a Vietnamese power projection capability there 
was some form of force interface in existence between Singapore and Vietnam. 
Despite this interface, however, in terms of the manifestation 
of threat as capability, from Singapore's perspective this was 
essentially limited to one category - combat aircraft - and 
resulted from the linkage of Vietnamese and Soviet capability. 
In this regard, Chin Kin Wah notes that the Soviet- 
Vietnamese alliance, and the associated presence of Soviet 
aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay (particularly the long-range Tu- 
16s) and modernisation of the VPAF, "increased Singapore's 
sense of vulnerability with respect to air defence. "10, 
The orders for 'I-Hawk' and RBS-70 SAM, and 'Rapier' AD 
(air defence), systems between 1979 and 1981, along with the 
order for F-5Es in 1980, can be seen partially as a reaction to 
these Soviet and Vietnamese capabilities. The process of 
improving Singapore's air defence system,, as part of its 
overall defence strategy., however, was also an ongoing one. 
Thus, these acquisitions have also to be seen in the context of 
a pattern of "incremental additions to provide greater depth 
to capabilities already in existence' '102: a point which is also 
valid with regard to later acquisitions in these categories. 
Mala 
The idea of ongoing efforts to improve elements of 
conventional capability, and the need to see any reaction to 
the Vietnamese invasion in the context of these, is equally 
applicable to Malaysia. This is particularly so because of the 
apparently causal relationship between the invasion and the 
100 This concern was apparently given substance by the dispatch of Singapore 
commandos to Thailand to assist in the defence of the Thai border. Discussion with 
former SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) NCO, April 1997. 
101 Chin Kin Wah, "Singapore: Threat Perception and Defence Spending in a City- 
State", in Chin, op. cit. p. 199. The defection of a Vietnamese airliner to Singapore in 
November 1979 with little warning, he recognises, only aggravated this sense. Ibid. 
102 Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81 p. 43. 
58 
V"O 
precipitate defence expansion programme which Malaysia 
embarked upon between 1979 and 1981.103 
Although it is undeniable that the Vietnamese invasion and 
the concomitant threat posed to Thailand's security were "unsettling" for Malaysia, and thus needed to be taken 
account of in Malaysia's national security calculations, 104 it is 
far less obvious that the invasion created an action-reaction 
process: one which led to arms acquisitions by Malaysia based 
on the emergence of a clearly identifiable threat and thus 
concerns about Vietnam's capabilities. It has been suggested, 
in fact,, that the Vietnamese invasion provided the "final 
catalyst" for ongoing moves to develop conventional warfare 
capabilities. 105 
Certainly, it would be fair to say that the Vietnamese invasion 
heightened existing, and growing, perceptions of external 
threat and gave greater impetus to the ongoing attempts to 
develop conventional warfare capabilites. Thus, as Tim 
Huxley contends, although the invasion heightened concerns, 
"the military expansion programme was justified in terms of 
the need to be prepared to face a much wider range of military 
contingencies than had been thought likely in the past" rather 
than with reference to a Vietnamese threat. 106 Indeed, in this 
respect, PERISTA was motivated as much by wider strategic 
objectives as it was by a clearly identifiable threat; although 
the two were clearly linked to some extent because of 
Malaysian concerns about possible Vietnamese activity in the 
South China Sea and the general instability in the region 
resulting from the invasion and occupation of Cambodia. 
103 The basis of this expansion lay in the long-term Special Expansion Plan of the 
Armed Forces (PERISTA). This plan aimed to develop and re-orientate the 
Malaysian Armed Forces to fulfil a number of conventional capabilites in addition to 
their counter-insurgency role. The first phase of the plan was timetabled for 1979- 
1983. For further details, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Malaysia: From the 
Commonwealth Umbrella to Self-Reliance", in Chin, Defence Spending in Southeast 
Asia pp. 183-185. 
104 Ibid. p. 183. 
105 Mak, Qp. cit., p. 128. 
106 Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-1981 p. 35. 
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Significantly for an assessment of the impact of the Vietnamese invasion as an external threat leading to arms 
acquisitions by Malaysia, much of the defence expansion plan initially outlined (not all of it was actually implemented due to 
financial constraints after 1980/81) was in the areas of 
personnel and infrastructure and not in major weapons. 
Even those weapons ordered in the early 1980s, for which 
money was made available under the defence expansion plan, 
which might have been thought to have been influenced by, 
and designed to counter, Vietnamese capabilities (most 
notably the orders for various APCs) were already decided 
upon in 1977-78.107 The requirement for them was influenced 
by a variety of factors and not just those relating to the idea of 
an external threat. Particularly notable in view of Thailand 
and Singapore's concerns about Vietnamese and Soviet air 
capabilities, was the fact that under PERISTA no fighter 
aircraft were acquired. 108 In fact, the only acquisition by 
Malaysia which appears to have been (at least partially) 
influenced by Vietnamese - ground - capabilities, was the 
order for an unknown number of SS-11 ATGWs which were 
delivered in 1979. These obviously had no real utility for 
anything other than operations against armoured forces. 
Even the influence of the external threat from Vietnam as a 
catalyst for Malaysia's defence expansion was relatively 
short-lived. By 1981, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. 
Mahathir, had declared that: I do not think [the Vietnamese] 
will have much time for a lot of adventures outside of 
Vietnam. I do not think it is their intention to invade 
Asean. "109 Downplaying any threat from Vietnam was also 
107 In announcing the large expansion plan under the 4th Malaysia Plan, the Prime 
Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn, made it clear that the expansion was decided upon 
earlier - especially for the air force - but was "accelerated" 
by the Vietnamese 
invasion. Straits Times, 5 July, 1980, p. I 
108 Malaysia had intended to acquire an additional squadron of F-5Es under the first 
phase of PERISTA but this purchase was postponed in 1982 in the wake of the 1981 
economic downturn. See Alagappa, op. cit. p. 188. The planned purchase of the F-5Es 
contradicts his earlier point the the RMAF's planned development under the first 
phase had "[n]o provision ... for increasing the numbers of 
fighter interceptor 
aircraft. " Ibid. p. 185. Alagappa does point out, however, that the two RF-5Es 
ordered in 1980 for "tactical reconnaissance" enhanced Malaysia's air defence 
capabilites. Ibid. 
109 The comment made during a visit to Jakarta in August 1981. Cited FEER 21 
August, 1981, p. 14. 
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compatible with Malaysia's more long-run threat 
perceptions, which tended to regard China as the "greatest long-term threat". 110 The threat from China, however, was primarily in the context of Malaysia's internal security, and thus China did not constitute a military competitor whose 
capabilities were a source of concern for Malaysia in the sense employed here. 
Indonesia and Burma 
The thinking displayed by Malaysia about the threat from China also helps to explain why the influence of external 
threat assessment is non-existent on Indonesian arms 
acquisitions. For Indonesia, China was also regarded as the "most serious external threat facing [itf', "' although this too 
was related more to its perceived propensity to proffer 
support to communist elements within Indonesia than to 
concerns about its power projection capabilities and the need 
to react to them-112 
Moreover, this concern about China/ in tandem with the 
shared experience of an independence struggle (the primary 
influence on Indonesian foreign policy-making according to 
Tilman), 113meant that the Vietnamese invasion did not cause 
any of the sorts of concern in Indonesia that were evident in 
the cases of Thailand, Singapore and, less so, Malaysia. Not 
only was there no real geographical or power projection 
derived force interface between Indonesia and Vietnam - Indonesia being physically difficult for Vietnam to invade in 
any case - but Indonesia also viewed Vietnam's strategic 
ambitions as essentially being limited to Indo-China. These 
110 Zainal Abidin B. Abdul Wahid, "Malaysian Threat Perceptions and Regional 
Security", in Morrison, op. cit. p. 109. In this context it was actually thought that a 
11 stable, independent, and reasonably strong Vietnam" was in Malaysia's best 
interests as it "could serve as a buffer against China". Ibid. 
111 Tilman, op. cit. p. 87. A view which was confirmed in discusssions with the Vice- 
Governor of LEMHANNAS (Institute of National Resilience), Jakarta, January, 1996. 
112 China's propensity for internal interference was based on the experience of 1965 in 
which the PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party), in the 
view of Indonesian policy makers, received "massive support from the PRC" in the 
GESTAPU affair. Tilman, op. cit. p. 87. 
113 See Ibid.., p. 74. 
I- , 
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ambitions thus challenged those of Thailand as the - to borrow from Ayoob - sub-regional 'power centre',, 114and 
consequently did not constitute a threat to Indonesia's own 
regional power ambitions in maritime SE Asia. 
Lastly, the non-existent influence of external threat 
assessment in the case of Burma is for the rather different 
reason that the external dimension was virtually absent from 
the Burmese 'arms dynamic' during almost all the Second 
Cold War period: an absence which was clearly a function of 
the preoccupation with the internal security dimension, but 
also one of the complete lack of inter-state relationships 
between Burma and any other country. This lack of inter- 
state relationships, among other factors, also means that 
Burma merits little attention in the next chapter on the 
requirements of defence policy and strategy. 
Using the idea of an 'action-reaction' model characterised by 
a clearly identifiable threat and a high level of military 
competition as the basis for an evaluation of the influence of 
external threat assessment on arms acquisitions, it is evident 
that this pressure has only had a major effect in the case of 
Thailand (taking into account that Vietnam's reaction to the 
external threat posed by China was dependent upon the 
policy of its Soviet patron). Although both Malaysia and 
Singapore shared some of Thailand's concerns about the 
threat posed by Vietnam - and concomitantly the Soviet Union 
- this did not generally lead them to procure weapons. 
Instead, the Vietnamese threat acted as a reinforcement (and 
sometimes an accelerator) for ongoing procurement plans. 
The pressure for these states to acquire arms clearly lay 
elsewhere as, indeed, it did for Burma and Indonesia. 
114 The term 'regional power centre' is employed by Ayoob in his analysis of the 
effects of such states on regional security. 
Ayoob, op. cit. p-60. 
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Chapter III The Requirements of Defence Policy and Strategy 
The pressure to be considered here is, self-evidently, not a 
singular one like many of the others, but a binary one. Its binary, and expansive, nature is derived not only from the 
ongoing attempt to juxtapose the superpower derived 'arms 
dynamic' with the determinants of arms procurement in the developing world, but also from the internal logic of the thesis itself. It contains, therefore, elements which are widely 
acknowledged to influence arms acquisitions as well as those 
which are not. 
In the latter respect, this pressure can be regarded as a 
residual one as it encompasses some of those factors which 
are often overlooked in other analyses of arms procurement 
and which do not appear to fit clearly into any of the other 
pressures or factors. It highlights as well one of the 
weaknesses in seeking to apply the theory of the 'arms 
dynamic' derived from the superpowers' experience too 
rigidly to the regional, developing world, context. The sense 
of overwhelming threat which underpins that dynamic - even if it does not fully account for the production and acquisition 
of weapons - tends to mean that any non-threat strategic 
objectives are subsumed in it, rather than being considered on 
their own merits. In addition, the relevance of the less 
intense form of action- reaction - characterised by possible 
threats and low level competition - to other states is often 
neglected. 
The requirements of defence policy and strategy thus provides 
a way of linking elements of the superpower derived theory 
with the experiences of developing states. It acts as a bond 
too between the external dimension, the internal one, and the 
role of technology. Moreover, this pressure can also be 
regarded as a bond between the Second Cold War period and 
the years preceding and succeeding it, containing, as it does, 
vital elements of continuity and change. 
Defence policy and strategic requirements are, of course, 
inextricably linked. Defence policy is defined here as the 
acquisition, or maintenance, of a military capability in order 
to fulfil strategic objectives. These strategic objectives, in 
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turn, being determined by the priorities of threat assessment 
and the protection of vital national interests-' The pressure, therefore, essentially contains three aspects. First, the 
military capability of the state itself. Secondly, the possible threats which that state might face. And thirdly, the state's 
national interests. It is an assessment of the way in which 
each of these aspects can influence a state's arms acquisitions 
which constitutes the analytical approach to be employed in this chapter. 
To contend that a state's own military capability - both broadly and narrowly defined - influences its arms 
acquisitions may appear somewhat odd at first. As an influence on arms acquisitions, however, it is more or less 
constant in nature and can be seen in terms of being an 
important residual factor. Its influence on arms procurement 
can operate in two ways. 
First., at the start of the Second Cold War period each state 
possessed existing military capabilities in accordance with the 
requirements of defence policies determined by previous 
strategic objectives (and the influence of other pressures). 
There is, therefore,, an automatic continuity of capability from 
the pre-Second Cold War period to the Second Cold War 
period itself. In view of the propensity of states to seek to 
preserve a military capability once it has been established - in 
accordance with both the needs of long-term strategy and the 
same sort of 'organisational momentum' (or, rather, inertia) 
found in other areaS2 -a number of the weapons acquired by 
1 The definition of strategic objectives used here is partially derived from that used 
by Karp in his idea of 'national strategy' and partially from Synnot's analysis of the 
factors which go to make up medium powers' defence policy. See Aaron Karp, 
"Military Procurement and Regional Security in Southeast Asia", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia Vol. 11, No. 4, March 1990, pp. 337-338; and Admiral Sir Anthony 
Synnot, "The Determinants of Defence Policy for a Medium Military Power", in Robert 
O'Neill and D. M. Horner (eds. ), New Directions in Strategic Thinking (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 281-283. 
The classic definition of strategy is that it is to do with the connection between 
fmilitary power' and 'political purpose' or 'political objectives'. See Colin S. Gray, 
Strategic Studies (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 24; and John Garnett, 
"Strategic Studies and its Assumptions", in John Baylis et al., Conteml2orary 
Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 3. 
2 This has been discussed by Buzan in terms of the role of the Services in the domestic 
structure model and by Denoon in relation to the relatively constant defence 
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the states under consideration will have been obtained to 
maintain an already existent capability. This can occur through the replacement of written off or lost equipment; through the purchase of weapons to provide spare parts; or, through the replacement of obsolescent hardware3 (which can 
often actually extend existing capabilities, or, generate new 
ones). 
It will also be evident that (particularly in the more mundane 
categories of weapons such as transport and training aircraft 
and helicopters) a number of the items procured were intended to augment existing capabilities; enhance overall force structures; or, provide improved training opportunities. 
In addition, limited quantities of some weapons were 
procured to evaluate potential acquisitions. This was often - but not always - in order to maintain exisiting capabilities 
which were threatened with technological obsolescence. Into 
this bracket can be fitted Malaysia's order for four F-517 
fighters in 1979 and Thailand's for a single, refurbished, 
German M41 tank in 1984. Other weapons acquired for 
evaluation purposes (for example, Thailand's first two 
'Stingray' tanks and Indonesia's first B737-200 aircraft) were 
meant to help determine which weapons should be acquired to 
meet new capability requirements resulting from the influence 
of other pressures. 
Secondly, capability can also influence arms acquisitions in a 
much more dynamic way. The acquisition of certain 
weapons, either as the result of a need to replace obsolescent 
ones or to fulfil a new strategic objective, may require (or 
facilitate) the procurement of other weapons for operational 
effectiveness. For example, as Karp notes in the context of 
the Philippines' acquisition of jet trainers in the late 1980s, the 
expenditure levels displayed by many SE Asian states. See Buzan, An Introduction to 
Strategic Studies p. 100; and Denoon, op. cit. pp. 60-61. 
3 In respect of the need to replace obsolescent hardware there is an obvious, and 
unavoidable, overlap with the influence of technology on arms acquisitions: an 
indication of the bond provided by the pressure of defence policy and strategy. To 
provide a delineation between the two influences the focus here will be on the specific 
examples of replacement equipment procured and the extent to which this has been 
affected by regional developments. The general, and systemic, nature of the pressure 
of the process of technological progression will be considered in a later chapter. 
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desire to create a capacity to operate advanced fighters 
necessitates an investment in jet trainers too. 4 
With regard to threat assessment - and we are again referring 
to the external dimension - it has already been indicated that 
the focus here is on the influence of the less intense form of the 
action-reaction process on states' arms aquisitions: a process 
occurring where there are possible threats and a low level of 
military competition rather than clearly identifiable threats 
and high level competition. In all other respects, however, 
the process is the same revolving around the occurrence of an 
action by one state which heightens the sense of threat 
perceived by another and leads to a reaction in terms of arms 
acquisitions. Here, again, threat being seen as synonymous 
with the capability of a potential opponent. 
The distinction between the two forms of action-reaction 
process, and thus the nature of the threat, is one of both 
immediacy and intensity. Possible threats are not necessarily 
unidentifiable - as Buzan notes, states will usually have some 
idea of who might attack them (see Chapter 11) - instead, they 
are latent rather than manifest. In such circumstances, 
therefore, states are not concerned about changes in 
capability which could affect an ongoing or imminent conflict, 
but more about the long-term effects of these changes on the 
prevailing military balance. 
The possible threats which regional states' perceive usually 
emanate from within their own region, especially where a 
security complex is in existence. A regional security complex 
provides a ready source of states with which to compare 
capabilities against5 and obvious 'force interfaces' between its 
members. It may also have a history of antagonism and 
confrontation which can influence its members' 'strategic 
cultures' (that is, their "'ways of war' and 'ways in defense 
preparation"'). 6 
Karp, p. 354. 
5 For any state, as McKinlay notes, its military capabilities are only relevant 
in 
comparison with "those of other states". 
McKinlay, oj2. cit. p. 111. 
Gray, p. 92. 
Ar 
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Within a regional security complex such as the SE Asian one, however, in which even on the same side of the main divide it ý! 
" 
patterns of enmity can co-exist with those of ostensible amity, it may be difficult to distinguish between the "development or 
acquisition of new military technology by a potentially hostile 
country" which is seen as a threat and that by "a friendly 
nation [which] is seen as a political challenge, part of the 
competition for status within the international system, "7 
Acharya makes a similar point with his contention that it is 
"difficult to separate strategic competition from 
prestige/ imitation as the determinant of potential arms 
purchase decisions since both involve an interactive dynamic 
leading to the rise in the overall level of armaments within the 
region. " 8 
What is clear, though, is that the action-reaction process at 
the regional level - the interactions between regional states - 
can have a significant influence on regional states' arms 
acquisitions. Indeed, from their research, Brzoska and 
Ohlson contend that: "At the regional or sub-regional level, 
there is the almost automatic pressure [to acquire arms] 
arising from circular arms procurement patterns and regional 
arms races. "9 Moreover, earlier research on the ASEAN 
states - which drew attention to the impact of the introduction 
of new categories, or generations, of weapons systems - 
suggests that the "interactive weapons acquisition" which 
occurred will also be apparent in the Second Cold War period 
too. 10 In particular, it may be the case that neighbours' 
acquisitions of sophisticated weapons systems may illustrate, 
or highlight, the technological imperative and thus indicate an 
'objective' requirement for modernisation. In this instance, of 
course, it would be very difficult to separate the requirements 
of strategy from technological factors as an influence on 
weapons procurement. 
7 Asbjorn Eide and Mary Kaldor, "Conclusion", in Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide 
(eds. ), The World Military Order (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 257. 
Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? p. 30. 
Brzoska & OhIson, op. cit. p. 127. 
10 See Ron Huisken, Arms Limitation in South-East Asia: A Proj2osal (Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 16), (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1977), pp-16-17. 
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That other component of a state's strategic objectives - the 
protection of national interests - is somewhat less affected by 
any interaction with other states. National interests are 
relatively, though not entirely,, constant,, encompassing the 
need to maintain political independence and territorial 
integrity, uphold trade links, and, on occasion, influence 
events beyond national borders if they have the potential to 
threaten the national security of the state itself. The defence 
policy, and concomitant capability, which such national 
interests give rise to will, therefore, be heavily influenced by 
flenduring geographic ... [and] economic features". 11 The 
policy and capability which ensues therefore, will, likewise, be 
similarly enduring over time. 
Although 'enduring geographic features' are fixed, the 
awareness of certain aspects of these and the associated 
. mportance attached to them can be subject to change over 
time, with important implications for defence policy and force 
structure. The Second Cold War period was, significantly, a 
time of such change with regard to the maritime sphere: one 
brought about by a combination of resource demands and 
changes in international law. As Khatharya Um contends, 
the increasing "need to access and manage scarce resources ... 
compelled a reassessment of international maritime 
regimes. " 12 
Accordingly, therefore, the 1982 UNCLOS (UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea) "resulted in the creation of new 
maritime regimes, including [provision for] extended 
territorial seas and 200-nautical mile exclusive economic 
zones. " 13 In so doing, however, without providing a way of 
resolving disputes over overlapping EEZs, the law not only 
11 Synnot, op. cit. p. 282. To these enduring features Synnot also adds another - 
'"political" - one, "such as whether a country is non-aligned or 
has particular 
alliances. " Ibid. This aspect will obviously be important in terms of the 
impact of 
relationships with extra-regional powers. 
12 Khatharya Um, op. cit. p. 260. 
13 Mak, Qp. -cit., p. 
30. In the case of the ASEAN states, as Mak notes, they declared 
their own EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) even before the 
UNCLOS had been 
ratified. -1bid. 
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increased the importance of maritime national intereStS, 14but 
also created an additional source of potential inter-state 
disputes. 
The fact that the emergence of this emphasis on the maritime 
sphere of geographically determined national interests (far 
beyond that which might hitherto have occurred anyway) 
occurred at a time when the internal component of security 
was being downplayed only highlighted its potential 
significance for the arms acquisitions of many of the states. 
From our discussion of the various aspects which go to make 
up the pressure of defence policy and strategy,, it is readily 
apparent that the pressure as a whole will be of relevance to 
all the states under consideration. They all have exisiting 
capabilities and national interests, for example, even if they 
are not concerned with possible threats. The weight attached 
to the importance of each of the aspects, however, may vary 
from state to state. It is also apparent that the pressure as a 
whole will be of greater significance for some states than for 
others according to existing capabilities, prevailing strategic 
circumstances, and the extent of the significance of some of 
the other related pressures (notably the more intense form of 
action-reaction and the internal security dimension). For 
example, in the case of the more intense form of action- 
reaction being significant - and here we are referring to 
Thailand rather than Vietnam - all three aspects of policy and 
strategy tend to be seen through the lens of the clearly 
identifiable threat. Those states in which the pressure of 
policy and strategy was of particular significance are 
Singapore and Vietnam (albeit for very different reasons) 
and, to a slightly lesser degree, Indonesia and Malaysia. It 
was of little significance for Thailand and Burma. 
Singapore15 
14.1bid., p. 31. The UNCLOS also emphasised the maritime 
dimension in another 
way by drawing attention to "the issue of the right of coastal states 
to protect their 
maritime integrity and sovereignty versus the transit rights of 
international 
shipping. " 1bid. 
15 1 am particularly grateful to my superviser, 
Dr. Tim Huxley, for his comments on 
the various aspects of Singapore's defence policy and procurement which are 
discussed 
here. 
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Of all the states under consideration here, Singapore - by 
virtue of its physical characteristics and its strategic culture 
provides the most complete example of the influence of policy 
and strategy on major weapons acquisitions during the 
Second Cold War period. 16 
For Singapore, the enduring features of its small physical 
base and population size (combined with the ethnic make-up 
of that population); its dependence on others for such vital 
resources as water (and its general dependence on external 
trade links as an entrepot centre); the need to create a stable 
environment conducive to economic growth (and 
concomitantly foreign investment); and the formative 
experiences in the 1960s of its separation from the Federation 
of Malaysia and 'confrontation' with Indonesia, have all 
shaped its defence policy. That defence policy, therefore, has 
accordingly centred around the creation of a military 
capability sufficient to "deter" and, if necessary, "defend" 
Singapore "against external threats which might develop 
within the immediate region. "17 
Because of its all too evident lack of strategic depth, the 
capacity to defend Singapore had come to mean that 
Singapore must pursue a strategy of forward defence, with 
capabilities to match. This meant that the working 
assumption was that Singapore had to be defended in 
Malaysia: in effect, that the defence of Singapore and 
Malaysia was "indivisible". 18 Of course, the indivisibility of 
16 Not unrelated to this is the fact that Singapore has been described as possessing 
"the only armed forces in the region fully oriented for conventional, as opposed to 
counter-insurgency, warfare. " Karp, op. cit. pp. 348-349. 
' 
6' 
17 Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81 p-16. These threats were 
most commonly regarded as being likely to emanate from Malaysia and 
Indonesia, 
although not necessarily in the form of actual military aggression 
but possibly in the 
form of political "pressure": such pressure perhaps being occasioned 
by instability in 
either of its larger - Malay - neighbours. See Tim 
Huxley, "Singapore and Malaysia: 
A Precarious Balance? ", The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 3,1991, p. 208. SeealsoTim 
Huxley, "Singapore forces shape up", Jane's Defence Wee 19 November, 1994, 
p. 25; and FEER 13 April, 1989, p. 29. 
18 This description is used by the Singapore Ministry of Defence. Defence of 
Singapore-1-9-9-0-, (Singapore: Ministry of Defence, 1990), p. 9. 
The indivisibility of Singapore's defence with that of Peninsular 
Malaysia was not, 
of course, a new development. 
It was first emphasised prior to the Second World War 
by the General Officer Commanding Malaya, Major 
General William Dobbie, as the 
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Malaysia and Singapore is given a different connotation if Malaysia itself constitutes a possible threat. 19 
Both the general requirements of forward defence and the 
possible need to mount a pre-emptive strike on Malaysia have 
meant that since 1965 Singapore has placed a premium on 
two things: first,, on air defence (including a strike capacity) 
and, secondly, on mobile, offensively-oriented, ground forces. 
In establishing these capabilities appropiate attention has 
been paid to the hardware aspect. 20 Moreover, to give 
meaning to the SAF's deterrent capability in these areas, any 
possible aggressors - Malaysia especially - must perceive of it 
as a "superior force" which gives Singapore an obviously 
favourable military balance. 21 To a great extent,, therefore, 
Singapore sought to be proactive rather than reactive in 
many of its arms acquisitions. 
Although by 1978 the basis of the required air defence and 
ground force capabilities had been established, with the then 
most "essential" hardware having being acquired., 22 the early 
part of the Second Cold War period saw a consolidation and 
expansion of these. This consolidation and expansion was 
mainly brought about by the long-term influences of strategy 
rather than by the actions of other regional states. 
British forces began to prepare for possible Japanese aggression in the Far East. See 
Ong Chit Chung, Operation Matador. Britain's War Plans against the jal2anese 1918- 
1941 (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997), Chapter 3. 
19 This point is recognised in an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review in a 
discussion of the so-called 'Mersing' line. FEER 13 January, 1983, p. 30. The 'Mersing 
line' is also discussed by Tim Huxley, who contends that the amount of territory 
seized in establishing such a line would secure access to essential water supplies and 
provide a feasible area to maintain control over. See Huxley, A Precarious Balance? 
p. 208. 
20 This is for the very reason that because of its small population size Singapore could 
not hope to depend on manpower. As the then Minister of State (Defence), Dr Yeo, 
was reported speaking in parliament: "Singapore had to be capital intensive in its 
defence because it could not afford to have a large standing army. " Straits Times 21 
March, 1982, p. 8- 
21 Huxley, A Precarious Balance? p. 210. The need for air superiority was, of course, 
imperative if Singapore was to be able to be defended at some distance from the 
island state itself. Discussion with a former SAF NCO, 
April 1997. 
22 See Chin, Singapore: Threat Perception and Defence Spending p. 208. 
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To further develop the army's firepower and mobility, orders 
were placed for a further 150 AMX-13 light tanks in 1979 and 
some 600 M113 APCs in 1982ý., _ 1 These orders can be seen in the context of the Singapore army's need to be able to mount 
a rapid and successful armoured thrust into the Malaysian 
state of johor in order to secure the so-called 'Mersing line'. 
Improvements to the army's 'tactical mobility' through the 
expansion of the RSAF's (Republic of Singapore Air Force) 
inventory of helicopters - notably the acquisition of 22 'Super Pumas' in 1985-87 - can also be seen in the context of the 
requirements of operations in combination with the armoured forces to secure territory in Johor. Huxley describes the sort 
of army operations which could be expected as follows: 
Singapore army units would quickly seize the 
initiative in the land war: light armoured forces 
would cross the causeway into johor Bahru, already 
secured by para-dropped commandoes [sic] and heli- 
mobile 'guards' units. These airmobile forces would 
conduct rapidly-paced operations in support of the 
armour as it advance into the peninsula. 23 
Given the fact that Singapore's orders for the AMX-13s and 
the M113s occurred at a time when Malaysia was embarking 
on a move to develop its own conventional warfare 
capabilities, including an expansion of its armoured forceS, 24 
it might appear that Singapore was reacting to Malaysian 
intentions. Indeed, Singapore would have been concerned 
about the prospect of any armoured thrust it might make into 
johor being countered by an expanded Malaysian armoured 
force, especially as the Malaysian army was already well 
respected for its professional capabilities. 25 In reality, 
however, the expansion of Singapore's own armoured forces 
was probably planned long before Malaysia's intentions were 
clear. Thus, although Singapore might have appeared to 
have been 'reactive', it was truly still being proactive. 
23 Huxley, A Precarious Balance? p. 208. 
24 Malaysia had decided in 1978 to acquire some 60 MBTs to form its first tank 
regiment, which was intended to be operational by the end of 1980. See Straits Times 
20 March, 1980, p. 14. Ultimately, Malaysia was only to acquire 26 'Scorpion' light 
tanks in 1983-84. 
2-5 Discussion with a former SAF NCO, April 1997. 
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The requirements of operations in Malaysia - specifically the 
need to mount a pre-emptive or first strike on the RMAF 
while its aircraft were still on the ground followed by attacks 
on vital installations such as the Malaysian army's 
headquarters - undoubtedly influenced Singapore's 
acquisition of 'Maverick' ASMs in 1981.26 This purchase, 
however, given the utility of the missiles for attacking 
concentrations of armour, may also have been related to the 
possibility of the Malaysian army acquiring a significant 
armoured capability. Indeed, during the Second Cold War 
period, there was a gradual move to to expand the RSAF's 
role to encompass ground support. 
Air defence, though, in its various forms, remained the first 
priority for the RSAF during this period with many major 
weapons being acquired to consolidate and expand that 
capability. In particular, considerable importance was 
attached to the creation of a comprehensive, layered, ground 
air defence system consisting of guns and missiles. This 
system, when added to with radars and fighter aircraft, 
would thus provide an "overlapping" defensive shield. 27 
Between 1979 and 1981, therefore, orders were placed for J- 
HAWK', RBS-70, and'Rapier'AD and SAM systems, with 
35mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns being ordered in 1984(? ). 28 
The 'I-HAWKs' could, however, also be seen in the context of 
maintaining an existing capability as they were procured as 
eventual replacements for the RSAF's ageing 'Bloodhound' 
SAMs which had been transferred to Singapore by the 
departing British forces. 29 
26 See Huxley, A Precarious Balance? p. 208. The thinking here was very much 
influenced by the Israeli experience during the 'Six Day War' in 1967 when such a 
strike by the Israeli air force led to the destruction of the Egyptian air force before it 
had got off the ground. Israel, it has been widely recognised, had a crucial influence 
on Singapore's 'strategic culture' and on the development of the SAF's doctrine and 
order of battle in the aftermath of the Republic's separation from the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1965. 
27 Defence of Singapore p. 40. 
28 The 'Rapiers', RBS-70s and Oerlikons provided short-range defence, whilst the 'I- 
HAWKs'were for medium-range defence. Long-range defence would be provided by 
fighter aircraft. See Straits Times 9 May, 1990, p. 24. 
29 The 'Bloodhounds' were not actually taken out of service until c. 1990 however. 
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The procurement of these various missile systems, as was 
noted in the preceding chapter, can also be seen as a partial 
reaction to Singapore's concerns about Soviet and 
Vietnamese capabilities. Furthermore, these concerns also 
highlighted a lacuna, or weakness, in Singapore's existing air 
defence system and pointed the way towards another 
important 'incremental addition' to that systeM. 30 
Singapore's existing ground-based radar network, in view of 
the size of the city-state, was only able to provide extremely 
limited warning time (about one minute) of incoming aircraft 
and was acutely vulnerable to fast, low-flying, aircraft such 
as the Soviet MiG-23.31 The decision was taken, therefore, in 
1983, to acquire four E-2C 'Hawkeye' AEW (airborne early 
warning) planes which would be used "primarily to detect and 
track low-flying aircraft. "32 
The consolidation and expansion of the other component of 
the overlapping defensive shield - fighter aircraft - was also 
evident in the orders for additional F-5Es and for Singapore's 
first batch of F-16s. 
The eventual order for eight F-16A/B 'Fighting Falcons' (see 
Appendix entry for full details) certainly represented a 
significant, qualitative, improvement to the RSAF's fighter 
complement. Their purchase, however, was officially 
portayed rather differently with it being indicated that they 
were intended to represent the beginning of a programme to 
replace the RSAF's 'Hunters'. 33 In effect, Singapore was 
30 It is unlikely that the limited capabilities of either the Malaysian or Indonesian 
air forces at this time would have have generated the same response. 
31 See Straits Times 24 March, 1987, p. 2. The Singaporeans, it appears, were 
unwilling to rely totally on the Malaysian ground-based radar designated to the 
IADS (integrated air defence system) operating under the auspices of the FPDA (Five 
Power Defence Arrangements). See Michael Richardson, "New eyes and sting for 
'poisoned shrimp' ", Pacific Defence Reporter March 1983, p. 43. 
32 Straits Times, 24 March, 1987, p. 2. The E-2Cs were also capable of monitoring the 
movements of ships and vehicles, and could act as command and control platforms 
for 
fighter interceptors. 
33 The 'Hunters' were, in any case, really intended to perform a ground attack - rather 
than interceptor - role. 
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seeking to play down the acquisition of the F-16s for the 
purposes of minimising the concerns of its two Malay 
neighbours. 
Singapore's order for F-16s at this time might also appear to have been an attempt to keep up with the prevailing state of 
technology in the region, illustrated by Thailand's order for 
the aircraft. It is most probable, though, that Singapore's 
decision to procure F-16s was taken before Thailand's - even if the actual order which it placed in 1984 for F-16/J79s "was 
placed in close consultation with Thailand' '34 - in keeping with its proactive policy on arms procurement. 
The first 'Skyhawk' order (for 40 aircraft in 1981) should not 
be seen in the context of expanding Singapore's fighter 
cover. 35 These aircraft were not intended to perform an air 
defence function at all, but were instead eventually meant to 
provide a ground attack and maritime strike capability. A 
further order for 'Skyhawks' in 1983 was meant to provide 
replacements and a source of spare parts. 
Lastly, the RSAF received 24 T-33As in 1980-82 and 30 S-211 
jet trainers in 1984-87. The S-211s were acquired as 
replacements for the BAC 'Strikemasters', but as the number 
of S-21 1s was almost double that of the 'Strikemasters' they 
were intended to replace it evidently represented a major 
expansion of basic jet and weapons training capabilities - at a 
time when there was an ongoing expansion in combat 
aircraft. 
Notable by its omission so far has been the area of naval 
capabilities. This mainly reflects the limited acquisitions in 
this area by Singapore during much of the Second Cold War 
period, which is in itself indicative of both the priority 
accorded to the areas already discussed36and of the adequacy 
34 FEER 1 August, 1985, p. 31. 
35 For this reason, in addition to the aforementioned advance planing practised 
by 
Singapore, the 'Skyhawk' order should not be construed as a reaction to the purchase 
by Malaysia of the same aircraft a year earlier. 
36 In this regard, mak notes that what he terms the 'third phase' of Singapore Is 
defence build-up - the development of the RSN (Republic of 
Singapore Navy) - only 
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and relative modernity of the RSN's existing vessels (especially the 'Sea Wolf' fast attack craft acquired in the 1970s). 37 
Although Singapore was less affected by the new focus on 
maritime security in the mid-1980s than its maritime SE Asian 
neighbours, it was not immune from the implications of this 
development, both in terms of an increased emphasis on 
maritime national interests and in terms of potential 
developments in the naval capabilities of other states. From 
Singapore's perspective it was no longer sufficient in the new 
climate to be able to ensure its 'seaward defence' by the 
defence of its maritime approaches. It was now increasingly 
necessary to be able to protect its vital SLOCs too. To do so 
required the acquisition of larger warships capable of 
operations over extended distances and possessed of a 
capability for a wider range of naval operations. The 
decision to acquire six 'Victory' class missile corvettes (of 
which three had been delivered by the end of 1989) was mainly 
in order to fulfil this need: "the purchase of the ... missile 
corvettes for the navy was made mainly to ensure free access 
to the sea lines of communications ... as it is of vital national interest. "38 
The missile corvettes were, significantly, to be equipped for 
ASW (anti-submarine warfare) which reflected the "RSN's 
increased concern over the threat posed to Singapore by 
submarines passing through the Malacca Straits". 39 This 
concern, the Straits Times notes, was "based on the RSN's 
experience of tracking Soviet submarines passing through the 
straits submerged. NO This experience almost certainly 
occurred after ground and air capabilites had more or less been fully established. See 
Mak, op. cit. p. 100. 
37 These vessels would certainly be adequate for the RSN to fulfil its designated roles 
in the event of any campaign against Malaysia of securing "the maritime flanks of 
the thrust into Malaysia against interference by the Malaysian navy"; deterring 
"intervention by the navies of other interested powers"; and interdicting "maritime 
communications between Peninsular and East Malaysia. " Huxley, 
A Precarious 
Balance? p. 208- 
38 Straits Times, 23 March, 1989, p-23. 
39 Straits 
-TLmnes, 
2 September, 1986, p. l. 
40 Ibid. 
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heightened anxieties about the prospect of Malaysia developing a submarine force which was under discussion in the late 1980s. 
Additionally, and in keeping with Singapore's policy of 
upgrading its weapons where practicable to enable them to 
perform more effectively (to be discussed in a later chapter), 
two of the 'Sea Wolf' FAC (fast attack craft) were retrofitted 
with'Ha on' SSMs (surface-to-surface missiles) acquired 
in 1986-8 
Vietnam 
For Vietnam, the influence of defence policy and strategy on 
arms acquisitions can be summed up in terms of the 
operational requirements of the pacification of Khmer 
resistance to the Vietnamese installed government in 
Cambodia after the December 1978 invasion. To the extent, 
that is, that this pressure can be isolated from a complex mix 
of factors and,, concomitantly,, that the weapons acquired can 
be seen to have had as their main purpose the fulfilment of 
strategic requirements. The invasion of Cambodia resulted, 
in the first place, from what has been described as Vietnam's 
"abiding security fixation" with Cambodia (and, indeed, Laos 
too). 41 
In Vietnamese strategic thinking, Indo-China had long been 
regarded as a single entity. This point was reiterated during 
the Vietnamese operations in Cambodia in the mid-1980s by 
the PAVN's commander there, Colonel General Le Duc Anh: 
Indochina is a single battlefield and the militant 
strategic alliance among the three Indochinese 
countries involves the law of survival and 
development for each as well as the three 
collectively. 42 
41 Michael Leifer and John Phipps, "Vietnam and Doi Moi: Domestic and 
International Dimensions of Reform", (Discusssion Paper, no. 35), (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs), p. 23; cited Michael C. Williams, 
Vietnam at the 
Crossroads, (London: Pinter/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 61. 
42 Col. Gen. Le Duc Anh, TAVN and Its Noble International Mission in Friendly 
Cambodia", Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, (December 1984); cited Pike, Vietnam and 
the Soviet Unio p. 207. 
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For Vietnam, therefore, a vital national interest during the Second Cold War was establishing and maintaining a 'special relationship', or 'solidarity', with Cambodia which would see the promotion of Vietnam's own security. 43 To do so, in turn, 
necessitated the consolidation of the CNUFNS (Cambodian National Front for National Salvation) government under Heng Samrin and, crucially, the pacification of resistance to that government. 
Underpinning the resistance to the Vietnamese-backed 
government in Phnom Penh - and here we are primarily 
referring to the communist Khmer Rouge - was Vietnam's old 
antagonist, China., with whom it had been competing for 
influence over Cambodia and Indo-China since re-unification 
in 1975. Indeed, it can be argued that, for the Vietnamese, the 
clear external threat from China was also manifest in the 
latter's support for the resistance in particular and its 
opposition to Vietnam's dominance over Indo-China in 
general. In effect, "the hostility from Pol Pot's regime before 
its overthrow ... [which was] Part of the broader Chinese 
strategy to weaken Vietnam by multi-pronged pressure' '44had 
now reached a new level of intensity with full-scale conflict 
between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese forces in 
43 The term 'special relationship' is referred to by Evans and Rowley in citing the 
comments of a Vietnamese official in 1978. Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red 
Brotherhood at War. Indochina since the Fall of Saigon (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto 
Press, 1984), p. 97. 'Solidarity' was that used by the Vietnamese after the signing of 
the Vietnam-Kampuchea Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in February 
1979: a term which also applied to Laos. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
(hereafter SWB), 20 February 1979, FE/6047/A3/23. 
Whatever the term employed, there was a debate over whether or not Vietnam's 
dominance over Cambodia and Laos at this time meant that Vietnam's national 
interests lay in the establishment of a putative 'Indo-China Federation'. A theme 
running throughout Evans and Rowley's book is that this was not, in fact, a 
Vietnamese aim. See Evans and Rowley, op. cit. pp. 34-35; 93-98; and 196-198. 
Moreover, as an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1979 argued, given the 
existence of - in essence - security treaties with Cambodia and Laos (plus a range of 
other co-operation agreements) a Federation as such was unnecessary. See FEER 6 
April, 1979, P-9. 
44 FEER, 11 January, 1980, p-18. Sauvageot contends that Chinese support for the 
Khmer Rouge after 1976 was actually an attempt "to attack Vietnam from the west. " 
J. Andre Sauvageot, "Vietnam, Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception: Defending 
Communist Indochina", in Chin, Defence Spending in Southeast Asia p. 295. 
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Cambodia and China's post-invasion strategy of seeking to 'bleed Vietnam whitel. 
The obvious linkage between the clearly identifiable threat 
posed by China and Vietnam's national interests vis-a-vis Cambodia has two main implications for any analysis of the influence of defence policy and strategy on Vietnam's arms 
acquisitions. 
First, it could be argued that the conflict in Cambodia between 
the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese forces represented another 
manifestation of the action-reaction process already evident between China and Vietnam in the context of external threat 
assessment. In this case, the action (political and military) of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge led to a reaction in 
terms of the Vietnamese need to develop the capability to 
pacify that resistance. 
Secondly, and problematically, the simultaneity of the 
Vietnamese reaction to China's punitive invasion in 1979 and 
its need to build up its forces for longer than anticipated 
operations in Cambodia, means that it can be difficult to 
distinguish at times between those weapons acquired to 
strenghen Vietnam's capabilites for a future war with China, 
and those obtained to strengthen its capabilities for 
conducting operations in Cambodia, in the massive arms 
build-up which occurred in the years 1979 to 1981. This is 
especially so because some weapons had an obvious utility in 
both arenas. In this regard there appears to be something of 
a difference of opinion between Pike and Sauvageot. Pike 
contends that in the three years after the invasion many of the 
weapons acquired were for the purpose of prosecuting the 
campaign against the Khmer resistance, whereas Sauvageot 
contends that during the early years of the campaign in 
Cambodia, Vietnam was mainly using old Soviet and US kit - 
with some new hardware from 1983 onwards - as the modern 
equipment acquired was deployed to units facing the Chinese 
in the north. 45 
The near impossibility of making a clear distinction between 
the primary impetus for the acquisition of some major 
45 See Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 210; and Sauavageot, op. cit. p. 301. 
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weapons - for possible use against the Chinese or for 
operations in Cambodia - means that certain weapons will inevitably be discussed in the context of both factors. 46 
What is much more clear-cut, however, is that major weapons 
were central to Vietnam's pacification operations in 
Cambodia in the years following the invasion. Their central importance reflected the significant shift which had occurred during the 1970s in Vietnamese strategic culture, especially in 
the aftermath of re-unification and ddring the build up of the 
PAVN prior to the invasion of Cambodia. 
At the heart of this shift, according to Pike, was the virtual 
abandonment of Vietnam's traditional guerilla warfare 
strategy and the ad6p-fion, instead, of a heavy weapons - high-technology - approach: a shift, he contends, brought 
about by the combined influence of Soviet and US military 
doctrine. 47 The nature of this shift was certainly evident in 
both the tactics and language of the invasion itself, with e 
Vietnam's "strategic offensive" being based on the creation of 
flan over-powering force to wipe out the enemy. "48 
46 Stephanie Neuman makes no attempt to distinguish between influences in her 
analysis of Soviet arms supplies to Vietnam in 1979 and 1980, although as she dicusses 
these in the context of the aftermath of the brief Sino-Vietnamese war the 
implication is clear. Instead, she draws a distinction between the 'phases' in the 
supply of weapons. In 'phase one' (mid-1979) "replacement equipment that could be 
absorbed and maintained immediately" (for example, tanks and artillery) was 
supplied; and in 'phase two' (end of 1979 - early 1980) "new and more sophisticated 
deliveries began to arrive" (for example, strike aircraft and SAMs). Stephanie G. 
Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars (New York: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies/ Praeger, 1986), p. 18 
47 The influence of Soviet doctrine is more or less self-explantory as it was a natural 
consequence of the increasingly close ties between the Vietnamese and Soviet 
militaries after 1976. Almost perversely, the influence of US military doctrine was 
derived from the favourable nature of many PAVN officers reactions to the Americans 
use of heavy weapons which they had witnessed during the struggle for re- 
unification. See Pike, PAVN pp. 255-263 passim. PAVN officers, however, had also 
gained an appreciation of the utility of major weapons from their own firsthand 
experiences during the Second Indo-China war. The North Vietnamese 
first 
successfully employed some of their Russian supplied heavy artillery and tanks 
against South Vietnamese rearguard forces in early 1971, as they sought to respond to 
a damaging raid by the latter into their rear areas. 
This action by the North 
Vietnamese, Thompson contends, subsequently led them to focus on conventional 
warfare as the best way of defeating the 
South. See Thompson, Peace Is Not At 
Hand pp. 91-92. 
48 The comments of the Vietnamese Defence Minister, 
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, just prior 
to the invasion. Cited in FEER, 19 January, 1979, p. 10. 
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Despite the 'over-powering force' employed in the invasion - over 100,000 troops with armour,, artillery and air support - and the speed of its execution, the Vietnamese were unable to fulfil their main objectives of destroying the Khmer Rouge's 
armed forces before they could disperse and capturing the 
political and military leaderships before they could do 
likewise. What was expected, therefore, to be a six-month 
long campaign (for which the Soviet Union had supplied 
sufficient weapons in advance)49became instead an extended, 
counter-insurgency, campaign necessitating the acquisition of 
more major weapons. Some of these weapons were intended 
to perform a particular tactical role according to the 
requirements of operations in Cambodia. 
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, and up to 12 
months later, the Vietnamese forces were essentiallly engaged 
in conventional warfare against the armed forces of the 
Khmer Rouge: a function of the failure to destroy them in the 
initial assault. The Khmer Rouge were operating at brigade 
strength, with armour and artillery support, and mounting 
counter-attacks on Vietnamese forces occupying major 
towns. 50 
The requirements of countering such attacks and the 
preparations at the end of 1979 to mount a major offensive 
aimed at destroying Khmer Rouge main force units - which 
saw tanks and APCs moved into the western border area with 
Thailand - would certainly suggest that some of the T-55 
MBTs and BTR-60P APCs supplied to Vietnam at this time 
may have been intended for operations in Cambodia. 51 This 
would seem more likely given the apparent attitude of the 
Soviet Union which wanted the Vietnamese to "stabilise the 
situation in Kampuchea quickly" so it could further the 
expansion of its own influence in SE Asia. 52 
49 See Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 210. 
50 See FEER, 9 February, 1979, p-10. 
51 See FEER, 7 December, 1979, p. 22. The need to break up concentrations of Khmer 
Rouge forces may also have meant that some of the Su-7s acquired at this time may 
have been deployed in southern Vietnam for possible operations in Cambodia, rather 
than in the north. 
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One of the most pressing needs of the PAVN during the early 
stages of the post-invasion period (and subsequently too) was 
the need to improve its troops'mobility and logistic support. 
This was particularly important in view of the Khmer Rouge 
forces' ability in these early stages to disrupt road 
communication links on which the Vietnamese forces were 
virtually wholly dependent. As the area of operations 
subsequently shifted into the more peripheral parts of 
Cambodia, it also became essential because of the difficulty of 
operating in, and resupplying, more remote areas. This 
difficulty was also exacerbated by the annual onset of the 
monsoon season. To these ends, the Vietnamese acquired a 
squadron of An-12 transport aircraft in 1979 and a large 
number of Mi-6 and Mi-8 transport helicopters in 1979- 
1980.53 In addition to the Vietnamese squadron of An-12s 
which was reportedly based at Bien Hoa, and indicative of the 
level of Soviet support for Vietnamese operations in 
Cambodia, the Soviet Union also deployed its own aircraft 
(An-12s and 11-62s) and crews to Cambodia to provide air 
transport. 54 
After the immediate post-invasion period and the major dry 
season offensive of 1979-80, the Vietnamese were primarily 
engaged in the protection of Cambodia's infrastructure which 
entailed largely static defence. By the middle of 1981, 
however, and reflecting a growing realisation that its direct 
military role in Cambodia should end sooner rather than 
later, Vietnam began to build up its forces for a dry season 
offensive in the north and west of Cambodia. To this end 
'new' T-54s, PT-76s and APCs were deployed in Cambodia, 
52 Ibid. TI-iis point raises the issue of to what extent Soviet supplies to Vietnam for 
operations in Cambodia were actually intended to fulfil Soviet requirements - in much 
the same way as those for use against China were. Although in a broad, geostrategic, 
sense they were - as was the case with all Soviet support for Vietnam - their 
practical purpose was to meet Vietnamese, rather than Soviet, military requirements 
in Cambodia. 
53 There were no reports of PAVN operations in Cambodia at this employing assault 
helicopters, so the Mi-8s acquired were almost certainly all transport versions. The 
use of combat helicopters only occurred in later Cambodian operations in the mid- 
1980s. Discussion with Associate Professor Laurie Barber, University of Waikato, 5 
August, 1997. The Soviet Union was also reported to have supplied a number of Mi-8 
transport helicopters directly to the Cambodian government. See FEER 13 June, 1980, 
p. 44. 
54 See Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union pp. 198 and 210. 
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some close to Poipet on the Thai-Cambodian border. 55 It is 
impossible to determine whether or not the T-54s (most 
probably actually T-55s) and APCs were actually'new'- being 
part of the deliveries of these weapons which occurred in 
1979-1981 - or were only new to Cambodia, having previously 
been deployed in northern Vietnam as part of the build-up of 
defences there. The PT-76s, on the other hand, were almost 
certainly acquired specifically for these (and other) operations 
in Cambodia being both highly manoeuvrable and - at half the 
weight of a T-54/55 - light enough for use "in mangrove 
swamps". 56 
The 1981/82 dry season offensive, Evans and Rowley note, 
also saw the "first regular use of Antonov-26 transport 
aircraft for ferrying troops and supplies". 57 Indeed, the 
Antonovs were acquired as part of the aforementioned efforts 
to improve the PAVN's mobility and logistics supply. The An- 
26s, apparently, also played a different role during operations 
in western Cambodia in December 1981, when there were 
reports of them having 'pallet-bombed' targets in the border 
area. 58 
By this stage, with one exception (see below), the Vietnamese 
no longer appear to have required any more weaponry 
having now acquired a sufficient quantity and range of 
weapons to be able to mount large-scale offensive operations 
against resistance forces. It is notable in this respect that no 
new weapons were acquired prior to the massive operations 
in early 1983. Moreover, and taking account of the 
underlying influence of their Soviet suppliers on Vietnam's 
policies in Cambodia, it is also notable that by 1982 the Soviet 
Union had clearly indicated that it wanted the Cambodian 
army to take "most of the responsibility for security by 1985. "59 
Indeed, Soviet and Vietnamese thinking was beginning to 
coalesce at this point in time with the two states both wanting 
55 See FEER 8 January, 1982, p. 14, and 3 July, 1982, p. 11. 
56 Pike, LAMM p. 263. 
57 Evans and Rowley, pp. cit, p. 252. 
,8 January, 
1982, p. 15. 58 See FEER 
, 10 
March, 1982, p. 10. 59 FEER 
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to see the conduct of the war handed over to the Cambodians 
themselves. To facilitate this, the Vietnamese equipped 
Cambodia's first armoured regiment with ex-PAVN T-54s 
and PT-76s in 1984.60 
As part of a five-phase plan to 'Cambodianize' the war, the 
Vietnamese decided to mount a series of major offensives 
against the resistance during the 1984/85 dry season. 61 These 
were aimed at destroying their forces on the ground and 
depriving them of a foothold in "strategically important 
areas", 62and forcing them out of camps along the Thai- 
Cambodian border. It was in order to stengthen its forces' 
capabilities to mount these vital operations, and probably 
specifically to attack the Khmer Rouge in their stronghold in 
the north around Tonle Sap, that Vietnam acquired 3(ý, 
I(? 
) Mi- 
24 helicopters. 63 
With the acquisition of the Mi-24s, the influence of the 
strategic requirements of operations in Cambodia effectively 
ended. A year after these offensives - which had achieved 
only partial success - Vietnam began to seek a negotiated way 
out of its Cambodian imbroglio and its already ongoing troop 
withdrawals steadily accelerated until the final withdrawal of 
forces in September 1989. 
Indonesia 
If Vietnam's strategic culture had increasingly come to 
emphasise the importance of a 'heavy weapons approachl - as 
demonstrated during its involvement in Cambodia - and 
Singapore's had long placed a premium on the deterrent 
effect of advanced conventional capabilities, then Indonesia's 
strategic culture" in stark contrast, had by and large eschewed 
60 See FEER 6 September, 1984, p. 11. 
61 For details of these plans see Carlyle A. Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army 
, (Pacific 
Strategic Papers No. 7), (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Under Doi-moi 
Asian Studies, 1994), p. 10. 
62 FEER, 12 December, 1985, p. 27. 
63 See 
_Jbid. 
There were, of course, obvious parallels here with the tactics employed 
by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
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"modern military techniques and equipment". 64 Instead, and influenced by both historical experiences (notably the struggle for independence from the Dutch) and enduring geographic 
and economic features, Indonesia's strategic culture has focussed on "mass-based, 'low-tech' tactics". 65 This focus is 
most clearly evinced in Indonesia's 'Sishankamrata' (Sistem 
Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta - Total People's Defence and Security System) and its reliance on a 'guerilla 
warfare' approach for dealing with any potential invader. 66 
Such a focus, though, does not mean that Indonesia has seen 
no need for major conventional weapons (in the late 
1950s/early 1960s, for example, during the campaign against 
the Dutch in West Papua, both the Navy and Air Force were 
rapidly expanded), nor, indeed, that the influence of the 
requirements of defence policy and strategy on arms 
acquisitions was negligible during the Second Cold War 
period. It does mean, however., that the utility of such 
weapons for Indonesia was viewed in the context of a broadly 
based military strategy aimed at fulfilling a number of 
requirements. Thus, according to Lowry, Indonesia "has an 
'active defensive' deterrence strategy, based on guerilla 
warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, 
designed to cope with lower level external threats, internal 
security, resource protection, and regime maintenance. "67 
The multiple nature of the tasks which Indonesia's 
conventional forces may be asked to perform provides an 
obvious pointer as to the scope of the strategic requirements 
which will influence arms acquisitions. More 
problematically, it also indicates that it will be difficult to 
distinguish at times between the influence of this pressure on 
arms acquisitions and that of the internal security dimension 
as there will be overlaps between them. This is most - but not 
exclusively - evident in the case of equipment for the Army. 
Armoured vehicles have been procured for the "combat 
64 Alan Dupont, "Indonesia's Defence Strategy and Security: Time for a Rethink? ", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 18, No. 3, December 1996, p. 282. 
65.1bid., p. 281. 
66 For further details, see Bob Lowry, op. cit. pp. 17-18. 
67 Ibid., p. 18. 
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support units" possessed by most military area commands of 
the territorial forces and for the central forces' Kostrad 
(Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat - Army Strategic Command) "cavalry reconnaissance companies", both of 
which have been developed to respond to internal and 
external security threats. 68 
Acknowledging that there will be overlaps between the 
influences of the requirements of defence policy and strategy 
and the internal security dimension on Indonesia's arms 
acquisitions, it is still clear that the former was an important 
factor; particularly in terms of the aspects of capability and 
national interest. The Second Cold War period saw the 
continuation of efforts begun in the mid-1970s to modernise 
ABRI's (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - Armed 
Force of the Republic of Indonesia) equipment inventory. It 
also saw a new emphasis attached to one of Indonesia's 
enduring geographically determined national interests - its 
archipelagic status. The new emphasis attached to this status 
provided a focus, and impetus, for elements of the 
modernisation programme. Additionally, Indonesia was also 
affected by various military developments within the SE Asian 
security complex which also indicated the need for the 
modernisation, or establishment,, of certain capabilities. 
The stimulus for the modernisation drive which began in the 
mid-1970s was provided by a combination of the communist 
victories in Indo-China and the experience of the invasion of 
East Timor and its aftermath. These two experiences, Lowry 
contends, led to an "awareness of the need to rejuvenate the 
armed forces. "69 In particular, they focussýd the minds Of 
those responsible for Indonesia's defence on the fact that 
whilst ABRI's equipment holdings may still have been 
numerically large from the build-up in the 1950s and 1960s, 
much of it was largely inoperable due to a chronic lack of 
servicing and spare parts. This was especially so in the case 
of the more capital intensive services - the Navy and the 
Air 
Force. Thus, although efforts were made prior to 1979 to re- 
(St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 68 Robert Lowry, The Armed FO-r-ce-s-of Indonesia 
1996), pp. 92 and 232. See pp. 85-94 
for a detailed analysis of the Army's structure and 
role. 
69 Lowry, Indonesian Defence Polim p. 42. 
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equip ABRI (for example, orders were placed for South 
Korean FAC in 1976 and for F-5E fighters in 1977) the extent 
of the requirements for major weapons to maintain - or, 
rather, re-establish - existing capabilities was such that the 
modernisation programme was more or less ongoing 
throughout the Second Cold War period. 70 
An interesting characteristic of Indonesia's modernisation 
during the Second Cold War was that it can predominantly be 
ascribed to what was seen as an "objective need for 
improvements in ... hardware' ', 71with an impetus being 
provided by the need to protect vital national interests. 
Indonesia's modernisation programme, therefore, appears to 
have been mostly autonomous of the acquisitions made by 
other members of the complex: there seems to have been no 
action-reaction process between Indonesia and any other 
state and thus the aspect of possible threat as an influence on 
arms acquisitions is of only limited relevance. Part of the 
explanation for this lies in a certain insularity displayed by 
Indonesia resulting from its pre-occupation with the internal 
dimension of security. It also lies in the fact that Indonesia 
did not view any of its SE Asian neighbours as posing even a 
latent threat to it (there were certainly no fears of invasion)72 
and consequently it was not overly concerned with shifts in 
the prevailing military balance. 
To say, however, that Indonesia's modernisation programme 
was primarily internally driven - and that there was no 
action-reaction process in evidence - is not the same as saying 
that weapons developments within the complex had no 
bearing on Indonesia at all. It is arguable that some of the 
major weapons acquired by other states in the complex (and 
elements of their overall capabilites) did have an effect on 
Indonesia in the sense of providing an example of the 
prevailing state of military technology and pointing to 
70 The modernisation programme was also a long drawn out one because of the lack of 
resources which were available to fund it: a traditional factor constraining 
Indonesia's development of its conventional capabilities. 
71 jusuf Wanadi and M. Hadisoesastro, "Indonesia's Security and Threat 
Perceptions", in Morrison, op. cit. p. 83. 
72 See Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 1. He attributes this to Indonesia's "size, 
military capability, and strategically advantageous location. " Ibid. 
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lacunae in its own capabilities. This is most evident with 
regard to the F-16, but is visible in terms of air defence 
missiles too. 
Following the rejection of its 1983 request for F-16AS73 
Indonesia reportedly decided in 1984 against acquiring a latest 
generation - high-tech - fighter, mostly on the grounds of 
CoSt. 74 The United States' eventual willingness to acquiesce 
to Thai and Singaporean demands for the F-16As, however, 
apparently led to renewed Indonesian interest in the aircraft 
and another request to purchase them in 1985 (which was 
approved). Andrew MacIntyre contends that the revived 
request can partially be explained by Indonesia's concerns 
about its status vis-a-vis Singapore and Thailand: 
Perceiving itself to be the leading member of the 
ASEAN grouping, and as such the prime manager of 
regional stability, Indonesia would find it extremely 
difficult to abide a situation in which Singapore and 
Thailand possessed front-line aircraft qualitatively 
far superior to its own. 75 
Although there is undoubtedly an element of truth in this, 
especially given the timing of the Indonesian order, it is more 
likely that the impact of the prospective introduction of the F- 
16 into the region by Singapore and Thailand highlighted the 
present state of combat aircraft technology for Indonesia. 
The actual decision to procure F-16s, therefore, owed more to 
the influence of the technological imperative. 
The need to keep "abreast with advanced technology" was, 
Crouch argues, also visible in Indonesia's orders for 'Rapier' 
AD missile systems in the mid-1980s. 76 In the case of AD 
73 This request appeared to have been motivated by a desire to modernise and expand 
the Air Force to the extent that it would have the capacity to oppose a "major threat" 
to Indonesia through "conventional air ... strategies" (i. e., strategic strike and air 
interdiction). Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy p. 43. This desire emanated from a 
prior, and soon to be dropped, strategy of "strategic denial". Ibid. p. 36. 
74 See FEER 7 March, 1985, p. 11 and 21 March, 1985, p. 33. 
7-ý Andrew MacIntyre, "Don't worry about those Indonesian F-16s", Pacific Defence 
Reporter August 1986, p. 9. 
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missiles, however, Indonesia was mainly reacting to regional 
military developments. Although, as we have seen, Indonesia did not share the concerns of some of its ASEAN neighbours 
about the threat posed by the expansion of Soviet and 
Vietnamese air force capabilities, the general climate was 
such that Indonesia realised the importance of the need for it 
to have an advanced missile capability. This capability - 
which it had not hitherto possessed - was necessary for Indonesia to bolster its own, inadequate, air defence system. 
In this respect it is noteworthy that the acquisition of RBS-70 
SAMs occurred at a time of maximum regional concern about 
air defence capabilities. The 'Rapiers' were ordered soon 
after the ABRI commander - General Murdani - had visited Vietnam in February 1984 as part of a series of visits to 
regional militaries. This visit led him to tell parliament on his 
return "that the Indonesian armed forces needed accelerated 
modernisation, acquiring among other things ground-to-air 
missiles [emphasis added]. "77 The 'Rapiers' were, Lowry 
notes, subsequently "deployed on asset protection tasks ... to 
protect vital infrastructure" in accordance with the Air Force's 
priorities. 78 
Returning to the general need to maintain, or reconstruct., 
existing capabilities through a process of modernisation, ' this 
was especially evident in terms of one of the Air Force's most 
basic capabilities - flying training - and led to a large number 
of aircraft for all stages of training being acquired during the 
Second Cold War. It had been recognised in the 1970s that 
there was an exigency for the Air Force to concentrate on 
"maintaining the training squadrons and their programs" 
because of concerns about a "personnel generation gap" and 
obsolescent Soviet (and US) kit. 79and this exigency was 
reinforced by the modernisation and expansion of the Air 
76 FEER 14 February, 1985, p. 34. For Lowry, the acquisition of 'Rapiers'by Indonesia 
It symbolised the upgrading of conventional capabilities post-1983". Lowry, 
Indonesian Defence Policy p. 63. 
77 FEER 1 March, 1984, p. 9. 
78 Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy p-65- Air defence priority was accorded to the 
vital straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar and to the Arun and Bontang 
liquified natural gas plants. See Ibid. p. 62. The RBS-70s were used to equip one 
Kostrad AD battalion "for the local defence of vital objects. " Ibid. p. 65. 
79 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia p-106. 
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Force's air defence and ground attack capabilities with the 
earlier acquisitions of the F-5Es and with the acquisition of a large number of A-4'Skyhawks'in the early 1980s. 
The training aircraft which were acquired demonstrated the 
need to meet the requirements of flying training across the board (that is, primary, basic and advanced). A total of 40 AS-202 'Bravos' were acquired for primary training; a further 
nine T-34s (some 16 had already been acquired in 1978) for 
basic training; and a further 12 'Hawk' T-53s (eight already being purchased for this role) were acquired for advanced 
training. 80 Five T-41s were also ordered for general training 
requirements. 
The training dimension was also evident in terms of the 
Army's acquisition of nine Hughes 300 helicopters in 1983. 
This occurred at a time when the Army's inventory of 
helicopters was expected to expand significantly with the 
acquisition of up to 50 NBo-105s which had been ordered back 
in 1976 (although far less than this were actually delivered) 
and five Bell Model 412s which were ordered in 1982. 
In respect of other equipment for the Army - and bearing in 
mind that orders had already been placed for AMX-13 light 
tanks and V-150 APCs prior to 1979, as the initial 
modernisation drive got under way - Indonesia ordered a 
large number of AMX-VCI MICVs in 1979 and lesser 
quantities of 'Commando Ranger' APCs and 'Commando 
Scout' armoured cars in 1983. These orders were certainly 
intended to maintain the Army's limited armoured capability 
through the replacement of ageing and/or inoperable kit (for 
example, British 'Saladin' and 'Ferret' reconnaissance 
vehicles and Soviet BTR-40 and -50 APCs). They must, 
however, also be viewed in the context of the need to develop 
the Army's combat capabilities for internal security operations 
80 The 'Hawks' were ostensibly procured to replace ageing T-33s in this role. They 
may, however, have been primarily procured with a view to their utility for counter- 
insurgency operations in East Timor (this will be explored more fully in the next 
chapter). 
The designation of these various aircraft for particular training roles is outlined in 
Captain H. A. Josephs, RAN (Ret), "Indonesia: Complex requirements and a huge 
task", (The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific Region, No 15), Pacific Defence 
&porter, March 1985, p. 22. 
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(hence the internal security dimension was influential here 
too). 
The last area in which modernisation was required - and one in which significant expansion also occurred - was the vital 
one of the defence of maritime national interests. Indonesia's 
archipelagic nature had long been a defining feature of its 
strategic thinking. The impacts of the Dutch blockade during 
the independence struggle and of the Outer Islands rebellions 
in the 1950s had highlighted the vulnerabilities of its physical 
make-Up,, 81 and had led, eventually, to the development of 
Indonesia's 'wawasan nusantara' (archipelagic principle) by 
which it was intended that the waters linking Indonesia's 
disparate land mass should be considered an integral part of 
the state. 82 Hence, to ensure Indonesia's security it was 
essential not only to defend the maritime approaches to the 
archipelago but also the waters of the archipelago itself. 
These territorial waters, of course, were also important for 
Indonesia's security (broadly defined) in the context of 
maritime resources - particularly oil and natural gas, but 
fisheries too. 
The prevailing regional strategic environment in the wake of 
the communist victories in Indo-China heightened Indonesia's 
concerns about its maritime security 83and "provided the 
[initial] motivation to begin rebuilding the Navy" which 
mostly consisted of ageing Soviet vessels and four more 
recent vintage secondhand US frigates. 84 Significantly, and 
in a similar vein to the experiences of the other ASEAN states, 
the arrival of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees from 
81 See FEER 6 January, 1983, pp14-15. The experience of Dutch and Royal Navy 
aircraft carriers passing through the archipelago in the 1960s was also influential. 
See Ibid. p. 15. 
82 The concept of 'wawasan nusantara' was "incorporated into ABRI doctrine in 1969 
and into national doctrine in 1973. " Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 8. Dupont 
traces its evolution from the juanda Declaration' in 1957 and its direct forerunner 
'Wawasan. Nusantara Bahari'which was enunciated in 1966. See Dupont, op. cit. 
p. 287. 
83 There were concerns, Crouch notes, about the potential for conflict in the area 
around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. See FEER 14 February, 1985, 
p. 32. 
84 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 98. 
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1978-1981 seemed to accent Indonesia's maritime security 
vulnerabilities. 85 
The pressing need for naval modernisation - and, ultimately, for expansion - was intensified by Indonesia's declaration in 
1980 of a 200-mile EEZ. This declaration was, in essence, an 
attempt to provide a mechanism through which Indonesia 
could ensure its access to vital maritime resources. As such, however, it clearly required the means to uphold it which, in 
the first instance, appeared to indicate the capability to not 
just patrol the zone but possibly to defendit too. 86 
Furthermore, the recognition of Indonesia's long-standing 
claims to be an 'archipelagic state' at the 1982 UNCLOS, 
which both expanded its territorial waters and gave it rights 
and obligations with regard to the passage of ships through 
sealanes in the archipelago, only reinforced this need. 87 
The various developments pertaining to maritime law meant, 
in effect, that Indonesia had to have the capability not only to 
defend itself from seaborne external attack and subversion, 
but also to "enforce" national and international laws on the 
"use and exploitation of the seas. "88 During the Second Cold 
War period it can be observed that Indonesia acquired a 
85 See FEER 6 January, 1983, p. 15. 
86 Indonesia's declaration of an EEZ, it was feared, could pose the possibility of 
conflict because of the existence of overlapping boundaries with other regional states. 
Specifically, it was thought that there could be conflict with Vietnam "as its 
definition of an economic zone ... 
[was] not accepted by Indonesia and encompasse[d] 
economic waters which Jakarta ha[d] already contracted out for oil exploration. " 
FEER I April, 1980, p. 53. These concerns were short-lived, however, dissipating once 
a process of negotiation got under way between the two states. 
87 For details of the implications of the archipelagic principle recognised at the 
Convention, see FEER, 6 January, 1983, pp. 12-14. The Convention was not ratified by 
Indonesia itself until 1985 and only finally took effect in November 1994. 
To some extent Mak is correct in arguing that as UNCLOS was predated by Indonesia's 
own concept of 'wawasan nusantara', it had less significance for Indonesian naval 
planning than for some of the other ASEAN states; particularly as Indonesia had 
already declared its EEZ. Mak, op. cit p-65. What it did mean, however, was that 
now the principle had been recognised internationally the onus was on Indonesia to 
develop the capability to at last really enforce the principle which it had not 
hitherto sought to do. 
88 Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy p. 67. 
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substantial number of weapons which facilitated the 
modernisation and development of both these capabilities. 
To facilitate resource protection and law enforcement - especially in the seas in the eastern part of the archipelago 
which were particularly prone to illegal fiShing89 - Indonesia ordered a number of Lurssen 57m patrol craft in 1982 and Boeing jetfoils in 1983. The second-hand ex-RN (Royal Navy) 'Tribal' class frigates ordered in 1984 were also intended to perform a patrol function, although they could 
play a role in the defence against external threats too as they 
enabled the Navy to carry out ship-based ASW operations 
through their ability to carry 'Wasp' helicopters. 90 
The virtual impossibility of acquiring and deploying a 
sufficient number of patrol vessels to adequately cover 
Indonesia's vast territorial waters -a fact which only highlights the "central paradox" of Indonesian strategy and 
illustrates why that strategy has not depended solely upon 
conventional warfare capabilities9l - meant that it was 
necessary for Indonesia to acquire maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance aircraft to augment the Navy's warships. 
For the purpose of short-range maritime surveillance, 
therefore, six additional 'Nomad Searchmasters' were 
ordered in 1980 (Indonesia had already received six of these 
aircraft - transferred from the Australian Defence Force - in 
the mid-1970s). For more extended patrols, and specifically 
to monitor shipping - especially warships - passing through 
the main archipelagic sea lanes linking the Java Sea and the 
89 It was also in these waters where the majority of the Vietnamese refugees, and 
other illegal immigrants, arrived. See FEER 6 April, 1979, p. 33. Dupont notes that 
since the re-organisation of the Navy in the mid-1980s the Eastern Fleet has been 
focussed on "non-conventional military threats and law enforcement", with the 
Western Fleet being "a traditional sea-warfare group. " Dupont, op. cit. p. 280. 
90The Tribals' were even more versatile as with their two 4.5" guns they could also 
provide "naval gunfire support of troops ashore": a useful ability given ABRI's desire 
to be able to mount effective amphibious landings. A. W. 
Glazebrook, "Indonesia 
builds for its needs", Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1986, p. 17. 
91 "While difficult to conquer because of the strategic depth afforded by size, terrain 
and archipelagic nature, ... 
[Indonesia] is also difficult to defend ... for those very 
same reasons. " Dupont, Qp-. cit-, p. 277. The Indonesian response to this problem, 
Dupont notes, has been for certain areas to be accorded critical strategic importance: 
for example, the South China Sea and the Sulawesi 
Sea. Ibid. A list of such 
"sensitive areas" is provided in The Policy Of The 
State Defence And Security Of The 
[no publication details provided], p. 33. Republic Of I idonesia 1995 
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Indian Ocean (Sunda, Bali and Lombok), the Air Force's 
limited maritime reconnaissance capability was expanded 
with the acquisition of three B737-200 maritime 
reconnaissance planes in the period 1982-1984 and two C- 
130H-MP aircraft in 1982. 
The acquisition of these aircraft, with their ability to monitor 
the movements of foreign warships, can also be seen in the 
context of Indonesia's efforts to develop its capabilities for 
conventional maritime warfare. At the heart of these efforts 
was the attempt to establish an effective capacity for ASW 
operations. In this regard Indonesia was not only responding 
to the widespread increase in concern about the passage of 
Soviet submarines through regional waters, but was 
specifically concerned about the passage of all submarines 
through the archipelago (whether Australian, American or 
Soviet) given their symbolic - if not actual - threat to 
Indonesia's maritime security. 92 
To develop an effective ASW capability, a capability which at 
the start of the Second Cold War was only minimal, Indonesia 
first ordered 10 'Wasp' helicopters in 198 1. These helicopters, 
the first ASW ones to be operated by the naval air arm, were 
almost entirely shore-based at first - and thus of limited utility 
- as only one of the recently delivered 'Fatahillah' class 
frigates was capable of operating a helicopter. Ship-based 
ASW operations were only really developed with the later 
acquisitions of the 'Tribal' class frigates and of the Dutch Type 
12s. 93 
It was these Type 12 frigates, however, five of which were 
acquired between 1985 and 1989, which dramatically 
improved the Navy's capacity for ASW. In addition to being 
able to operate the 'Wasps', they also had more advanced 
sonars than the 'Tribals'. The Type 12s - fairly advanced by 
regional standards - could thus both monitor the passage of 
submarines through vital straits and deny it too if required. 94 
92 This point is partially derived from Dupont's discussion of post-Cold War 
maritime security concerns. Dupont, op. cit. p. 288. 
93 The three much larger 'Super Puma' ASW helecopters acquired between 1985 and 
1989 could not be operated from either of these types. 
94 
The Type 12s also represented a major advance in the Navy's 
surface warfare capabilities as their weapons fit included 'Harpoon' SSMs. 
Finally, in terms of the development of maritime defence 
capabilities, Indonesia also ordered vessels which were 
essential for the often neglected area of mine clearance - the two 'Alkmaar' class minhunters in 1985 - and a training frigate in 198T`(? ) probably in order to prepare for the future 
anticipated expansion of the frigate force. The training 
frigate, when it arrived in 1984, could also be seen as an 
economical stop-gap measure to improve the Navy's then 
limited capacity for modern warfare as in the event of "hostilities" it could be utilised for "ASW, escort and 
trooping. "95 
Malaysi 
Moving on to the Malaysian experience of the influence of the 
requirements of policy and strategy, it is evident that it shares 
some important similarities - as well as displays differences - 
with that of Indonesia. Most notable, in terms of shared 
experiences, are some of the same overlaps between the 
influence of strategic requirements and of the internal security 
dimension and a common concern about maritime national 
interests; geographic features again being an important 
determinant. Malaysian arms acquisitions were also 
LI/ unaffected by an action-reaction process of Possible threats 
and low level competition - despite the existence of a number 
of territorial disputes which could have given rise to concerns 
about the prevailing military balance with other states. 96 The 
impact of military developments within the complex (for 
example, the increased presence of foreign submarines in 
94 See Glazebrook, op. cit. p. 16. 
95 Josephs, o12. cit. p-20. 
96 The most obvious example here, of course, would be the dispute with the 
Philippines over the East Malaysian state of Sabah. Tim Huxley contends, however, 
that there is little evidence of a possible Philippine threat to Sabah leading to 
anything more than "contingency plans". Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence 
Policies, 1975-198L p. 17. Moreover, given the Philippines' reliance on the US for 
external defence, the Philippine Armed Forces' conventional capabilities were very 
limited. 
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regional waters and the associated development of ASW 
capabilities), however,, cannot be completely discounted. 97 
Despite these similarities, though, it appears harder to 
construct a suitable framework for discussing the influence of 
such requirements on Malaysian arms acquisitions than it was for Indonesia. Furthermore, the influence of such 
requirements can,, at best,, seem rather short-term and 
intermittent because of the rather unsystematic character of 
Malaysia's arms acquisitions: a character which was itself a function of the stop-go nature of the modernisation and 
expansion programme during the Second Cold War period. 
This stop-go nature was distinguished by the dearth of major 
acquisitions between the end of the first phase of PERISTA in 
1983 (many of the planned developments in which were either 
deferred or scaled down on cost grounds after the economic 
downturn which began in 1981) and the signing of the Anglo- 
Malaysian MoU in 1988. Those purchases which were made 
during this period - with the exception of the 'Wasp' 
helicopters - were confined "to piecemeal acquisitions of 
essential support equipment., such as small transport aircraft 
and helicopters [for example,, the HU-16Bs ordered in 
19851. "98 Nevertheless, it is possible to discern - during the 
bouts of acquisition and the interregnum between them - 
where the aspects of capability and national interest did have 
an impact on arms procurement. 
In contrast to Indonesia, the need to maintain existing 
capabilities actually resulted in only a limited number of 
acquisitions, although these are significant in the context of 
Malaysia's overall acquisitions. The main reason for this 
97 Malaysia also shared the same sort of concerns displayed by Indonesia (albeit not 
generated by regional leadership anxities) about the introduction into the region of F- 
16s. One of the reasons for the inclusion of 'Tornado' aircraft on the priority 
equipment list outlined in the 1988 MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) with 
Britain - although the order never eventuated - was that unfavourable comparisons 
were being made by Malaysian military officials with Malaysia's neighbours' air 
forces' inventories. See FEER 24 November, 1988, p. 23; and Acharya, Arms 
Proliferation Issues in ASEAN p-254- 
98 FEER 24 November, 1988, p. 23. The unsystematic and piecemeal nature of 
Malaysian arms acquisition could also be ascribed to Malaysian defence policy as a 
whole. Malaysia, Stubbs contends, has no "fully fleshed out defence policy but rather 
a series of policy statements". Richard Stubbs, "Malaysian Defence Policy: Strategy 
versus Structure", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, p. 53. 
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was that although Malyasia had embarked on an expansion 
of its conventional capabilities in the mid-late 1960s, this 
expansion had been on a much smaller scale than Indonesia's 
and thus there were not the same number of weapons which 
needed replacing. 
During the 1970s, in fact, as part of Malaysia's move towards 
f 'self-reliance" in the aftermath of the withdrawal of British 
forces, 99 Malaysia coud be said to have still been creating a 
limited conventional war capability. The need for the 
creation of such a capability being reinforced by the regional 
instability engendered by the communist victories in Indo- 
China which saw "the MAF [Malaysian Armed Forces] 
beginning to examine conventional warfare concepts, 
organisation and structure". 100 
At the outset of the Second Cold War period, one of the most 
pressing needs was for a replacement for the RMAF's jet 
trainers - the 'Tebuans' (Canadian CL-41Gs). 101 In early 
May 1979 the Defence Minister announced that the RMAF 
would replace these trainers with new aircraft as the 
'Tebuans' would reach the end of their life expectancy in two 
years. 102 The imperative for their replacement was made 
more acute by the third crash of the type since January at the 
end of the month, which threatened to lead to their 
permanent grounding and the dramatic curtailment of pilot 
training. The compulsion for an urgent Stop-gap 
replacement - and a desire to evaluate potential long-term 
ones - led to an order for four F-5Fs in 1979. The Italian 
MB- 
339A was eventually selected as the replacement jet trainer 
and 12 of these aircraft were ordered in 1982. 
The requirements for pilot training actually increased once the 
decision had been taken to acquire the A-4s which, once 
99 Alagappa, op. cit. p. 181. 
100 Mak, pp. cit., p. 128. 
101 The 'Tebuans' also constituted the RMAF's main counter-insurgency capability at 
this time, although it had already been decided that this capability would 
be 
expanded with the acquisition of the A-4s: the 
A-4s being intended to replace the 
'Tebuan' "operational squadron" in this role. Ibid. p. 185. 
, 16 
May, 1979, p. 13. 102 See 
_Straits 
Times 
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delivered, would more than double the RMAFs frontline 
combat aircraft. To cater for this expansion 44 Pilatus PC-7 
'Turbo Trainers' were ordered in 1981, with their delivery both preceding and being contemporaneous with that of the 'Skyhawks'. The PC-7s were eventually intended to replace the RMAFs 'Bulldog' 102 trainers which had been obtained in 
the early 1970s. 
A requirement for replacement equipment also had a partial influence on the decision in 1977 to acquire new armoured 
vehicles for the Army. Its existing 'Ferret' scout cars were 
thought to be soon nearing the end of their operational lives 
and the 'Commando' V-1 00 APCs acquired in 1971 were now 
somewhat dated having been superseded in production soon 
after Malaysia received them by the more advanced V-150 
version. 103 More importantly, however, the decision to 
significantly increase - quantitatively and qualitatively - the Army's mechanised capability (reflected in the 1977 order for 
'Commando' V-150s and the 1981 orders for'Condor'APCs 
and 'Sibmas' armoured fire support vehicles) resulted from 
the ongoing build-up of the MAF's conventional capability 
and, especially, from the requirements of counter-insurgency 
operations (see Chapter IV). 
The RMN (Royal Malysian Navy) had little need for 
replacement equipment to maintain its existing capability, 
particularly given the modernity of its principle combat 
element - the eight FAC (the four Swedish 'Spica-2' class 
vessels only being delivered in 1979). Instead, the small size 
and composition of the navy, given Malaysia's extensive 
maritime interests and the increasing focus on them, meant 
that the requirement was for it to be considerably expanded. 
The only example of the need for replacement equipment 
103 A good deal of confusion surrounds the exact model of the 'Commando' APC which 
the new vehicles ordered in 1977 and subsequently were intended to replace. 
Alagappa, for instance, states that the new vehicles ordered in 1981 and 1982 under 
PERISTA were intended to replace 'Commando' V-150s (along with Panhard M3 APCs 
and, presumably, Panhard AML armoured cars which Malaysia also possessed). 
Alagappa, op. cit. p. 184. As Malaysia had only just ordered a large number of 
'Commando' V-150s in 1977 as part of the expansion of the Army's mechanised 
capability, he is obviously referring to the earlier V-100 versions. 
Many of the 'Ferrets', incidentally, were eventually modernised rather than 
replaced. 
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leading to the acquisition of new ships during the Second Cold 
War period was the purchase of four 'Lerici' class MCMVs 
(mine countermeasures vessels) ordered in 1981 to replace all 
the RMN's existing minesweepers. 104 
The gradual expansion of the RMN which had been 
underway prior to the start of the Second Cold War had, Mak 
contends, been necessitated by the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and the need to protect 
resources; particularly oil and gas which Malaysia had 
"begun exploiting ... in the late 1970s. "105 These two aspects 
were also emphasised in PERISTA which, amongst other 
capabilities, stressed the need for the MAF to have the 
capability to "secure the lines of communication between 
penisular Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak, and to protect 
Malaysia's offshore interests. "106 
The significance of these concerns was heightened in the early 
part of the Second Cold War period by a number of 
interconnected developments. First, like Indonesia, Malaysia 
was concerned about the implications of possible Vietnamese 
activity in the South China Sea, especially in the light of 
Malaysia first stating a claim in the Spratly islands with the 
publication of a new map of its continental shelf in 1979.107 
Secondly, Malaysia declared its own EEZ in 1980 to secure 
access to its vital maritime resources and also had its 
territorial waters expanded under the 1982 UNCLOS. 108 
104 The Defence Minister had announced in 1979 that the RMN's existing 
minesweepers (six British 'Ton' class vessels) were to be relaced 'soon'. See Straits 
Times 16 May, 1979, p. 13- 
105 J. N. Mak, "The Modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces", Contemi2orary 
Southeast Asia Vol. 19, No. 1, June 1997, p. 35. 
106 Alagappa, ol2. cit. p. 184. 
107 See Stubbs, op. cit. p. 46. 
108 In reference to the latter which had duly recognised Indonesia's 'archipelagic 
principle', Tim Huxley notes that Malaysia was concerned about the 
"implications" 
of this principle "for uninterrupted sea communication 
between peninsular Malaysia 
and the Borneo states. " Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence 
Policies, 1975-81 p. 25. 
It might be possible, therefore, that Malaysia did take account of 
Indonesia's naval 
expansion in planning its own. 
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Thirdly, there was an increased incidence of piracy and illegal immigration. 109 
Of all these developments, it would appear to be the need to 
protect maritime resources which had the greatest effect on the RMN's expansion and on the type of ships and other 
weapons procured. This view is shared by Tim Huxley who 
cites the opinion of a retired RMN official to the effect that: 
by 1981 the protection of Malaysia's EEZ in general 
and oil and natural gas drilling platforms in 
particular, had become the principal operational role, 
and reason for continuing expansion of the 
Malaysian navy. 110 
An expansion of the RMN was certainly required because its 
composition in 1979 was mostly unsuited to the extended, 
long-range, patrols which were necessary to protect the EEZ. 
With the exception of two British frigates., the only other 
vessels suited to patrolling were limited to coastal waters. 
The FAC were primarily designed for anti-ship operations 
and with their "limited durability in the open seas ... [were] 
unsuitable for patrolling and protecting offshore 
installations. "ill To establish the required capability, 
therefore, Malaysia ordered two West German FS-1500 
frigates in 1981 (these also being able to defend the SLOCs 
between East and West Malaysia with their anti-ship -a 
number of MM-38 'Exocets' also being ordered - and ASW 
capacity) and two OPVs (offshore patrol vessels) in 1983.112 
In addition, to enhance the utility of the frigate force for 
extended operations and improve naval defence overall, two 
support ships were also ordered in 1981. One of these ships 
109 See Straits Times, 21 January, 1980, p. 13. 
110 Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81 p. 25. The importance of 
the EEZ was, it has been suggested, even greater in the wake of the economic downturn 
after 1981: "the oil and gas potential of the economic zone is of critical importance for 
Malaysia ... [to 
help] achieve a rapid economic turnaround". FEER, 29 September, 
1983, p. 40. 
111 Acharya, Arms Proliferation Issues in ASEAN p. 263. 
112 The initial plan had been to purchase two additional units of each type although 
this had to be scaled-down because of economic constraints. 
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was a "multi-purpose command support ship" and the other 
one was an "ammunition-carrying ship. "113 
To further improve maritime security capabilities, for both the 
protection of the EEZ and guarding the coastline against 
illegal immigration, the decision was also taken to form a 
maritme reconnaissance squadron for the RMAF, with three 
C-130H-MP aircraft being ordered in 1979.114 The order for 
the two RF-5Es in 1980, it has been suggested, could also be 
viewed in this context. 115 
The importance of maritime national interests, and an 
indication of the enduring significance of this for Malaysian 
arms acquisitions, was such that the only acquisition of major 
weapons which occurred during the interregnum between 
1983 and 1988 - except for the purchase of a single IPTN NAS- 
332 'Super Puma' ordered in 1987 for evaluation - was that of 
six 'Wasp' ASW helicopters ordered in 1987. These first six 
helicopters provided the basis for the formation of the RMN's 
air arm which was established in 1989 at Lumut on the west 
coast of Peninsular Malaysia - near the vital Strait of 
Malacca - for the purpose of "surveillance duties and anti- 
submarine operations. "116 The 'Wasps' could also be 
deployed on the two FS-1500 frigates, and on the British 
'Mermaid' class frigate,, to improve their capacity for ASW 
operations. A further six'Wasps'were subsequently ordered 
in 1988., which thus doubled the RMN's air arm's stength. 
Procuring these helicopters certainly seemed to fit in with the 
growing importance attached by Malaysia to ASW. An 
importance which reflected the aforementioned general 
concern within the region about the presence of foreign 
submarines. In 1985, in fact, Malaysia had requested 
( C,, ýe- 
113 Alagappa, op. cit. p. 185. 
114 See Straits Times 11 May, 1979, p. 9 and 13 June, 1979, p-10. 
115 See Acharya, Arms Proliferation Issues in ASEAN p. 258. Acharya also suggests 
that a squadron of the PC-7s provided a maritime surveillance capability 
too. Ibid. 
There is no other evidence, however, to support this contention about 
the PC-7s. All 
the PC-7s were either deployed to flying training squadrons or employed 
in a forward 
air control role. 
,9 
May, 1990, p 116 Straits Times . 19. 
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Australian assistance in training its naval personnel for ASW, 
with the Malaysian Defence Minister saying that such 
training was required "to equip the ... RMN with the expertise to counter intrusion of foreign submarines into its waters. "117 
Many of the items of equipment listed under the Anglo- 
Malaysian MoU in 1988 were also indicative of the 
importance attached to maritime security (as well as the 
continued need for modernisation): an importance which was 
reinforced by the skirmish between Vietnam and China in the 
Spratly Islands in March. 118 None of the items under the 
MoU - many of which were ultimately dropped on cost 
grounds - were ordered and delivered before the end of 1989, 
though, and are thus outside the scope of this study. Apart 
from the additional 'Wasps', the only major weapons ordered 
and delivered in the 1988-1989 period were nine FH-70 
artillery pieces and these actually represented a long intended 
purchase of medium artillery first outlined in PERISTA and 
subsequently postponed from the Fourth to the Fifth Malaysia 
Plans. 119 
Thailand 
For Thailand, as was noted at the beginning of the chapter, 
the influence of all these aspects can be seen in the context of 
the clearly identifiable threat posed by Vietnam which, in any 
case, marginalised the impact of the less intense form of the 
action-reaction process. Thus, when equipment was 
procured to maintain existing capabilities through 
replacement and modernisation , or to protect national 
interests,, it has been discussed in the preceding chapter on 
external threat. The exception to this is the acquisition of 
training aircraft and helicopters which, although obviously 
related to the expansion of the RTAF brought about in 
response to concerns about Vietnamese and Soviet air force 
117 "ASEAN Notes", Pacific Defence Reporter August 1985, p. 20. This did not mean, 
however, that "there were [emphasis added] frequent intrusions". Ibid. 
118 For details, see FEER 13 October, 1988, pp. 85-86; 24 November, 1988, pp. 23-24; and 
8 June, 1989, p-30 
119 See Alagappa, Qq2., --cit. p. 
189. Stubbs describes this order - although it was 
eventually only for 15 and not 30 pieces - as 
"a Euro-purchase outside the MOU". 
Stubbs, Qp. cit, p. 53. 
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capabilities, seems more suited to inclusion here. These 
aircraft and helicopters were not actually a reaction to any 
external stimulant and their acquisition fits in with the 
general requisite to preserve and develop training capabilities 
which had been much in evidence in terms of the other states. 
To meet the continued requirement for flying training, and the 
need to expand this in tandem with the expansion of the 
RTAF's combat strength, Thailand ordered a range of aircraft 
to fulfil the need for planes at all stages of the training 
process: T-33As were orderd in 1982 and 1988 for advanced jet 
training; F-5Bs in 1982 for operational conversion; T-37B/Cs 
in 1979 for basic jet training; and 'Fantrainers' in 1983 for 
primary training. The requirement for pilot training was 
evident also in the orders for TH-300C helicopters in 1986 and 
1987 for the RTA, which were probably meant to replace the 
ageing TH-55As in this role. 
Burma 
Precisely the same point about context can also be applied to 
Burma. In this case, though, it is the internal security 
dimension which is of the greatest significance. Thus, 
Burma's need to maintain its air force's training and counter- 
insurgency capability through the replacement of its elderly 
AT-33As and T-37s was overwhelmingly determined by the 
pressure of the internal security dimension. It is to that 
pressure which we must turn next. 
The pressure of the requirements of defence policy and 
strategy has influenced each state's arms acquisitions in one 
way or another. Although in the cases of Burma and 
Thailand its impact appears rather minimal because of the 
need to see it in the context of more influential pressures, its 
relevance is still discernible nonetheless in both states' orders 
for a variety of training aircraft. The paramount reason for 
the pressure's general applicability is that the three aspects it 
contains (military capability, potential threats and national 
interests) are more or less continous features of all the various 
states' defence equations: national interests,, of course, are 
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exceptionally enduring even though they may be liable to 
shifts in emphasis. 
The pressure's impact on arms acquisitions was greatest in 
Singapore. This resulted from the city state's strategic 
culture,, its sense of vulnerability and its overwhelming 
reliance on hardware. It was also significant for Malaysian 
and Indonesian arms acquisitions where the geographic 
make-up of both states meant a premium was placed on 
maritime capabilities, especially in the light of the increased 
importance attached to maritime territory and resources 
which emerged in the Second Cold War period. For Vietnam, 
the need to acquire major weapons to pursue its military 
campaign in Cambodia, in fulfilment of national interests 
which extended beyond its borders, meant that the pressure 
took on a rather unique, and essentially one-dimensional, 
form. 
---l 
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Chapter IV The Internal Security Dimension 
Having more or less thoroughly explored the SE Asian arms dynamic's external dimension, it is now time to turn our 
attention more fully (acknowledging the nexus between the 
two provided by aspects of the requirements of defence policy 
and strategy) to the internal one. 
In contrast with the case of external threats, where the 
action-reaction process derived from the superpower 'arms 
dynamic' provided a clear general analytical approach as a 
starting-point, it is far less evident that the domestic structure 
model can perform the same function here. This is despite the 
fact that the internal security dimension as an individual 
pressure was identified with the domestic structure model 
sub-set in the introduction. Indeed, most elements of this 
model have little or no utility for an analysis of secondary 
arms dynamics, such as the SE Asian one, consisting of states 
which are either part- or non-producers. 
Although Buzan recognises that there are elements of the 
domestic structure model which do have general applicability 
( mainly the role of 'I organizational pressures from the 
military establishment ... and the domestic insecurity logic of 
autism"), ' these elements appear to have been either 
inapplicable, or of marginal relevance, to the states under 
consideration here. 2 Of more pertinence to our analysis is the 
point he makes in his concluding discussion on the relationship 
between arms production and the 'arms dynamic': namely, 
that the role of domestic structure will differ from primary to 
secondary arms dynamics and that the abscence of the 
'institutionalisation' of R&D and production factors means 
that different internal factors will come into play. 3 
1 Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies p. 104. 
2 The 'domestic insecurity logic of autism' has already been considered as part of the 
complex linkage of internal and external security concerns, and been found to be 
wanting in many respects. The non-existent, or at best marginal, influence on arms 
acquisitions of military pressure as an independent factor will be discussed in the 
conclusion. This is not to say, however, that the military did not have an input into 
the identification of threats and the drawing up of defence policies and strategies - as 
a componenet of the bureaucratic politics process - and thus an important influence on 
the means of responding to, or furthering, them. 
Buzari, An Intro luction to Strategic Studies p. 130. 
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Viewed in the context of the SE Asian'arms dynamic'during 
the Second Cold War, it is readily observable that the most 
important different internal factor which might have 
influenced arms acquisitions was that of internal military 
security threats which was one of those -domestic (or non- 7> interactive) factors referred to earlier. In spite of the 
reorientation of many of the states security thinking towards 
external concerns and away from internal ones, there were 
still instances in which the existence of specific, tangible, 
internal security threats necessitated a military response. As 
already noted in the context of external threat assessment, of 
course, arms procurement was not just influenced by actual 
threats but also potential threats, and thus an assessment of 
the impact of the internal security threat factor needs to 
include the idea of potential internal military threats, or 
contingencies, too. 
In terms of weak, or developing, states,, these actual and 
potential internal military security threats usually took the 
form of insurgencies: insurgencies which were motivated and 
sustained by a variety of forces (for example, communism; 
ethnic-nationalism; and religion). Generally speaking, such 
insurgencies usually remained at the so-called 'guerilla phase' 
and did not progress to the stage of mobile, conventional, 
warfare (or a Maoist 'war of movement'). 4 The military 
nature of such insurgencies, however, has meant that the idea 
that they can actually influence the acquisition of major 
weapons - in effect, that the existence of such internal threats 
could constitute the internal security dimension of the SE 
Asian 'arms dynamic' - could be called into question. 
Indeed, it might be suggested that the greater the focus on the 
internal security dimension (in terms of the threat posed by 
insurgencies) in a state., the less influence this pressure or 
factor will have on major weapons acquisitions. The point 
here is that the appropriate military response to such threats 
would not be a large, conventionally armed, force, but 
something smaller and less heavily armed. The need for 
major weapons, therefore, would be obviated. Nicole Ball, 
4 For a classic discussion of these stages in terms of communist 
insurgency, see Sir 
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1966), 
Chapter I 
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for example, contends that in the case of such internal threats 
the purchase of advanced weapons systems is unlikely to have 
much (if any) utility and that counter-insurgency operations 
can best be waged by well trained, and lightly equipped, infantry. 5 In the SE Asian context, Ball's contention is 
supported, and applied to the utility of such threats as an influence on major weapons procurement, by Karp. After 
recognising the importance of "domestic insurgencies" for SE 
Asian states, he argues that "they represent a poor guide to 
military procurement", Particularly as the "conduct of 
counter-insurgency warfare with major weapons was largely discredited by the US failure in Vietnam. "6 
Significantly, however, for the purposes of determining 
whether or not internal security threats such as insurgencies 
can constitute the internal security dimension and provide a 
general analytical approach at the same time, Karp 
immediately follows his contention with the statement that: 
"Propeller aircraft and armoured cars are the largest items 
routinely deployed against insurgencies today. "7 The 
implication here, which is also evident in Ball's reference to 
'advanced weapons, is that although counter-insurgency 
operations may not require the use of large numbers of v9_01- 
-J technologically advanced weapons, the appropiate military 
response to insurgencies does not preclude the need for 
certain types of major, low-tech, weapons. Successful 
5 See Ball, op. cit. pp. 82-83. It is noteworthy in this respect that she cites counter- 
insurgency operations in Burma as an example of the effectiveness of infantry units. 
Ball's general point has also been well made by Thompson, who states that the 
"requirement is for a small, elite, highly disciplined, lightly equipped and 
aggressive army, with a supporting air force and navy of sufficient capability to make 
the army highly mobile". Thompson, Defeating Communist InsurgenU, p. 62. The 
point about the role of the air force, especially, and the need for mobility, is also 
highly significant in the context of the discussion here. 
6 Karp, op. cit. p-340. It is worth noting the argument put forward by Kolko, 
though, that the US was not actually seeking to pursue a counter-insurgency strategy 
based on the use of major weaponry but, rather, was just using the Vietnamese 
experience as a way of 'testing' its strategic doctrines and military hardware for a 
possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam. Anatomy Of 
War 1940-1975 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 188. 
7 Karp, Qp-. -cit-., p-340. 
Helicopters (both combat and transport) could also be added 
to this list. 
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counter-insurgency operations may, in fact, actually require the acquisition and utilisation of such weapons. 8 
It would seem " therefore., that it is actually in relation to 
quantity and technological level that doubts are raised about the influence of insurgencies on arms acquisitions, rather than in relation to the idea per se. Indeed, the point is well made by Nutter that internal threat assessment is not irrelevent " but is of less relevance in determining high-tech hardware 
acquisitions than external military threat assessment. 9 
If limited acquisitions of low-tech weapons in a few major 
categories can be influenced by specific internal security 
threats., then it would not be unreasonable to suggest that 
concerns about the potential emergence of such threats may 
also influence arms acquistions in those states prone to such 
threats. This would appear to be particularly likely in those 
states which are characterised by high levels of ethnic and 
religious diversity and which are geographically spread over 
a large area: the metropolitan centre (including major 
military facilities) may thus be some distance away from areas 
of potential unrest. In these cases, arms acquisitions would 
not just be in the areas discussed above, but also in those areas 
relating to the creation and development of air- and sealift 
capabilities. 
The only other different internal factor which appears to lend 
itself to a brief examination, could be described as a 
'structural' factor: one which relates to both the nature of the 
state (weak) and to that of the international system 
(hierachical). 
Developing, or Third World, states will, like others in the 
international system, seek to develop their power capabilities 
(including military strength) in order to improve their position 
in the hierachy and enhance their autonomy and security. In 
8 Thompson, in noting the importance of the air force in counter-isurgency operations 
(in both transport and tactical support roles), argues that the versatile nature of the 
helicopter means that it "is one of the greatest modern assets to a government faced 
with insurgency. " Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p-106. 
He also goes 
on to recognise that in instances where insurgents or their supplies are 
being moved by 
sea, the acquisition of "small patrol vessels" can 
be useful. Ibid. p. 108. 
Nutter, Pp. -cit., p. 
30. 
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the case of Third World states, however, their desire to improve their position mainly reflects the if primary objective it 
of their ruling elites which is "to reduce the deep sense of insecurity from which Third World states and regimes suffer domestically and internationally. "10 Power, therefore, Ayoob 
contends, is seen not just as an "end in itself but as an instrument to ease their security predicament. "" Acquiring 
and enhancing a military capability, therefore, could be seen 
as a partial response to a condition of internal insecurity. 
The validity of this limited interpretation of the structural factor in the case of the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' during the 
Second Cold War rests on the extent of the insecurity, or 
weakness, of the SE Asian states under consideration and the 
extent to which they are both aware of an international 
hierachy of military strength and try to improve their position 
in it. 
On both counts, however, the argument is against the 
structural factor playing any significant role at all. As was 
argued in the chapter on external threat assessment,, several 
of the states were somewhat less weak during this period 
than before and, in the case of the weakest, Burma, its virtual 
opting out from the international system meant its weakness 
had essentially been internalised. Moreover., the idea that 
the SE Asian states would acquire arms to further their 
security through improving their position in the international 
hierachy can largely been deemed irrelevant. 12 To the extent 
that they do take account of an international - military - 
hierachy, then it is almost solely in terms of weapons 
technology and thus it is the technological imperative which is 
at work. 
10 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament pp. 2-3. 
11 Ibid. p. 4. 
12 Mr. Daljit Singh, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 
Singapore and a former official in Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 
example, contends that Singapore would probably consider that idea irrelevant, as 
would the other ASEAN members. Arms acquisitions, he contends, occur because of 
the requirements of individual security, modernisation and the need to keep abreast of 
technology. Correspondence, September, 1997. It is an idea which is also absent from 
the literature. 
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In view of the lack of relevance of this structural aspect as another different internal factor which could be a component 
part of the internal security dimension of the SE Asian'arms dynamic', an assessment of the significance of this dimension for that dynamic necessarily revolves around the impact of 
specific internal security threats posed by domestic 
insurgencies and the potential development thereof. 
Contrary to previous practice, where the initial discussion 
was on those states in which the particular pressure was of 
greatest relevance and significance, it is useful here to do the 
opposite and immediately identify and discuss those states in 
which the internal security dimension was of little or no 
relevance. To do so reinforces the notion that arms 
acquisitions in SE Asia during the Second Cold War generally 
owed less to domestic factors such as insurgencies and more 
to external ones; notwithstanding the fact that the internal 
security dimension was of considerable importance in terms of 
one or two individual states. 
For Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, albeit for different 
reasons, it is clearly evident that the internal security 
dimension had little or no relevance for arms acquisitions. 
Singapore and Vietnam 
In the case of Singapore, the complete absence of either a 
specific or potential domestic insurgency in the Republic 
during the Second Cold War totally negates the role of the 
internal security dimension in arms acquisitions. 13 There is no 
linkage between any of the acquisitions of major weapons for 
the SAF and the requirement for counter-insurgency 
operations in the Republic. 
13 This is not to say that the threat of (communist) insurgency was entirely absent. 
Indeed, Singapore was indirectly threatened by the then prevailing CPM (Communist 
Party of Malaya) insurgency in Malaysia as the aim of the CPM was to overthrow 
both the Malaysian and Singaporean governments. In Singapore, however, the CPM 
was unable to get beyond the stage of limited subversion in the 1970s, and in the 
1980s 
its focus was on building up (or rebuilding) its organisational and support networks. 
See Lau Teik Soon, "National Threat Perceptions of Singapore", in Morrison, op. cit. 
p. 119. Moreover, the CPM insurgency in Malaysia itself began to tail-off 
from the 
early 1980s, making even the indirect threat it posed an extremely remote one. 
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Vietnam, on the other hand, did face specific threats posed by domestic insurgency: most notably that by Montagnard tribal 
groups in the Central Highlands operating under the 
umbrella of FULRO (Front Unifie Liberation des Races 
Opprimes - United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races). 14 The nature of this threat and the Vietnamese 
government's response to it, however, suggests that the 
internal security dimension had no impact on arms 
acquisitions. 
The threat posed by FULRO, which was the largest and the 
most active of the insurgent groups, was chiefly confined to its 
own locale and limited in its extent. Its activities primarily 
revolved around acts of sabotage and ambushes, though there 
were reports of open. military engagements in the Highlands 
involving large numbers of guerillas. 15 
The generally limited nature of the military threat posed by 
FULRO meant that the primary responsibility for dealing 
with it was vested in the forces operating under the auspices 
of the Ministry of the Interior. According primary 
responsibility to the Ministry's forces also reflected the policy 
of the government that the best counter-insurgency strategy 
to pursue was not a military one, but a 
"counterorganizational" one aimed at dividing and gradually 
demolishing the insurgent movement. 16 The employment of 
the PAVN, Pike notes, was essentially restricted to responding 
to actual "guerilla attacks". 17with the pattern of operations 
by the PAVN generally consisting of "military sweeps or mop- 
up campaigns, often involving battalion-size units and 
14 A variety of other insurgent groups were also in existence (for example, the 
National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam - NUFLVN). These groups, 
however, had limitations in their numbers, the duration of their activity or the range 
of their operations. The NUFLVN, for example, was reported to have focussed on 
of political works" and sought to avoid any "military engagement". FEER, 18 
November, 1987, p. 30. 
15 See Pike, PAVN p. 80. These reports mentioned figures of up to 1000 fighters, but 
Pike contends these "probably are exaggerated. " Ibid. 
16 Ibid. p. 82. 
17 Ibid. p. 81. 
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sometimes employing helicopters to attack resistance centers in the remote areas. "18 
The restricted role played by the PAVN in countering the insurgency (bearing in mind too the physical nature of the 
area of operations), plus the very limited nature of the 
military threat posed by the insurgents,, meant it was very 
unlikely that Vietnam would have requested any major 
weapons from the Soviet Union specifically to deal with it. It is also unlikely that the Soviet Union would have supplied 
weapons specifically for that purpose in any case, given the 
overriding need to equip PAVN units for conducting 
operations in Cambodia and for countering the threat from 
China. 
This is not to say, however, that major weapons supplied by 
the Soviet Union to the PAVN had no potential application in 
countering the insurgency: Pike's point about the employment 
of helicopters may be relevant in this context. There is a 
possibility that some of the Mi-8 utility transports acquired in 
1979-1980 (along with those already in the VPAFs inventory) 
could have been employed in the extensive operations against 
FULRO in the Central Highlands along the border with 
Cambodia from late 1980 to early 1981 when the Vietnamese 
government was acutely concerned by reports of links 
between FULRO and the Khmer Rouge. 19 The Khmer Rouge 
link is the crucial factor here, however. If any helicopters 
were employed in these operations they were probably 
diverted from operations in Cambodia itself. 20 
18 Ibid. p. 79. The generally restricted role of the PAVN is also acknowledged by 
Thayer, who notes that over "several years, VPA [Vietnam People's Army] main force 
regular divisions made periodic sweeps over the remote hinterland in an effort to 
wear FULRO units down. " Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army p. 12. 
19 See FEER 30 October, 1981, pp. 9-10, and 8 October, 1982, p. 14. 
20 With regard to the Mi-24s acquired in 1984-85 - an acquisition which was clearly 
influenced by the operational requirements of the PAVN in Cambodia - there was 
little likelihood that they would even have been diverted to short-term counter- 
insurgency operations in Vietnam. By that time FULRO was regarded by the 
Vietnamese military as more or less a spent force. Thayer cites the comments of 
General Tran Cong Man to this effect, who contended in an interview in 1985 that 
FULRO's "activities are inconsiderable. Now they are without food and face 
starvation. " Thayer, The Vietnam People's Army, p. 12. 
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Thailand 
For Thailand, there are parallels with Vietnam, though the 
magnitude of the insurgency threat and the military response 
to it were both of a rather different order. The counter- 
insurgency strategy pursued by Thailand for most of the 1979- 
1989 period also emphasised the primacy of a'political' 
approach. Military operations for much of this period were 
conducted on a selective, though more intense basis, by 
conventional forces employing limited elements of major 
weaponry and, gradually, the main responsibility for counter- 
insurgency was given to paramilitary forces. Finally, if for 
Vietnam its operations in Cambodia represented one of its 
most pressing tasks, then Thailand's most pressing task was, 
of course, the need to respond to the threat posed by the forces 
which Vietnam had deployed there. The internal security 
dimension, therefore, had almost no impact on arms 
acquisitions by Thailand. 
Interestingly, however, an analysis of a slightly different 
historical period would have reached a rather different 
conclusion. From the mid-1970s until 1979, Thai national 
security planning was very much preoccupied with internal 
elements and, especially, the growing CPT insurgency. This 
concern was certainly influential for arms acquisitions with 
Thailand acquiring major weapons specifically for counter- 
insurgency operations. In 1979, Thailand was reported to 
have begun receiving both 'Scorpion' light tanks and LAV-150 
'Commando' APCs for this purpose. 21 
The year 1979, though, as it turned out, marked a watershed 
in the CPT insurgency as activity peaked in February 1979 and 
then went into steady decline until its effective end in 
1986/1987. Moreover, the following year, 1980, the 
government's overall counter-insurgency approach 
underwent a change of emphasis and there was also a change 
in the RTA's tactics. 
Somewhat paradoxically for Thai defence thinking, Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia (when added to its existing influence 
over Laos) acted as a catalyst for a series of developments 
21 See FEER 1 June, 1979, p-15. 
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which seriously weakened the CPT's position in the north and 
north-east of Thailand. In an actual reversal of Thai 
concerns about internal-external linkages 
/ 22 1979 saw Laos expel the CPT from its bases there; Vietnam expel it from bases in Cambodia; and China begin to cut off its aid from the CPT. These problems compounded the growing difficulties 
the CPT was facing due to internal divisions arising from 
ideological differences. 
The exogenous and endogenous changes which were, 
ultimately,, to weaken the CPT fundamentally, occurred at a 
time when the results of the Thai government's earlier 
concern about the pressing nature of the insurgency and the 
concomitant need to rethink its counter-insurgency strategy 
became evident in the Order of the Prime Minister's Office 
No. 66 / 2523. This Order refocus$ed the strategy towards the 
'political', with military operations essentially being of 
secondary importance and of a 'supportive' nature. 23 
Almost simultaneously, and influenced not only by the change 
in overall strategy but also by the local situation and the need 
to 'economise' in terms of troop deployments, the army in 
southern Thailand was changing its tactics for dealing with 
the CPT and theCPM. 24 Instead of extended, large-scale, 
operations (often in conjunction with Malaysian forces), the 
new tactical approach was to use long-range patrols"'who, 
22 The Thais had traditionally been concerned that the CPT insurgency was 
supported, and could be strengthened, by links with external communist states who 
provided the CPT with propaganda and materiel support. These concerns were acute 
in the aftermath of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation 
and Vietnam's subsequent invasion of Cambodia, when it was thought that both 
states could support an intensified insurgency leading to the possible loss of the 16 
north-eastern provinces. See Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand", in Chin, Defence 
Spending in Southeast Asia p. 79. 
23 See Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai government responses to armed communist and 
separatist movements", in Chandran Jeshurun. (ed. ), Governments and Rebellions in 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 260. 
24 The CPM had extensive base areas in southern Thailand, mainly in the Betong 
salient, with many of its members originating from Thailand. See Leonard 
C. 
Sebastian, "Ending an Armed Struggle Without Surrender: The Demise of the 
Communist Party of Malaya (1979-89) and the Aftermath", Contemj2orary Southeast 
Asia Vol. 13, No. 3, December 1991, pp. 278-279. 
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could identify targets which would then be attacked by 
it 25 mobile strike forces". 
This tactic of identifying and then attacking communist 'base 
areas' in strength was also employed in the north when, in 
1981, a large campaign was mounted against three companies 
of insurgents who were hindering the development of a vital 
road (itself an important component of the development side 
of the counter-insurgency strategy). Following the 
identification of the communists'base areas, helicopter 
gunships carried out defence suppression before an 'insertion 
force' was landed by transport helicopters. Artillery was then 
used to bombard subsequent guerilla strong points before the 
troops advanced, with any remaining 'pockets of resistance' 
being attacked by aircraft. 26 
The campaign proved to be the largest of its type - it was 
not repeated in the remaining duration of the insurgency, in 
either the north or the south - and it certainly entailed the 
most extensive use of major weapons in a counter-insurgency 
context in Thailand in this period. The equipment employed 
in this operation, though, was essentially of Vietnam war era 
vintage (UH-1 helicopters and Cessna 'Bird Dog' counter- 
insurgency aircraft) and was certainly not recently acquired. 
A continued need for transport helicopters in subsequent 
counter-insurgency operations may partly have influenced the 
orders for new and replacement UH-Is in 1982 and 1984 for 
RTA aviation, though a need for these to move troops in the 
border area near Cambodia is also obvious. 
The evidently limited relevance and significance of the 
internal security dimension as an individual pressure is 
further illustrated by the marked decline in the level of CPT 
insurgency after 1981 and the reduced role of Thai regular 
forces in countering it. By the end of 1981 the RTA had 
declared that the insurgency (especially in the north) was 
'coming to an end' and that the primary responsibility for 
counter-insurgency operations would be handed over to the 
paramilitary 'Ranger' forces. 27 Indeed, at the end of 1981 
it 
25 FEER 20 June, 1980, p. 18. 
26 See FEER, 8 May, 1981, pp. 26-28. 
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was announced by the Assistant Army Commander-in-Chief, 
General Arthit, that 80% of regular army units involved in 
counter-insurgency operations in three army regions had been 
replaced by Rangers. 28 The RTA was clearly anxious to direct 
its attention towards the defence of Thailand's eastern border 
and back to its primary (military) responsibility - conventional 
war. 29 
The discussion now must necessarily shift to those remaining 
states in which the internal security dimension, whether 
manifested in specific or potential domestic insurgencies, is 
relevant, and assess its significance for arms acquisitions by 
those states. 
'Riirmn 
For the Burmese army (and, indeed, the air force and navy too 
- both of which were tasked with counter-insurgency 
operations), in view of the absence of an external dimension 
in terms of either threats or strategic requirements, 
conventional war was very much a peripheral consideration. 
The army's primary role during the Second Cold War period 
was counter-insurgency and its structure and equipment was 
27 See FEER, 9 October, 1981, P. 23. 
Ranger units consisted of lightly armed civilian volunteers who were tasked with 
guerilla-style operations against the CPT insurgents. They were recruited from 
villages in communist areas and returned to their villages after receiving basic 
weapons training. The initial development of Ranger units occurred in the late 1970s 
in response to increased fears about the external threat posed by a communist Indo- 
China, but the direct threat resulting from the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
accelerated it substantially. Details from FEER 18 December, 1981, p. 15. 
The desire to reduce, or limit, the role of the regular army in counter-insurgency 
operations had, arguably, already been evident in the case of Muslim separatists in 
the south. Here, a 400-strong police task force had been established in 1980 to deal 
with increased unrest generated by the Pattani United Liberation Organisation. See 
FEER 9 October, 1981, p. 23. It is debateable, though, as to whether or not the 
separatist campaign actually necessitated a conventional military response at all as 
it almost wholly consisted of acts of subversion and never really reached the stage of 
insurgency. 
28 See FEER 18 December, 1981, p. 15. 
29 One senior officer was quoted as saying that: "The army is trained for a 
conventional war and is not exactly fit for a protracted guerilla war". Ibid. The RTA 
retained a limited counter-insurgency role, in support of Ranger units operating 
against the CPT, until 1986. It conducted its last counter-insurgency operations, 
against the remnants of the CPM in the south, in 1987. See FEER, 28 May, 1987, p. 24. 
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wholly directed towards the conduct of counter-insurgency 
operations. Indeed, Tin Maung Maung Than makes this 
point with reference to the Tatmadaw (the Burmese armed forces) as a whole: "The organization, deployment and 
equipment of the tatmadaw indicate a posture dedicated to low intensity conflict for COIN [counter-insurgency] 
warfare. " 30 
This focus on counter-insurgency during the Second Cold War 
did not, of course, represent a new departure for the Burmese 
armed forces. Instead, it represented a continuation of past 
practice. The Burmese government had faced a combination 
of insurgencies by the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) and 
various ethnic groups, almost since the time of independence 
in 1948.31 These insurgencies remained a pressing concern 
during the 1979-1989 period. 32despite intensive counter- 
insurgency operations in the 1960s and early 1970s which had 
seen the government effectively drive the insurgents 
(especially the CPB) out of the highly sensitive Irrawaddy 
Delta areas and into the hills in the north and eaSt. 33 
30 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Burma's National Security and Defence Posture", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, p. 47. Taylor contends that 
the Burmese military's force structure and equipment was conditioned by economic 
factors, the nature of the opponents faced and by the type of terrain in which they 
had to operate; all of which "led to the development of relatively small and lightly 
equipped armed forces .... [devoid of] expensive and technologically sophisticated 
equipment. " Robert H. Taylor, "Burma: Defence Expenditure and Threat 
Perceptions", in Chin, Defence Spending in Southeast Asia p. 263. 
31 The deep-seated nature, and considerable extent, of insurgency in Burma is 
encapsulated in one of Martin Smith's chapter titles: 'Insurgency as a Way of Life'. 
This chapter details the origins of insurgency in Burma and the reasons for its 
sustained nature. Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of EthnidLy, 
(London: Zed Books, 1991), Chapter 5. Smith's impressive work provides details on 
all the insurgent groups, along with the waxing and waning of their campaigns 
throughout the post-independence period. 
32 In public, however, the Burmese government actually sought to play down, or even 
ignore, the insurgencies it faced with the Defence Ministry frequently under-reporting 
the strength of some of the ethnic insurgents. See FEER, 29 May, 1981, p. 20. 
Moreover, Martin Smith notes that only in the aftermath of the military's takeover 
in September 1988 was the extent of the insurgencies openly acknowledged, as was the 
severity of the problems they posed. Smith, op. cit. p. 18. 
33 The basis of this campaign was the so-called 'Four Cuts' strategy which aimed "to 
cut the four main links (food, funds, intelligence and recruits) between insurgents, their 
families and local villagers. " Smith, ol2. cit. p. 259. The strategy focusýW on the 
creation of secure areas through the establishment of 'strategic hamletý' (the idea 
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The priority accorded to the continued threat of insurgency, 
and the ever-present need to mount extensive counter- 
insurgency operations,, suggests that - within the context of the Tatmadaw's traditional force structure and limited 
equipment inventory - the internal security dimension as an individual pressure or factor would be both relevant and 
significant in the case of Burma. The more so., perhaps,, given 
the Tatmadaw's willingness to employ major weapons in 
several of the counter-insurgency operations it mounted in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Smith,, for example, notes that the 
Tatmadaw used air support to cope with CPB "human tidal- 
wave tactics" in the defence of Kunlong in 1970, and aerial 
bombing of Mong Yang as part of its successful attempt to 
recapture it in 1973.34 
Paradoxically, however, the very success of the Tatmadaw's 
counter-insurgency operations in the 1970s made the 
subsequent use of the limited major weaponry it possessed 
less efficacious. Moreover, the fact that the Tatmadaw had 
such a very limited inventory,, 35combined with the difficulties 
in keeping even this equipment operational and the protracted 
paucity of funding available for arms procurement, all meant 
that the use of major weapons in counter-insurgency 
operations during the Second Cold War period was very 
restricted. This is not to say that the internal security 
dimension was irrelevant or insignificant (quite the contrary 
in fact), but, rather, that it only led to very minimal arms 
acquisitions and many of these were clearly intended to 
perform more than one function. 
developed by Thompson, as Smith duly notes), following on from which the 
Tatmadaw would then go on the offensive. bid. pp. 259-260. 
34 Smith, op. cit. pp. 254-255. Tin Maung Maung Than also notes the army's use 
(albeit limited) of artillery. See Tin Maung Maung Than, op. cit. p. 49. 
35 For a detailed analysis of the Tatmadaw's inventory prior to 1988, see the 
relevant sections in Selth's chapters on the army, air force and navy. Andrew Selth, 
Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces since 1988, (Canberra Papers 
on Strategy and Defence No. 113), (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
1996), Chapters 3,4, and 5. Analysis of the Burma Air Force's inventory prior to 1988 
can also be found in a subsequent article by the same author. Andrew Selth, "The 
Myanmar Air Force Since 1988: Expansion and Modernization", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4, March 1998, pp. 389-395. 
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The success in pushing the insurgents out of the plains in the 
1970s meant that counter-insurgency operations in the 1980s 
were largely conducted in the remote, hill, terrain of the north 
and north-east, and were generally characterised by low- 
intensity infantry operations as part of the government's 
overall strategy of "gradual attrition". 36 The nature of such 
operations rendered the Tatmadaw's armour and artillery 
either redundant or virtually redundant I 37whilst when it did seek to employ limited air support in an attack on the Karen 
National Liberation Army in 1979, it reportedly had one of its 
AT-33A 'Shooting Stars' 'crippled' by ground fire. 38 
The effective loss of this single AT-33A can be seen as highly 
symbolic. First, it reduced the already limited number of 
ground attack aircraft the air force possessed (a limitation 
which was exacerbated by the serviceability problems the air 
force faced)39and made the Tatmadaw reluctant to lose any 
more. Secondly, and inter-related, it reinforced the already 
evident need for additional, and more modern,, counter- 
insurgency aircraft; particularly in the light of the then 
concerns about the CPB's increased strength and the re- 
establishment of the Shan State Army in northern Shan 
state. 40 Both of these developments necessitated increased 
36 Smith, op. cit. p. 99. The government was compelled to adopt such tactics, he 
contends, because of a realisation that the scale of the insurgencies (both in terms of 
the numbers of insurgents involved and their armaments) was such that anything else 
was beyond the existing capabilities of the Tatmadaw. Ibid. p. 99 and p. 307. 
37 Tin Maung Maung Than notes the restrictions the area of operations placed on the 
army's use of artillery: "mobility limitations and logistical difficulties associated 
with deploying artillery in the monsoon forests and hilly terrain where insurgent 
enclaves are situated ... prevented the army from fully utilizing the 
firepower of mass 
artillery assaults. " Tin Maung Maung Than, op. cit. p. 49. 
38 See FEER 2 March, 1979, p. 28. 
39 The air force's problems with maintenance, due to the lack of spare parts, have 
been widely commented upon. Clare Hollingworth, writing in 1985, noted that of "16 
combat aircraft, only eight could, with luck, take off", and that the number of 
helicopters which were grounded in four squadrons equalled half. Clare 
Hollingworth, "Burma's uncertain future", (The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific 
Region No 14), Pacific Defence Reporter, February, 1985, p. 18. See also William 
Ashton, ''Air Force gets arms boost H, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter November, 1991, 
p. 47; and Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw p. 74. 
40 See FEER, 15 June, 1979, p. 37; 4 January, 1980, p. 13; and 25 July, 1980, p. 28. 
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counter-insurgency operations at a time when the army's 
manpower was already stretched. 
The Burmese government's response to this need for 
additional, and more advanced, counter-insurgency aircraft (in tandem with its requirement for more modern training 
aircraft) was to order a number of SIAI-Marchetti SF-260M 
and Pilatus PC-7 training aircraft. Both of these types were designed for dual-use, having the capacity to be adapted for 
counter-insurgency operations through the fitment of a 
variety of underwing ordnance. 
Although the majority of these new aircraft had been 
delivered by 1981, it is notable that they were not utilised in 
the major operations against the KNU (Karen National 
Union) during the dry season offensive in 1984 when it was 
observed that the government's forces' capabilities were 
seriously hampered by the apparent lack of an "air-strike 
capacity". 41 It seems probable, therefore, that despite the 
"ingenuity" of the air force's technicians, 42 they were either 
facing difficulties in adapting the SF-260s and PC-7s for a 
ground attack role, or, that the relevant fitments and 
weapons had not yet been delivered. 43 Indeed, it may only 
have been during Ne Win's visit to Europe in 1984 (primarily 
to obtain small arms) that orders were placed for the 
ordnance which was eventually to be fitted. 
41 FEER 5 April, 1984, p. 26. The reports of the fighting highlight the almost First 
World War-like nature of the operations. Government troops used 'trench-warfare 
tactics' in an attempt to dislodge the Karens from Maw Po Kay, after they had 
subjected the Karen insurgents to considerable, but ineffective, artillery and mortar 
fire. This analogy with the First World War is also employed by Smith in describing 
the ongoing struggles for Maw Po Kay from 1984-1989. Smith, ol2. cit. p. 398. 
The air force did employ some of its UH-1s for transport and casevac (casualty 
evacuation), however, which was significant because their use had been restricted 
after at least two (and possibly three according to Smith - Smith, 012. cit. p. 395) were 
shot down in 1983. It thus demonstrated that the government was prepared to risk 
the posssible loss of further aircraft from its limited inventory. 
42 Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw, p. 35. 
43 Clare Hollingworth has noted the general problems the air force faced in receiving 
equipment in the mid-1980s due to officials' reluctance to sign papers to release it from 
the docks at Rangoon. See Hollingworth, op. cit. p. 17. 
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This visit to Europe has been attributed with considerable 
importance as it seemed to indicate a clear move by the 
government (and Ne Win personally) to develop the 
Tatmadaw for an 'upgraded' offensive against the KNU: one 
which would move away from the "force of manpower" with 
its attendant heavy casualties. 44 
The imperative for this enhanced campaign undoubtedly 
influenced the decision to opt for the uprated PC-9s, rather 
than additional PC-7s, and, arguably, led to the onset of a 
search for more firepower for the artillery. The 
ineffectiveness of the artillery barrages by the army's M-101 
105mm howitzers during the battles for Maw Po Kay, in 
which it evidently lacked the necessary "punch" to dislodge the 
insurgents from their well dug in positions, indicated the need 
for heavier calibre guns and/or MRLs (multiple rocket 
launchers) "in the face of [continued] enemy intransigence ". 45 
Although the army did mount a renewed offensive against the 
KNU during the 1985-1986 dry season, it was not until the 
1986-1987 offensive against the CPB and its ethnic insurgent 
allies in the NDF (National Democratic Front) that the first 
reports of the use of aircraft for several years occurred. 46 
This offensive also saw the increased use of artillery by the 
army. 
The intensity of these operations,, the greatest for a number of 
years,, reflected the Burmese government's heightened 
concern about the insurgencies resulting from the dangerous 
military alliance between the CPB and the NDF (albeit the 
KNU withdrew shortly afterwards) which occurred after a 
meeting in March 1986. This alliance saw all the various 
insurgents united in common cause against the government 
and meant: 
44 FEER 27 December, 1984 -3 January, 1985, p. 32. Hollingworth notes Ne Win's 
desire for a "personal victory" over General Bo Mya, the Karen leader. 
Hollingworth, op. cit. p. 19. 
45 Tin Maung Maung Than, op. cit. p. 49 and p. 54. 
46 See FEER 16 April, 1987, p. 27, which reported that the "fixed-wing aircraft used 
were apparently Swiss-built, propeller-driven trainers which had 
been modified for 
battle. " These aircraft were used in the ground attack role to support operations by 
the army. 
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that for the first time in nearly 40 years of insurgency 
all the main armed opposition groups and well over 
30,000 rebel troops were allied against the 190,000 
strong Tatmadaw. By any reckoning it was a highly 
favourable ratio for fighting a guerilla war. 47 
Given the difficulties of pursuing a 'war of attrition' against 
such odds, subsequent counter-insurgency operations 
witnessed the increased use of major weapons (MRLs were 
reportedly used for the first time during the 1988-1989 dry 
season offensive against the Karens' fortified bases along the,,,, /- 
Thai-Burmese border). 48 
The nature of these counter-insurgency operations, which 
saw the increased use of major weapons,, set a pattern for the 
remainder of the Second Cold War period and beyond. Soon 
after the State Law and Order Restoration Council (or 
SLORC) came to power in 1988, they were to embark on a 
major expansion and re-armament of the Tatmadaw. This 
was to enable it to go on the offensive against the ethnic 
insurgents (the CPB insurgency coming to an end after 
mutinies in mid-1989) in order to ensure the regime's survival 
by 'encouraging' the insurgents to enter into ceasefire 
agreements and, ultimately, shifting the military balance 
"firmly and permanently in the Tatmadaw's favour. "49 
Mala 
An assessment of the influence of the internal security 
dimension on Malaysia's arms acquisitions is rather less 
straightforward than it was in the case of either Thailand or 
Burma. One of the reasons for this is that the Malaysian 
experience shows similarities, and displays differences, with 
both of these states. 
t., 
47 Smith, jýp. cit. p. 357. 
48 See FEER, 22 February, 1990, p. 21. It is not clear whether these were the SovIet 
BM-21s acquired in 1987, or the US M40Als which were acquired at that 
time. 
49 Selth, Transfor ning the Tatmadaw p. 131. 
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Malaysia, like Thailand, faced a specific threat from 
communist insurgency in the early stages of the Second Cold 
War period which was to gradually decline and, ultimately, 
disappear by the end of it. In this instance the threat was 
posed by the CPM and its offshoots - the CPM-Marxist- 
Leninist and CPM- Revolutionary Faction - in Peninsular Malaysia, and by the small People's Army of North 
Kalimantan in Sarawak. Unlike the Thais, however, 
particularly after the change in their counter-insurgency 
tactics in 1980, the Malaysians placed greater emphasis in 
their operations on the use of large numbers of troops and the 
employment of major weapons (the parallels with the 
Burmese experience are evident here). 
Furthermore, and again in contrast to the Thai case, the 
Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Cambodia, though important in the context of Malaysia's 
overall arms procurement, did not lead to a complete re- 
orientation towards conventional warfare: the Malaysian 
armed forces continued to play a prominent role in countering 
the CPM insurgency. The invasion did, however, lead to a 
change in 'emphasis', which shifted to conventional warfare 
(a clear departure from the Burmese experience). 
Moreover, in terms of the added complexity of the Malaysian 
experience, and this is hinted at in the above comments about 
'emphasis', it is difficult at times to disentangle the external 
and internal dimensions of Malaysian defence planning and 
procurement. Indeed, and this has already been alluded to, 
there is an overlap between the impact of the internal security 
dimension on arms acquisitions; that of the requirements of 
defence policy and strategy; and the effects of the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia. In effect, the internal security 
dimension must be seen in conjunction with these other 
pressures and not in isolation. 
It can be argued, though, that many of Malaysia's arms 
acquisitions in the early part of the Second Cold War period 
were primarily motivated by the requirements of counter- 
insurgency operations: a view which is supported by the fact 
that the rapid arms build-up in the early years was halted not 
only by economic difficulties but also by the decline in CPM 
123 
activity. 50 This motivation was, however., ultimately of only 
transitory, as opposed to lasting, relevance and significance. 
The Malaysian approach to counter-insurgency operations in 
the wake of the upsurge in CPM activity in 1975-1976 was 
evident in the large-scale joint operations conducted with the 
Thais in 1977 ('Big Star' and 'Sacred Ray') and in a combined 
exercise with the Thais in early 1978 which included air 
strikes, battalion sized troop movements and naval patrols. 51 
These large-scale operations had proved very successful in 
dislodging the CPM from its bases in the border area and in 
forcing the insurgents to move frequently and had, as it 
subsequently emerged, the effect of bringing about a marked 
decline in the CPM's level of activity. 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, 
however, appeared to portend a resurgence of CPM activity 
from the perspective of both the CPM itself and the 
Malaysian government. The CPM (and its offshoots) 
believed that the situation in Indo-China presented the "right 
climate to escalate their activities' '., 52especially at a time when 
it was faced with the loss of support from China and needed 
to demonstrate its continued viability. This view was 
'anticipated' by the government and its anticipation was 
reflected in the Malaysian armed forces' conduct of more or 
less continuous 'search and destroy' operations throughout 
1979.53 The thrust of the Malaysian armed forces' counter- 
insurgency strategy was to have 'mobile stike forces I 
(employing the army's APCs and air force helicopters) 
harrying the insurgents in order to keep them on the move 
and, when concentrations of insurgents were found, attacking 
them with artillery and ground attack aircraft. 54 
50 1 am grateful to Dr. Leonard Sebastian and Mr. Daljit Singh (both Fellows at the 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) for confirming this view in discussions at the 
Institute during my visit to Singapore in May 1998. 
51 See FEER 31 March, 1978, pp. 18-19. 
52 FEER 8 June, 1979, p-21. 
53 Evidence of the CPM's attempt to step up its activity, and of the validity of the 
Malaysian government's concerns and responses, was provided in June 1979 when the 
army successfully detected a CPM attempt to construct a large new base near Ipoh in 
the state of Perak and destroyed it. Ibid. 
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Simultaneously, of course, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia also heightened the perception of external threat 
and gave greater impetus to the ongoing attempt to expand the armed forces' conventional warfare capabilities. It also 
gave a new, and worrying, dimension to the traditional 
linkage between internal and external security concerns. 
The invasion, in the Malaysian government's mind, was 
undoubtedly linked with an upsurge in the number of refugees 
arriving on the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia from 
Vietnam. These refugees (who were mainly ethnic-Chinese) 
were thought to constitute a limited security problem, in 
addition to the general difficulties they posed, because of the 
potential for them to lend support to the CPM - itself 
primarily composed of ethnic-Chinese. 55 
The need to equip the MAF for more intensive counter- 
insurgency warfare therefore, in conjunction with ongoing 
moves to develop their conventional capabilities and the 
specific ramifications of the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, was certainly evinced in Malaysia's arms 
acquisitions during the early part of the Second Cold War. 
In order to better equip the army for operations against the 
CPM - at a time when many of its brigades were conducting 
mobile operations to "cut off escape" by the insurgentS56and 
when its existing Panhard M-3s and 'Ferrets' were virtually 
obsolescent - orders were placed in 1981 for'Condor'APCs 
and 'Sibmas' fire support vehicles. This order was the result 
of the 1977 plan to acquire new APCs and fire support vehicles 
for the army which had been motivated by the very need for 
such "high intensity counter-insurgency operations. "57 
54 The Far Eastern Economic Review cites a Malaysian security official in 1980 as 
saying that the use of artillery, helicopters and fighter bombers can 'demoralise' 
large areas at a time and force the CPM to move. FEER, 20 June, 1980, p. 18. 
55 See Richardson, ASEAN and Indo-Chinese Refugees pp-104-106. 
56 FEER 6 March, 1981, p. 27. 
57 Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81 p. 28. The need for such 
operations was seen in the context of the Third Malaysia Plan which clearly stated 
the government's intention to intensify operations against the CPM and accordingly to 
ft expand and strengthen ... [the] security forces considerably. " Third Malaysia Plan, 
1976-1980, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1976), p. 101. 
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The lengthy delay between the initial decision and firm orders being placed resulted from both an extensive trials 
programme for all the contending vehicles and, in the case of 
the 'Sibmas' tender,, controversy over whether or not the 
tendering process had been rigged in such a way that the fire 
support vehicle specification could only be met by the Belgian 
vehicle. 58 
In addition to enhancing the army's capacity for counter- 
insurgency operations, the acquisition of these armoured 
vehicles also helped the army to develop its capacity for 
conventional warfare. Indeed, Harold Crouch, writing in 
the Far Eastern Economic Review, contends that the new 
APCs (along with the 'Stormers' and the 'Scorpion' light 
tanks ordered in 1982) were intended not only "to supplement 
the light armoured personnel carriers [currently] used in 
counter-insurgency ... [but also] to create a conventional 
capability. "59 
These acquisitions are,, therefore,, symptomatic of Malaysian 
defence thinking at this time which was centred on the need to 
develop the MAF to conduct both counter-insurgency 
operations (the traditional focus) and to be able to engage in 
conventional warfare (an area of neglect). In other words, 
the armed forces were not being completely refocu ed on, or 
re-oriented towards, conventional warfare, but w re instead 
being developed to perform two roles. 60 Illustrative of the 
dual purpose nature of the role which it was hoped the MAF 
would be able to play were the comments made in 1982 by the 
Deputy Defence Minister, Abang Abu Bakar Mustapha, cited 
by Crouch: "The armed forces need both capabilities; we have 
not given priority to the conventional aspect in the past and 
are now trying to make up forit. "61 
58 See Straits Times 26 November, 1981, p. 15, and 28 November, 1981, p. 14. 
59 FEER, 20 October, 1983, p. 48. 
60 Mak on the other hand, implies that they were more or less being completely 
refocus)ed. He expresses the view that the fact that Malayisa had "broken the back 
of the CPM insurgency" by the 1970s, meant that (in terms of land warfare, in 
particular) it could focus on conventional threats. Mak, ASEAN Defence 
Reorientati-0--n-, p. 27. 
I) 
) 
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In practical terms, though, it was the army's counter- insurgency role which still remained pre-eminent. In 1981, 
for example, the army's 12 infantry brigades were still 
predominantly engaged in counter-insurgency operations, 62 
and even in 1983 Crouch noted that the six infantry brigades 
located in the north and centre of Peninsular Malaysia were 
still tasked with counter-insurgency with the army continuing 
to retain the primary responsibility for such operations and 
the now expanded PPF (Police Field Force) only assisting. 63 
The priority accorded to counter-insurgency operations at this 
time was also evident in the RMAF's role and - with some 
qualification - weapons acquisitions. Much like the Burmese 
Air Force, the RMAF was essentially subordinate to the army 
with its principal task remaining the provision of 
"communication and air-lift support for the army". 64 In 
addition to this support the RMAF was also expected to 
provide "limited close air support for infantry against 
insurgents. "65 The RMAF was not, however, unaffected by 
the increased attention being paid to conventional warfare 
and something of the tension between current priorities and 
possible future requirements was evinced in the debate over 
its most important acquisition - the A-4'Skyhawks 
The decision to procure 'Skyhawks' was taken in 1978 as part 
of a plan to expand the air force: a decision which reflected 
the then priority accorded to counter-insurgency in general. 
61 FEER 20 October, 1983, p. 52. The same point was made earlier by the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Maj-Gen Datuk Zain Mahmoud Hashim, speaking at the time of the 
large 'Gonzales Two' exercise: "It is known that we are very good at jungle fighting. 
But we need to know how to go against a bigger enemy. " Cited, Straits Times 13 
February, 1980, p. 12. 
62 Only when there was no activity by the CPM could they engage in conventional 
warfare exercises. See FEER 6 March, 1981, p. 27. 
63 See FEER 20 October, 1983, p. 52. 
64 Acharya, Arms Proliferation Issues in ASEAN p. 249. In his analysis of the 
relationship between all the three services in Malaysia, Mak notes that "as a result 
of history and strategic demands, [the army] has always been the dominant service in 
the MAF. " Mak, Modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces p. 30. For an 
overview of the relationship between the army and the air force from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s, see Ibid. pp. 31-35 passim. 
65 Mak, Modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces p. 33. 
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I The 'Skyhawks - short-range, primarily ground attack 
aircraft - seemed the most appropiate option at the time in 
view of the unavailability of the then preferred A-7'Corsairs' 
due to restrictions on their foreign military sale. 66 
In 1981, however, having placed an order for 88 second-hand 
'Skyhawks' the year before, the deal was put on hold whilst 
the RMAF re-evaluated the option of new A-7s which were 
now available. 67 An important component of the decision to 
postpone the 'Skyhawk' deal was a debate about whether or 
not the air force now needed a more advanced aircraft, with a 
greater payload, given the changed external environment. In 
other words, did the RMAF's principal role remain counter- 
insurgeny for which the A-4 was ideally suited. The eventual 
decision to press ahead with the 'Skyhawk' purchase seemed 
to owe more to the high cost and maintenance complexity of 
the A-7s, than to any final decision about the RMAF's main 
role and thus on the most appropriate aircraft to purchase. 
The continued importance attached to the RMAF's traditional 
role was evident though in the order for more 'Alouette IIF 
helicopters in 1981 (? ) as these were intended to supplement 
those the air force was then using in a liaison role in support 
of army operations against the CPM. The importance of the 
traditional role was, arguably, also evident in the fact that 
there appeared to be a continuing need for the RMAF to 
possess a ground attack capability at this time. With the 
'Tebuans' which had performed this role hitherto no longer 
operational, and the 'Skyhawks' not expected to be 
operational until the mid-1980s, the order for the MB-339A jet 
trainers in 1982 seems to have been a way of ensuring that the 
air force could provide air support in the interim, if required. 
The MB-339As, in common with many jet trainers on offer, 
were also capable of being adapted to perform a light attack 
role. 
An order for three C-130H-MP 'Hercules' aircraft in 1979 
represented a special case of the conjunction of internal and 
external defence requirements, and of the impact of the 
66 See FEER 16 October, 1981, pp. 24-25. 
67 See Straits Times 20 September, 1981, p-5. The original A-7s under consideration 
had been second-hand ex-US Air Force and Navy models. 
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Cambodian invasion. These acquisitions have been seen as 
part of the air force's ongoing "expansion programme"68and 
the particular importance attached to the South China Sea off Peninsular Malaysia's east coast in the wake of the concerns 
about Vietnam. More obviously, however, the decision to 
procure these aircraft was influenced by the security concerns 
posed by the refugee problem. The maritime patrol aircraft 
were needed to monitor refugee movements in the South 
China Sea and to assist the navy in intercepting their boats so 
that they could be towed out to sea before they could land on 
Malaysian shores. 69 
The influence of the internal security dimension as an 
individual pressure did not extend to any naval acquisitions 
(the counter-insurgency operations conducted by the RMN 
employing the patrol vessels it had acquired earlier), nor did it 
extend beyond the early part of the Second Cold War period. 
The last significant incidence of CPM activity in Malaysia 
occurred in June 198470 and the first mass surrenders of CPM 
insurgents to the Thais occurred in 1986, which was to mark 
the beginning of the end of the insurgency. 71 By this time the 
army's role had been reduced, and its counter-insurgency 
training and deployment accordingly (the latter to areas 
along the border with Thailand), with the PFF actually 
bearing primary responsibility for any cross-border 
operations into Thailand which did occur. The army's role 
was now limited to that of a 'blocking force, preventing CPM 
insurgents retreating into Malaysia in the wake of operations 
by the Thais. 72 
68 Straits Times 13 June, 1979, p. 10. 
69 Richardson observes that the Malaysian navy began "regular patrols in off-shore 
waters" to effect such a policy, around November 1978. Richardson, ASEAN and 
Indo-Chinese Refugees p. 105 
70 This incident saw the entry of a small group of insurgents into a road maintenance 
camp for the East-West highway near the border with Thailand, although no one 
was injured in the attack. See FEER 23 May, 1985, p. 53. 
71 The CPM finally gave up the armed struggle in December 1989 after signing 
agreements with the Malaysian and Thai governments. For details, see Sebastian, 
op. cit. pp. 284-285. 
72 See FEER, 23 May, 1985, p. 51. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, the decline in the CPM insurgency 
in the mid-1980s coincided with a refocu54ng by the 
government on the internal aspect of sec/urity as concerns 
about the external threat posed by Vietnam abated and, 
Alagappa contends, renewed concerns about the CPM's links 
with China emerged. 73 The priority for national security 
policy now became the promotion of political stability and the 
pursuit of socio-economic development. 74 This refocus ing 
was also ipfluenced by increasing concerns that the tensions 
between KL and the state government of Sabah (in the 
aftermath of the 1985 elections which saw the Partai Bersatu 
Sabah take control of the state) could signal an upsurge in 
centre-periphery tensions. The nature of these concerns 
about internal security were such that they reinforced the 
internal security dimension's increasing irrelevance as an 
influence on arms acquisitions. Indeed, Alagappa notes that: 
"Malaysia's approach to preserve its national security was to 
de-emphasize the military dimension and to lay greater 
dimension on the development of national reslience and on 
diplomacy. "75 
Indonesia 
Finally, in terms of assessing the relevance and significance of 
the internal security dimension as an individual pressure 
influencing arms acquisitions by each state,, we come to 
Indonesia. Within the context of the absence of any 
immediate external threat concerns (especially any arising 
from the situation in Cambodia), and acknowledging the 
evident inter-linkages which occur with Indonesia's strategic 
requirements,, the internal security dimension is relevant and 
highly significant for Indonesian arms acquisitions during the 
Second Cold War. Indeed, the internal security dimension 
appears to be particularly significant given the relatively low 
levels of major weapons acquired by Indonesia overall during 
the period. 
73 Alagappa, op. cit. p. 187. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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A cursory examination might, however, in the first instance 
suggest otherwise. Although Indonesia has long been pre- 
occupied with the internal element of the comprehensive 
security equation, 76 the nature of the problem (which 
obviously conditions the response) has tended to be seen as 
often being at a level below that of insurgency. Even when insurgencies have existed then, amongst broadly based 
'security operations', the use of major weapons has been 
eschewed where possible and low-intensity counter- insurgency operations have instead been conducted. 77 Not 
only, therefore, may the internal security dimension not 
actually be a pressing concern at all, but, if it was, then the 
response may not necessitate any acquisitions of ma or 
weapons: Indonesia replicating the later Thai experience 
rather than that of Malaysia. 
The above comments, however, are written at a certain level 
of abstraction. They take no account of the actualities of the 
Second Cold War period which., despite the very limited press 
coverage and almost complete absence of official comments., 
saw Indonesia facing a major insurgency problem in East 
Timor. In addition to the problem in East Timor., there was 
also a more long-standing - though much less intensive - insurgency in Irian Jaya and, in the early part of the period, 
the remnants of one in Aceh too. The insurgency in East 
Timor especially created a need to employ and acquire major 
weapons. Moreover,, these comments tend to obscure the 
idea that the internal security dimension contains both actual 
and potential insurgencies. Indonesia's experience of past 
76 For example, writing in 1993, Lowry stated that: "Internal security is historically 
and currently the most pressing threat and will remain so for some years to come. " 
Lowry, 
, 
Indonesian Defence Policy p. 16. The importance of the internal element is 
clearly reflected in much of Indonesia's defence and security thinking and its overall 
concepts and doctrines of 'Wawasan Nusantara'; 'Ketahanan Nasional' (National 
Resilience); and 'Sishankamrata'. See The Policy Of The State Defence And SecuKity 
Of The Republic Of Indonesia 1995 pp. 12-14. 
77 For details of the broad range of security operations which the Indonesian 
military uses to combat'armed movements', and the need to refrain from using major 
weapons, see Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and T. A. M. Simatupang, "The Indonesian 
Experience in Facing Non-armed and Armed Movements: Lessons from the Past and 
Glimpses of the Future", in Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (eds. ), 
Durable Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1987), pp. 100-102. Included in the'combat operations' which are conducted, 
are so-called "blitzkreig operations by mobile military units selected from their 
regions and central command". Ibid. p. 101. 
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insurgencies 
/ 78combined with the impact of those actually in 
existence during the Second Cold War, has meant that Indonesian defence policy has also taken account of the need for ABRI to be able to respond to any future insurgencies in 
the archipelago. The internal security dimension operates at both levels, therefore, which tends to reinforce its 
significance. 
There is an additional internal element in terms of the Indonesian experience which fits in with the general pattern 
of internal security concerns and of strategic requirements, but goes beyond the internal security dimension as defined in 
this study. It is certainly uniquely Indonesian in terms of the 'arms dynamic'during the Second Cold War in SE Asia, and 
thus does not have the more general applicability which 
would be required if it was to constitute one of the other 
different internal factors referred to at the beginning. This 
additional element could perhaps best be described as the 
'civilian' dimension. In effect, several of the major weapons 
in the categories of transport aircraft (in particular) and 
warships (rather less so) were acquired specifically to fulfil the 
requirements of government policy outside the realm of 
defence, or, to enable ABRI to assist in fulfilling these 
requirements. 79 
The East Timor experience (the invasion,, its aftermath,, and 
subsequent operations against Fretilin insurgentS80), though 
not overtly acknowledged officially, appears to have had a 
profound influence not only upon elements of Indonesia's 
78 Most notable are those which occurred in the Outer Islands in the 1950s and early 
1960s, for example, the insurgency in the Maluku Islands. For a brief history of the 
RMS (Republic of South Moluccas) see Ibid. p. 110, and for a tabular representation of 
the movement's characteristics and the government's responses see Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-jakti, "Government responses to armed communist 
and separatist movements in Indonesia: Islamic and military perspectives", in 
Jeshurun, Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia Table 1, pp. 174-175. 
79 This is not to say that other states would not utillse military equipment for 
civilian purposes, in cases of emergency especially (for example, in disaster relief), 
but that there is no evidence that any transport aircraft or landing ships were 
purposely acquired with a view to fulfilling non-military roles; even in terms of an 
overtly dual-purpose capability. 
80 Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. The armed wing of Fretilin is 
actually called 'Falantil', but for the purposes of this study Fretilin will be used as 
the umbrella term for the insurgent movement. 
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force structure, but also upon arms acquisitions. Taylor, in 
Indonesia's Forgotten War, may overstate his case 
somewhat, but he clearly draws attention to the link between 
operational requirements there and Indonesian arms 
acquisitions. 81 This link is also implicit in general analyses of the impact of the East Timor experience on ABRI, in which it has been noted that the invasion in December 1975 showed up 
weaknesses in both amphibious landing and counter- 
insurgency capabilities and "suggested that there was a need for better training and equipment for the Indonesian armed forces. "82 
The influence of East Timor, and by definition the internal 
security dimension, on Indonesia's arms acquisitions during 
the Second Cold War essentially took two distinct, but inter- 
related, forms. First, it created the need for major weapons 
to conduct counter-insurgency operations in East Timor itself. 
Secondly, it encouraged the development of a mobile strike 
81 John G. Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War. The Hidden History of East Timor 
(London: Zed Books, 1991). 
Taylor's contention is that many (or most, it seems) of the major weapons acquired by 
Indonesia from 1977 to the late 1980s were acquired to meet the particular 
requirements of the counter-insurgency campaign in East Timor. In discussing the 
acquisitions in 1978 of A-4 'Skyhawks' and 'Hawk' T-53s, and the production of 
'Pumas' in 1979 (NB his dates for the 'Skyhawks' and 'Pumas' are actually incorrect), 
for example, he contends that these acquisitions "all met particular military needs at 
specific moments in the campaign. " Ibid. p. 175. Moreover, with regard to US arms 
sales in particular, he argues that these peaked in line with offensives in 1978-79, 
1981-82, and that sales in 1982-84 had utility for the 1983-84 offensive. Ibid. p. 169. 
There are, it must be noted, a number of flaws in his analysis; not least of which is his 
almost mono-causal explanation for all arms acquisitions by Indonesia. Notable in 
this regard is the fact that he includes the 1986 order for F-16s in his analysis of the 
linkage between US arms sales and offensives in East Timor. The Indonesian decision 
to acquire the F-16s, however, and the Americans eventual willingness to supply 
them, clearly lay outside the realm of the internal security dimension. 
Additionally, there are several errors with regard to the dates of orders/ production 
licences and the identity of suppliers: for example, the first 16 A-4s were second-hand 
Israeli (rather than US) aircraft and were only ordered in 1979. 
His discussion, however, of the role which major weapons played in many of the 
counter-insurgency operations mounted by ABRI, and the descriptions of some of these 
operations which he cites, highlights the evidence that the requirements of 
conducting such operations did influence some arms acquisitions. 
82 Glazebrook, op. cit. p-15. Lowry also states that: "the poor performance of 
Indonesian forces in the annexation of East Timor in December 1975 and in subsequent 
internal security operations created an awareness of the need to rejuvenate the armed 
forces. " Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy p. 42. 
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force able to respond to potential insurgencies resulting from 
centre-periphery tensions and other contingencies associated 
with the requirements of strategy (mostly the possibility of lower level external threats). The importance of both these forms more or less coincides with the period when Indonesia's acquisitions were at their peak (1979-1983), 
although the latter obviously had the potential for a longer 
term influence as the situation on the ground (and thus 
operational requirements) changed. 
ABRI's attempts to overcome Fretilin resistance in the 
aftermath of the invasion had seen it employ major weapons 
extensively. Lowry describes their use as being something 
akin to the US practice in Vietnam with ABRI carrying out 
aerial bombardment and strafing,, artillery barrages, and 
armoured patrols (where practicable). 83 Despite this,, 
however,, Fretilin's capacity for resistance,, combined with the 
still limited inventory actually available to ABRI, 84meant that 
by 1979 Indonesia still faced a considerable insurgency and 
had not established more than nominal control in parts of 
East Timor. 
The fact that ABRF s troops were effectively at full stretch in 
East Timor85and were having to be rotated frequently in 
order to prevent damaging losses of morale from occurring, 
in conjunction with the not unrelated reliance on the use of 
major weapons, meant that if Indonesia was to contain the 
insurgency then it required an expanded inventory to 
prosecute its counter-insurgency campaign. 86 
83 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 153. 
84 Acquisitions had been made to enable ABRI to prosecute its campaign more 
effectively: for example, the 16 OV-IOF 'Broncos' acquired in 1976-77. 
85 T1-iis was made worse by the continuing situation in Irian Jaya which saw ABRI 
having to respond to increased activity by the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka - 
Free Papua Organisation) in 1978. The OPM mounted a series of attacks on Indonesian 
troops and government offices in 1977 and 1978 which led to ABRI having to conduct 
extensive operations (including aerial bombing) against the OPM, especially in the 
area of the border with Papua New Guinea. See FEER 22 June, 1979, pp. 31-32. 
86 This campaign subsequently took shape in the period from 1979-1985 when a series 
of large-scale offensives by ABRI occurred. These were aimed initially at destroying 
Fretilin's "mainforce" units and, subsequently, at eliminating any guerilla resistance 
at all. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 154. Much more detail of the 
various operations is provided by Taylor; particularly from the perspective of the 
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In particular, there appears to have been a pressing need for 
additional ground attack aircraft to augment the OV-1OFs 
which were more or less continuously engaged in bombing 
and strafing missions to dislodge Fretilin insurgents from 
their base areas and attack concentrations of Fretilin forces. 
The need to augment the OV-1OFs was also motivated by the 
possibility that a number of them might have to be diverted to 
operations in Irian Jaya, where they had been used 
"extensively" after the OPM offensive in 1977.87 It was largely in response to this need that Indonesia ordered the ex- 
Israeli 'Skyhawks'in 1979 and, quite possibly, the ex-US Navy 
ones in 1981: these aircraft effectively replacing the 
obsolescent CA-27'Avon Sabres'which had hitherto been 
tasked with providing an additional ground attack 
capability. 88 
The question of whether or not the various batches of'Hawk' 
T-53s ordered between 1980 and 1983 (in addition to those 
acquired in 1978) were procured specifically with a view to 
their employment in counter-insurgency operations in East 
Timor, is both contentious and difficult to determine 
categorically. 89 There are, of course, no official reports of 
their use in East Timor during the operations in the early to 
mid-1980s - their acquisition being justified in terms of the 
need to provide a replacement jet trainer for the T-33s - 
although the use of 'Hawks' in some of these operations has 
insurgents inolved and the East Timorese civilians affected. Interestingly, Lowry 
does not make reference to Taylor's work at all, although he does refer to James Dunn's 
"Timor: A People Betrayed" (Milton, Qld.: Jacaranda Press, 1983). 
87 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 237. This possibility may have been 
realised after an uprising by the OPM in February 1984. 
88 Taylor notes that the A-4s were observed in operations in late 1983 (prior to a 
major series of operations which began in 1984) with OV-1OFs flying to the eastern 
sector assisted by "Skyhawks flying from Baucau and specializing in incendiary, 
cluster and anti-personnel bombs. " Taylor, op. cit. p. 149. 
89 Allegations that this was the intended purpose of these acquisitions have 
continued to be made in discussions about the subsequent supply of 'Hawks' to 
Indonesia. Until fairly recently the official British position was that there was no 
clear evidence to support these allegations (or, presumably, to deny them either). In 
1997, however, at the time the new British government approved the latest sale of 
'Hawks' to Indonesia, the official position seemed more clear-cut. One senior 
minister was quoted as stating that: "There is no evidence that the aircraft IS being 
used in East Timor .... 
Our Intelligence on that is very clear". C-reuters@clari. net 
Thursday, 17 July 1997. 
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been alleged by eyewitnesses. The 'Hawk' can clearly be 
configured for a ground attack role, however, which is one of 
the features which attracts buyers (much like the utility of the 'Skyhawk'), and Lowry notes that the squadron to which they 
were assigned - 15 Squadron based at Iswahyudi, Central 
Java - "can be employed in the ground support role. 1190 
The need to upgrade the army's firepower for operations in 
East Timor, as well as its general requirements (again taking 
into account the growing obsolescence of much of its 
inventory), may also have influenced the decision to acquire 
AMX-VCI MICVs (mechanised infantry combat vehicles) in 
1979 and the order for a large quantity of higher calibre M- 
101 howitzers in 1981. 
The equipment requirements of operations in East Timor did 
not just include enhanced firepower, but also enhanced 
mobility: mobility in terms of the movement of forces to East 
Timor (the strategic level) and in terms of the operational 
requirements of counter-insurgency operations (the tactical 
level). There are significant links between the two, of course, 
as well as with the more general strategic requirement for the 
establishment of a mobile strike force. 
The movement of troops and equipment to East Timor, 
especially prior to major counter-insurgency offensives when 
a rapid build-up was required, necessitated additional 
transport aircraft. In this regard the diversion of the L-130- 
70 to the air force in 1980 is significant, as is the order for five 
C-130H-30s in 1979, plus two more C-130s in 1981. The order 
for four 'Tacoma' LSTs in 1979 and a further two in 1981 can 
also be seen in this context, though their acquisition is clearly 
also very closely related to the development of a mobile strike 
force and to the increasing obsolescence of the very old US 
LSTs in the navy's inventory. It may even be possible that the 
LSTs were acquired with a view to their use in amphibious 
landings conducted as part of the overall counter-insurgency 
campaign, which was a tactic employed in the years following 
the invasion-91 
90 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 239. 
91 See Taylor's account of the cow-iter-insurgency campaign in July 1978. Taylor, pp. 
cit. p. 86. 
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The desire to strengthen the Navy's capacity for amphibious landings - also a crucial component of the efficacy of the 
mobile strike force - would also have influenced the order in 1981 for AMX-IOP/AMX-10 PAC 90 MICVs for the Marines, 
especially given the need to begin the replacement of ageing PT-76s and BTR-50Ps. The order for the transport version of 
the 'Super Puma' in 1983 can also be seen in this light as the 
naval'Super Puma' was able to operate from the South 
Korean LSTs. 
At the tactical level of Army operations, helicopters were 
extensively used to facilitate rapid troop movements with 
troops often being landed subsequent to aerial bombardment 
and artillery barrages in order to mop-up any remaining 
resistance. 92Additionally, helicopters were also employed in 
logistics support and Casevac/Medevac (casualty/ medical 
evacuation) roles. The use of helicopters for general troop 
movement was also evident in operations in Irian Jaya, and 
thus ABRI had an ongoing requirement for transport 
helicopters which was met by the local production of 'Pumas'. 
The need for mobility, strategic in particular, was certainly 
essential for the functioning of the PPRC (Pasukan Pemukul 
Reaksi Cepat - Rapid Reaction Strike Force) established in 
1984. Thus the development of the Air Force and Navy's 
transport assets must be seen in this context too. The 
establishment of this strike force was outlined in RENSTRA II 
(Rencana Sasaran Strategi - Defence-Security Strategic Plan) 
1979 / 80-1983 / 84 which referred to the development of a 
"compact strike force with a highly reactive capability which 
can be deployed within a short span of time". 93 ThePPRC 
was intended: 
to provide a rapid conventional-force reaction to 
sudden low-level external threats and internal 
92 To continue Lowry's Vietnam analogy referred to above, these movements were 
analogous to what Thompson describes as the US' 'eagle' flights during operations in 
Vietnam. Thompson, Defeating Communist InsurgencY, p. 106. 
93 RENSTRA 11, cited Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-jakti and T. A. M. Simatupang, "Indonesia: 
Defence Expenditures in the Period of the New Order, 1967-85", in Chin, Defence 
Spending in SE Asia p-115. 
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security disturbances. After this initial reaction " forces can be built up and national resources mobilised 
as required. 94 
The strike force would thus be able to supply a backup to the 
territorial forces' locally deployed strike forces. 95 
Troop transport requirements during the Second Cold War 
period were not confined to counter-insurgency operations in East Timor or Irian Jaya, nor, indeed, to the establishment of 
a mobile stike force. There was also the need to be able to 
move troops in order to respond to lower level internal 
security problems. For example, in the wake of anti-Chinese 
riots in Solo and Semarang in November 1980, C-130s were 
used to fly in some 500 troop reinforcements. 96 
If this point about internal security problems of a lesser 
magnitude than insurgency is taken a stage further., to the 
need for acquisitions of certain categories of major weapons 
to specifically promote national development policies, or to 
enable ABRI to assist in the furthering of such policies, we 
come finally to a uniquely Indonesian influence on arms 
acquisitions. 
Most obviously, a number of the transport aircraft acquired 
by Indonesia (the six C-160F'Transalls') were deliberately 
procured to help the implementation of the 'transmigration' 
programme which aimed at alleviating population pressures 
in the more densely populated islands, such as Java and Bali, 
by moving people to more sparsely populated areas (for 
94 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 113. Lowry describes the composition of the 
PPRC as follows: "The PPRC is built around one of the Kostrad divisions. The 
nominated division headquarters provides the task force headquarters, and the the 
force comprises one airborne brigade from the division, one marine battalion landing 
team (BTP) and naval escort, Air Force air transport for one airborne battalion, and 
offensive air support with air defence provided by Kohanudnas. " Ibid. Kohanudnas 
[Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional] is the National Air Defence Command. 
95 See General Murdani's comments on the conceptual origins of the PPRC made on 
his assumption of the post of ABRI Commander-in-Chief, cited in Bilveer Singh, 
ABRI And The Security Of Southeast Asia. The Role And Thinking Of General L. 
Benny Moerdani (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 
pp. 148-149. 
96 See FEER, 5 December, 1980, p. 10. 
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example, Irian Jaya, Kalimantan, and East Timor). 97 This 
point is recognised, and extended to the navy's acquisition of LSTs, in Josephs' analysis of the armed forces commitments to 
the transmigration programme. These "commitments bear 
strong influence on defence equipment spending, particularly 
on heavy lift capacity such as ships for the Military Sealift 
Command and transport aircraft for the Air Force": capacity 
which can be utilised to transport people and building 
materials. 98 
It is also evident that, particularly in the case of the navy's 
sealift capacity, such equipment was clearly intended to 
provide additional resources for the promotion of national 
development as and when required. The military sealift 
"units strength may also be used to help meet general sea 
transportation needs, especially those related to national 
development. "99 This, of course, is entirely in keeping with 
ABRI's role in Indonesia generally, which links it inextricably 
with the development of Indonesia as a whole. 
The influence of the internal security dimension - the need to 
respond militarily to existing and/or potential insurgencies - 
on arms acquisitions, was understandably not as widespread 
as that of the requirements of policy and strategy. In addition 
to the fact that there were inherent limitations to its influence 
in terms of the technological level of weapons acquired, the 
extent of its influence was obviously constrained by prevailing 
circumstances. Insurgencies were, by and large, not 
automatically a constant feature of the states's defence 
planning and thus the impact they had on arms acquisitions 
waxed and waned like the insurgencies themselves. This was 
97 It is readily apparent from the choice of some of the places for relocation that 
there is an important security function inherent in the policy of transmigration too. 
The policy has been related to the idea of 'territorial management' and the creation 
of a national - Indonesian - identity. Taylor cites the comments in 1985 of General 
Murdani and Minister of Transmigration, Martono, to this effect. Taylor, op. cit. 
pp. 191-192. 
98 Josephs, Qp. cit., p. 17. 
99 The efence And Security Of The Republic Of Indonesia 1995 
p. 29 
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most evident in the case of Malaysia. Where they were more 
intractable, or where the potential for new ones to emerge 
existed, as in Burma and Indonesia, the impact of the internal 
security dimension was highly significant and much less 
transient. For states such as Singapore which faced no threat 
of insurgency, or Thailand and Vietnam which faced more 
pressing external threats (and pursued a limited and mainly 
non-military response to prevailing insurgencies), the internal 
security dimension had no influence on arms acquisitions at 
all. 
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Chapter V Technology and the Role of Extra-Regional 
Powers 
The final two pressures or factors to exert a significant 
influence on arms acquisitions by the various SE Asian states, 
are those of technological progression and the role of extra- 
regional powers. By extra-regional, it is meant that they are 
outside the geographical area of SE Asia and are not members 
of the SE Asian security complex, though they may have an 
influence on that complex as a result of the inter-linkages 
between the regional and international complexes during the 
Second Cold War-' 
Both of these pressures have already been evident in relation 
to some of the other ones discussed previously (notably 
external threat assessment and the requirements of defence 
policy and strategy) so they are not completely unknown 
quantities. What was not much in evidence hitherto with 
regard to the other pressures was any suggestion that they 
could have the opposite effect. In other words, that they 
could actually militate against states acquiring arms. This is 
an idea which emerges for the first time in any discussion of 
the role of technology and of extra-regional powers: an idea 
which suggests a certain ýpterýconnectedness between them 
and one which is a function of the secondary nature of the SE 
Asian'arms dynamic'. 
In secondary arms dynamics especially, the two pressures are 
inextricably linked as the major extra-regional powers 
(predominantly the United States and the Soviet Union) set 
the global standard of technological progression in military 
equipment and act as the major suppliers of weapons. When 
the superpowers are engaged in a more intense phase of 
competition - as during the Second Cold War - then the 
revolution in military technology accelerates and those states 
V..;,, (, 
1 In terms of the theory of arms dynamics, or races, it can be difficult at times to 
determine whether the participants' allies are either 'internal' or 'external', with 
Gray recognising the impossibility of a "general answer". Gray, The Arms Race 
Phenomenon p. 73- "Allies may, by their own behavior, stimulate the arms 
programme of the adversary. Also, allies might successfully generate demands for 
arms that are additional to those believed to be essential by the principals. In these 
ways the actions of allies should be viewed as being external to the... system. Allied 
contributions may also be substitutes for armaments that would otherwise have to be 
found by the principals - to that extent it is reasonable to view them as being internal 
to the system. " Ibid. 
141 
which are part- or non-producers find it harder to keep up 
with the leaders and concomitantly become more dependent 
on them to doSo. 2 As Buzan contends: 
Since the pace of advance is itself pushed by military 
rivalry among the top-rank powers, the technological 
consequences of superpower rivalry are quickly imposed on the rest of the international system. States that cannot afford modern weapons, but see their security needs as requiring them, may have to 
make political arrangements with a supplier state in 
which allegiance, bases, or economic assets are 
traded for arms aid. 3 
Simultaneously, a more intense period of superpower 
competition can lead to a greater willingness on the part of the 
superpowers to supply friendly states with more advanced 
weapons than they would have done otherwise: "Competition 
between them can become so intense that they may even find it 
difficult to reserve all of their latest innovations for their own 
armed forces. "4 Even in times of less intense competition., the 
superpowers, and other suppliers, will facilitate the spread of 
advanced military technology through the process of 
'diffusion' (as was noted in Chapter I) in accordance with their 
general desire to increase their influence in the international 
system. 5 The process of diffusion may, therefore, be most 
2 The "intensification of the race in military technology" evident during this period 
was encapsulated in 'Star Wars', the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. 
Thee, op. cit. p. 9. 
3 Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies p. 39. The idea of a dependent 
relationship is not unique to secondary arms dynamics, however. Stephanie Neuman 
contends that even some of the major non-superpower producers of arms were 
dependent on the United States and the Soviet Union for some major weapons and 
certainly "for access to technical innovations". Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid 
and the Superpowers", ForeigII Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, p. 1058. For a 
discussion of the wider aspects of the 'dependent militarization' of Third World 
states, see Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, "The Systemic Sources of 
Dependent Militarization", in Brian L. job (ed. ), The Insecurity Dilemma. National 
Security of Third World States (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner, 1992). 
4 Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies p. 38. 
5 Diffusion will also be encouraged by other factors including, for example, the desire 
to maintain a favourable balance of payments position through the export of weapons 
and, crucially, the need for domestic arms industries to develop export markets in 
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evident where a close security relationship exists between 
supplier and recipient states. 
The impact of the security relationship between supplier and 
recipient states on arms acquisitions, however, goes beyond 
just the degree to which it enables the latter to keep up with the 
process of technological progression. The relationship can 
have a more fundamental impact on many aspects of 
secondary arms dynamic's states' acquisitions (as well as on 
their defence capabilities more generally, of course). 6 Indeed, 
this has already been indicated in elements of our previous 
discussion about Thai and Vietnamese arms acquisitions. In 
addition, therefore, to setting the standards of technological 
progression and facilitating the ability of part- or non- 
producer states to keep up to some extent, the role of the 
extra-regional powers can encompass a number of other 
important aspects. These aspects are: the direct supply of 
weapons through grant aid; the provision of favourable credit 
terms and/or payments arrangements for weapons purchases; 
the influencing of client states' preferences for weapons; and 
the supply of weapons in order that the recipient states can 
play a role in the extra-regional powers' defence strategies (in 
addition to their more general place in the extra-regional 
powers' foreign policies). 
The fact that an extra-regional power may supply weapons so 
as to enable a recipient state to participate directly or indirectly 
in its defence strategy brings us back to the idea that the role of 
extra-regional powers may militate against arms acquisitions. 
If the supply of weapons can be in the interests of the supplier's 
own defence strategy then so too., on occasion, can arms 
transfer restraint. Stephanie Neuman notes, for example, 
that the superpowers were often reluctant to supply unlimited 
quantities of weapons in the early stages of conflicts between 
Third World states for fear that this could have negative 
consequences - including acting as a catalyst for direct 
confrontation between the superpowers - and generally 
order to extend their production runs and achieve greater economies of scale. See 
ibid., pp. 40-41. 
6 In terms of the assistance which the superpowers provided to Third World states 
during the Cold War, Ball recognises that it enabled "most countries to build up and 
maintain a larger and/or better equipped force than would have been possible using 
only domestic resources. " Ball, op. cit. p. 291. 
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restricted the supply of leading edge weapons which might 
'destabilise' a region. 7 
The wide ranging influence which extra-regional powers can 
exert on arms acquisitions is clearly distinctive in secondary 
arms dynamics and obviously not part of the superpower 
derived 'arms dynamic'. The working of the technological 
imperative model in secondary dynamics, however, shares 
some similarities with the superpower dynamic and also 
displays differences from it. 
In the superpower derived 'arms dynamic, the technological 
imperative model revolved around the extent to which a 
demand for weapons development and acquisition resulted 
from the mechanics of the linkage between civilian and 
military technological advances and the desire to keep up with 
(or preferably lead) the process of military technological 
change in the context of the uncertainty engendered by the 
anarchic international system. Although states in secondary 
arms dynamics cannot participate in the creation of the 
military technological revolution (let alone expect to lead it), 
they are unable to escape from the effects of the systemic 
advances in military technology as members of the hierachical, 
competitive, self-help international system. As Buzan states: 
"all countries are caught in a worldwide pattern of military 
forms and standards determined by the doctrines., styles and 
technologies of the major arms producers. "8 What this means 
for states in practical terms,, therefore,, is that technological 
change becomes an abiding condition of defence planning for 
all states. The ways in which defence planners will respond to 
it, however, will differ according to the level of productive 
capacity the state possesses. Thus, expecting technological 
change, defence planners: 
7 See Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars pp. 31-33. For a more extensive 
analysis of the arms transfer restraint exercised by the superpowers 
during the Cold 
War period, see Michael T. Klare, "US policy on arms transfers to the Third 
World", 
and Joachim Krause, "Soviet arms transfer restraint", in Thomas 
OhIson (ed. ), Arms 
Transfer Limitations and Third World Security (Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University 
Press, 1988). The earlier SIPRI study in the 1970s on the arms trade - The Arms Trade 
With The Third World - noted that in the case of other suppliers such as 
Britain and 
France where (excepting arms supplies to their former colonies) arms exports were 
predominantly motivated by economic considerations, then no such restraint was 
exercised. 
Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies pp. 107-108. 
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have little alternative but to institutionalize the 
process of change within the state, either in terms of 
permanently organized R&D, or in terms of regular imports of up-to-date weapons from better-equipped 
producer states. 9 
The regularity with which states in secondary arms dynamics 
will be able to acquire up-to-date weapons, and thus 
participate in the systemic progression in military technology, 
will be conditioned by the policies of the extra-regional powers 
who supply them and by their ability to come up with the 
wherewithal to pay for them (especially if no financial 
assistance is forthcoming from the suppliers). Without such 
assistance, the exponential increases in the cost of state-of- 
the-art weapons can prohibit their acquisition by many 
developing states. 
Taking into account these various points about the way in 
which the technological imperative can have an impact on 
arms acquisitions in secondary arms dynamics, it is possible to 
suggest three ways in which it may have been apparent in the 
SE Asian dynamic during the Second Cold War period. 
In the first place, it may have been apparent in the desire by 
some or all of the states to keep up in some - possibly limited - 
way with the general process of military technological change 
through irregular acquisitions of selected high-tech equipment. 
This equipment would be selected with reference to the utility 
of the myriad military technological developments for their 
own particular circumstances. In the main, it would not 
appear to have been necessary for the SE Asian states to have 
sought to acquire the full panoply of advanced equipment 
available as they did not face the same sort of sophisticated 
combat scenarios (for instance, the extensive use of electronic 
warfare systems in ground attack operations) as the 
technological leaders. 
High-tech equipment would also be selected with reference to 
the acquisitions of other states in the regional complex. As we 
9 Ibid. p. 110. Buzan makes this point in reference to the way in which the 
technological imperative can influence the domestic structure model. 
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saw in the context of the requirements of defence policy and 
strategy, acquisitions of advanced weapons systems by 
neighbouring states often provided an illustration of the 
prevailing state of technology indicating an objective need for 
modernisation (although it is difficult to disentangle this from 
an action-reaction phenomenon). Certainly there was 
evidence in the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' that there was a 
degree of technology induced action-reaction. The idea of a 
technology induced action-reaction process was also seen in 
terms of prestige. When a new and advanced weapons system 
was introduced into the region,, on occasion this was thought 
to signal a change in the "balance of prestige between nations" 
and led to a "countervailing purchase". 10 
Secondly, in the need for the states to respond to the problem 
of obsolescent equipment: a problem which results from both 
the very process of technological progression and from the fact 
that military equipment obviously has a finite life span. In 
terms of the former it is a truism that technological advance 
leads to technological redundancy: 
Permanent technical progress implies a permanent 
process of obsolescence. The continuous 
development of new weapons, incorporating 
improved firepower, mobility, or communication, 
necessitates the continuous replacement of existing 
[emphasis added] weapons. " 
10 Karp, op. cit. p. 341. Karp discusses this primarily in the context of the 
of sequential orders" for F-16s in the mid-1980s, although he also contends that such a 
it procurement pattern [was] visible in ship-to-ship missiles, surface-to-surface 
missiles, 155mm artillery, ASW ... frigates and 
jet trainers. " Ibid. 
11 Kaldor and Eide, op. cit. p. 10. In other words, as soon as an existing weapon is no 
longer operationally effective because of its inability to match a new one, it is 
obsolescent. This point was one of the many which was drawn to my attention on the 
nature of obsolescence, and the responses to it, in correspondence and discussions over 
the last two years with Mr. Howard Lang, an avionics and weapons systems engineer 
at British Aerospace, Warton, Lancashire. 
It is worth noting, however, that just because a weapon is 'operationally obsolescent' 
this does not preclude it from being deployed in a different operational role. Many 
'Canberra' bombers, for example, were successfully employed as reconnaissance 
aircraft after they were no longer operationally effective in their 
designated role 
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One way of obviating, or at least mitigating, this problem 
(without actually having to acquire new weapons) and of 
ameliorating the costs of keeping up with the general process 
of technological progression, is for states to refurbish and 
upgrade wepaons which have become operationally 
obsolescent. 12 For a modern combat aircraft., for example, 
minor modifications and the addition of newer technology can 
occur throughout its lifetime although it will usually only have 
one major upgrade at its mid-life point. The scope for 
refurbishment or upgrading is ultimately limited by the 
predicted service lifetime of the weapons system which is an 
unavoidable problem. 
Thirdly, and inter-related to the role of extra-regional powers, 
in the efforts of part-producer states to develop their 
productive capacity: to move to a higher stage of production. 
These efforts will be motivated by the wish to be able to carry 
out their own modernisation of existing weapons and by the 
desire to reduce their expenditure on increasingly costly 
imports of advanced weapons. The desire for greater self- 
reliance will also be engendered in some cases by the policy of 
states to reduce their dependence on extra-regional powers 
for arms supplies for wider political and strategic reasons. 
Paradoxically, perhaps, for in the long-term it may be 
detrimental to their arms exports, attempts by recipient states 
to develop their productive capacities will be facilitated by the 
willingness of supplier states to agree to a variety of 'offset 
deals' which may entail offering the recipients licensed 
production opportunities or technology transfer 
arrangements. This willingness, Brzoska and OhIson 
recognise, will be apparent when the arms market is fairly 
stagnant and there is consequently increased competition 
among supplier states: a situation which was evident in the 
mid-1980s. 13 
12 Karp contends that refurbishment, or upgrading, is considerably cheaper than 
acquiring new weapons "typically [being] one-fith to one-half the cost. 
" Karp, QP. 
cit. p. 356. It still has its drawbacks, however, as it "cannot overcome the 
inherent 
limitations of a weapons platform" and an extension of life requires "accepting 
continuously restrictive operating parameters. " Ibid. 
13 See Brzoska and Ohlson, op. cit. pp-130-131. They also note that the development 
of productive capacity, and the attendant decrease in the imports of arms, can 
be a 
function of a "substitution cycle" which occurs as states'incomes grow: "direct 
imports 
of weapons are increasingly ... supplemented 
by imports of support equipment and 
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This chapter will seek to analyse the multifarious ways in 
which the pressures of the technological imperative and the 
role of extra-regional powers influenced the various states' 
arms acquisitions (bearing in mind that some of these aspects 
have already been discussed in the context of other pressures). 
Much as in the case of the requirements of defence policy and 
strategy it is apparent - given the secondary nature of the SE 
Asian'arms dynamic' and the inescapable nature of the 
technological imperative - that these pressures will be of 
relevance to all the states under consideration. Again, 
however, they will differ in the degree to which they influence 
arms acquisitions according to the various states' 
circumstances. In particular, they will differ according to the 
scope of their relationships and dependence on extra-regional 
powers; their desire to keep up with technological 
developments; and their efforts to develop their defence 
industry (if, indeed, they have one). From these criteria it is 
possible to determine in which states these pressures were of 
particular significance (Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore), of 
some significance (Indonesia), and of marginal significance 
(Malaysia and Burma). 
Vietnam 
For Vietnam, the impact of these two pressures on its arms 
acquisitions during the Second Cold War period can be seen 
wholly in terms of its strategic relationship with the Soviet 
Union. In the absence of a domestic defence industry 
producing anything other than small arms, and in view of the 
chronic economic problems which it suffered from, the 
relationship was one in which Vietnam was almost entirely 
dependent on the Soviet Union for the supply of major 
weapons and other military equipment - all of which is thought 
to have been provided as grant aid. 14 The nature of the 
arms production technology and, finally, imports are substituted by growing 
domestic 
production". Ibid. p. 132- 
14 Pike estimated that in 1979, for example, 97% of Vietnam's 
"military hardware" 
was supplied by the Soviet Union, with East Germany (2%) and 
Poland and 
Czechoslovakia (1%) accounting for the remainder. Douglas Pike, "The USSR and 
Vietnam: Into TIie Swamp", Asian Surygy, Vol. XIX, No. 12, December 1979, p. 1165. 
According to the 1985 edition of "Soviet Military Power" published by the US 
government, the USSR provided a total of US$5bn in military aid 
to Vietnam 
between 1979 and 1984. Cited Denis Warner, "Vietnam, the double-edged sword 
in 
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relationship also meant that the provision of weapons to 
Vietnam was often determined by the specific requirements of 
Soviet strategy. To the extent that the technological 
imperative had any effect then this must also be seen in the 
context of Vietnam's dependence upon its Soviet patron. 
Vietnam's ability to keep up with. the process of technological 
progression, and to avoid the problems of obsolescence, was 
contingent on the Soviet Union's willingness to allow it to do 
so by making either the latest,, or at least more modern, 
weapons available to it. 
The existence of a patron-client relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam was not new to the Second Cold 
War period. It did, however, reach its apogee in the wake of 
the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and 
Co-operation in November 1978 and the Chinese invasion of 
northern Vietnam in February 1979. 
The origins of the relationship lay in the Soviet Union's 
support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) 
struggle against the Republic of Vietnam in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and in the USSR's calculations as to the likely utility of a 
relationship with a re-unified - communist - Vietnam for 
ensuring a strategic configuration in SE Asia which was highly 
favourable to it. The foundations for the future relationship 
were laid in 1971 when, as Thompson notes., there was a 
coalescence of North Vietnamese and Soviet thinking. At this 
point in their struggle the North Vietnamese recognised that 
they would effectively have to choose the USSR over China as 
their major military backer in order to ensure the receipt of the 
weapons required to defeat the South in an invasion: whilst, 
for its part, the Soviet Union recognised that the defeat of the 
Americans in Vietnam would create "a vacuum which she could 
fill ... thereby completing 
her encirclement and containment of 
China. "15 The upshot of these decisions was that the Soviet 
South-East Asia", Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1985, p. 15. McGregor contends that 
much of this aid would have to be "free, simply because Vietnam could not possibly 
afford to equip and supply its large armed forces. " McGregor, op. cit. p. 
68. He does 
not, however, discount the possibility of "partial payment either 
by barter or in 
labour" although he concludes that this was more likely to have gone towards 
shoring-up Vietnam's "balance of payments deficit in non-military trade with 
the 
Soviet bloc. " Ibid. This point about barter payments in primary products was also 
made in a paper presented to the NZ Institute of International Affairs 
in Hamilton, 
New Zealand, in April 1998 by an Australian diplomat formerly in Vietnam. 
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Union supplied huge quantities of weaponry to the DRV 
during 1971, including advanced weapon systems (for 
example, SA-7 SAMs) which it had not supplied hitherto. 16 
In the aftermath of the DRV's victory in 1975 and the 
establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the pattern 
of Soviet-Vietnamese relations which was to characterise the 
Second Cold War period began to clearly emerge. Soviet 
military (and economic) aid was provided to an increasingly 
dependent Vietnam because of the role which the latter could 
play in assisting the USSR to achieve its strategic ambitions in 
SE Asia. These strategic ambitions included countering China; 
establishing a military presence in the South China Sea and 
Indian and Pacific Oceans; and founding a legitimate claim to 
be involved in regional affairs. 17 The 1978 treaty, and the 
developments which ensued thereafter., represented the 
culmination of Soviet desires and Vietnamese dependence. 
The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation has been described 
as representing the fulfilment of long-standing Soviet 
ambitions of bringing Vietnam "into a military alliance against 
China"18: China being one of the Soviet Union's "core" security 
interests. 19 By implication, therefore, deterring Chinese 
aggression against allies like Vietnam was also a component of 
that core. 20 In this respect it would be accurate to contend that 
there were perceived to be mutual benefits accruing from the 
treaty,, with it effectively symbolising "a convergence of 
strategic interests between Moscow and Hanoi". 21 Indeed, 
from Hanoi's point of view,, the treaty with the Soviet Union 
was meant to provide what Chanda has termed an "insurance 
15 Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand pp. 93-94. 
1.6 Ibid. p. 94. 
17 See Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, pp. 180-181. 
18 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy. The War After The War, (New York: Collier 
Books, 1986), p. 321. 
19 Rajan Menon, Soviet Power And The Third World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986), p. 98. 
20 See Lb-id. 
21 Ibid. p. 224. 
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guarantee" against any potential Chinese aggression in 
response to Vietnam's impending invasion of Cambodia. 22 
The Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in February 1979 
appeared to belie the idea that the Soviet Union would act as 
the guarantor of Vietnam's security under the Treaty of 
Friendship and Co-operation. The Soviet response to the 
invasion, Pike contends, was certainly a "guarded" one: 
Throughout the seventeen days of the invasion the 
USSR took only minimal action and carefully labeled 
each act to avoid ambiguity. Moscow did nothing 
that could be interpreted as being militarily hostile 
toward China. .... At no time during the seventeen days did the USSR make any move in the direction of 
China . .... It did [however] immediately generate a 
crash program of military assistance to Vietnam. A 
special airlift flew in needed light cargo - such as 
medicines - and some heavy cargo in small amounts, 
chiefly for show. The war was over before new 
supplies could make any significant contribution, but 
they did demonstrate Soviet support. 23 
The Soviet Union's minimalist response to the invasion, Pike 
continues, was based on two calculations. First, the Chinese 
invasion had only limited objectives and did not threaten 
Vietnam's survival. Indeed, the Chinese decision to limit both 
the duration and extent of their invasion was influenced by 
their desire to prevent the Soviets from feeling any compulsion 
to become directly involved (in this sense the USSR did act as a 
guarantor of Vietnam's security). Secondly, given the limited 
objectives of the Chinese the PAVN would be more than 
capable of dealing with it (especially with some Soviet 
logistical support). 24 
22 Chanda, op. cit. p. 321. 
23 Pike, PAVN p. 76. The Soviet Union also demonstrated its support for Vietnam by 
mounting reconnaissance flights over the Sino-Vietnamese border area during the 
fighting. The Japanese Defence Agency reported that two Soviet Tu-95 'Bear' 
aircraft were thought to have been pursuing such a mission on 21st February. See 
SWB 22 February 1979 FE/6049/A3/22. 
24 See Pike, PAYN, pp. 76-77. For an analysis of the objectives and calculations 
which underlay China's invasion, and an account of it, see Jencks, op. cit. pp. 139-146. 
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The Soviet Union's limited response, moreover, indicated the 
I ambiguity' contained within Article 6 of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Co-operation which was the one which 
effectively specified what would happen in the event of an 
attack upon Vietnam. This 'ambiguity', Pike contends, was "deliberate on the part of the USSR. "25 Article 6 stated that: 
In case either party is attacked or threatened with 
attack the two parties signatory to the treaty should 
immediately consult each other with a view to 
eliminating the threat, and shall take appropiate and 
effective measures to safeguard the peace and 
security of the two countrieS. 26 
The wording here is significant because it did not commit the 
Soviet Union to provide "immediate military aid" as did 
treaties with North Korea and Mongolia. 27 
It is possible, however, that such a phrase was included in a 
'secret protocol' signed at the same time as the main treaty: a 
protocol which, significantly, was also thought to have seen 
Vietnam grant permission for Soviet forces to use Vietnamese 
air and naval facilities. 28 In effect, therefore, the treaty 
contained an important quid pro quo. In return for Soviet 
military assistance - and obviously we are most concerned 
with the issue of arms transfers - Vietnam agreed to provide 
the USSR with access to its military facilities. The Soviet 
Union could then use these facilities to fulfil its wider strategic 
ambitions in SE Asia. 
In the aftermath of the Chinese invasion in February 1979 the 
quid pro quo contained within the treaty effectively became 
operative and there was a massive injection of Soviet arms 
into Vietnam during the period 1979-1981. Fearful of further 
and potentially more threatening Chinese military action 
25 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 185. 
26 Cited ibid. 
27 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 186. 
28 Ibid. 
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against it, Vietnam urgently required substantial quantities of 
major weapons to build up all three branches of its armed forces so that they could hope to counter the PLA's clear 
quantitative superiority. 29 Furthermore, the Vietnamese now 
acquiesced to Soviet requests for access for its forces to the 
major Vietnamese facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, 
no doubt in the hope too that a Soviet military presence would 
act as an effective deterrent to further Chinese aggression. 
The first Soviet warships to visit Cam Ranh Bay, Chanda 
observes, including a cruiser and a frigate, arrived on 27th 
March, 1979 and thereafter there was a steady increase in the 
number of ships and aircraft which operated from Vietnam. 30 
It should be noted that there was an extensive debate over the 
exact nature of the presence of Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay 
during the Second Cold War and, concomitantly,, over the 
arrangements the Vietnamese had made to permit them to use 
it. In essence, the debate revolved around whether it was a 
Vietnamese or a Soviet'base'. 31 Irrespective of the most 
29 In June 1979 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that: "Vietnamese officials 
are convinced that renewed fighting with the Chinese is both inevitable and 
imminent. " The expectation was that next time the Chinese would mount a two- 
pronged attack through Laos and amphibious landings near Thanh Hoa in an attempt 
to cut-off the north of the country before reinforcements from the south could arrive. 
FEER 15 June, 1979, p. 12. Vietnam's concerns about the maritime dimension were 
heightened in September when China conducted a large combined air and naval 
exercise near Hainan Island and the Paracel islands at the same time as it was 
reactivating naval bases in north Hainan. See FEER, 21 September, 1979, p. 13. 
30 Chanda, op. cit. pp. 397-398. 
31 Chanda, basing his argument on the views of US analysts, contends that the 
"Soviet buildup in Vietnam began not on the basis of any open-ended commitment or 
'leasing' of Vietnamese facilities, but as a result of specific accords reached during 
periodic consultations held between Moscow and Hanoi officials. " Ibid., p. 397. The L 
official Vietnamese position, which was clearly reiterated in 1988 in the wake of 
Soviet President Gorbachev's call for a mutual US-Soviet withdrawal from their 
respective bases in the Philippines and Vietnam, was that Cam Ranh Bay was a 
Vietnamese base. "It is well known to everyone that Cam Ranh is a sovereign seaport 
of Vietnam, and that Vietnam has permitted the Soviet naval fleet to use Cam Ranh 
to supply it with material and technical aid. " SWB 20 September 1988 FE/0261 
A2/1. 
In his discussion of the extent to which the USSR used arms transfers to Third World 
states to secure the use of military installations, Menon makes a clear distinction 
between bases andfacilities. The former is "an installation that supports the 
operations of a military force and serves as its point of origin .... the right of access 
for 
a specified period [being] ... secured by a treaty 
between the host state and the 
lessee"; whilst the latter are signified by "noncontractual, less extensive, and ad hoc 
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appropiate epithet to attach to Cam Ranh Bay, it was evident by the mid-1980s that it was extensively utilised by Soviet forces giving them a significant strategic presence in the South 
China Sea and its environs. 
Cam Ranh is now the centre of the largest 
concentration of Soviet naval units outside the USSR. 
Approximately 30 units - including surface 
combatants., conventional and nuclear-powered 
submarines and naval auxiliaries operate in the South 
China Sea. The adjacent air base supports long- 
range naval reconnaissance, strike and tactical fighter 
aircraft. 32 
The early importance attached to Vietnam by the Soviet Union 
as a "forward-deployment air and naval base"33 for its military 
forces,, meant that Soviet arms transfers to Vietnam were for 
two (inter-related) purposes. First, to enable the Vietnamese 
to strengthen their forces for any future confrontation with 
China. Secondly, to enable the Vietnamese to "protect Soviet 
air and naval capabilities based in Vietnam. "34 
In the aftermath of the Chinese invasion the priority for 
Vietnam was to better equip those PAVN units responsible for 
the defence of the northern part of the country (near the border 
area and in and around Hanoi and Haiphong) as part of the 
preparations for an expected greater war with China. 35 To 
this end, Vietnam acquired some 200 T-62 MBTs in 1979; 
unknown (but presumably considerable) quantities of T-55 
MBTs and BTR-60P APCs during the period 1979-1981; and 300 
(? ) 152mm howitzers during the same period. The heavy 
artillery pieces were almost certainly intended for PAVN units 
privileges" in which "access" is limited in some way. Menon, oJ2. cit. pp. 228-229. 
Menon notes, however, that the distinction between the two can 'collapse' in such 
cases as Vietnam where the USSR had "exclusive, regular and long-term access to 
ports and shore installations for repairs, training, storage, communications, and 
reconnaissance. " Ibid., P. 229. 
32 "Soviet Military Power 1985" cited Warner, op. cit. p. 15. Vietnam also acted as 
an important base for Soviet signals intelligence gathering activities. Ibid. 
33 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 191. 
34 Ibid., p. 197. 
35 See FEER 20 April, 1979, p. 19. 
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deployed along the border in view of the frequent artillery barrages mounted by the Chinese on Vietnam's northern 
provinces of Ha Tuyen and Lang Son (invariably in response to 
Vietnamese activity along the Thai-Cambodian border). 36 
Despite the fact that the PLA did not employ air power during 
its February invasion - although it had amassed somewhere in 
the region of 700-1000 aircraft in the vicinty of the border37 - the Vietnamese appear to have placed a premium on the role 
of air power in any subsequent conflict with China. 38 
Accordingly, therefore, Vietnam acquired very large numbers 
of combat aircraft (including MiG-17s; MiG-19s; MiG-21s; 
Su-7s; and, possibly, Su-22s) between 1979 and 1981: aircraft 
which could provide both an interceptor and a ground attack 
capability. 
The ground-based components of Vietnam's air defences were 
not neglected either in the wake of the Chinese attack. This 
was indicative of both the importance which Vietnam attached 
to having a strong,, comprehensive air defence capability and, 
Pike contends, of the Soviet Union's wish to supply Vietnam 
with air defence systems so that it could afford better 
protection to Soviet air and naval assets based there. 39 In the 
12 months or so following the invasion, therefore, Vietnam 
received several SA-3 and SA-6 SAM systems and missiles 
(almost certainly with their attendant radars). These new 
systems were intended to supplement Vietnam's existing SAM 
network (ý, oth in the border area and in other strategic 
locationc)40 and to provide protection for those installations 
which were used by Soviet forces: A OW% 
36 See Pike, PAYN pp. 74-75. 
: L- N'' A? u 
37 See Jencks, op. cit. p. 142. The Chinese did not employ air power, Jencks contends, 
because of their desire to "limit the scope of the war". Ibid. 
38 Pike makes this point in reference to the contents of PAVN military journals. See 
Pike, PAVN pp. 255-256. 
39 See Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 197. The background to the importance 
attached by Vietnam to its air defences can be seen in the mid-1960s when North 
Vietnam deployed Russian supplied air defence equipment (including MiG fighters 
and SAMs) to defend Hanoi and Haiphong against American bombing. Moreover, 
North Vietnam's air defences had proved to be inadequate in December 1972 when 
they were virtually overwhelmed by American bombers. See Thompson, Peace Is Not 
At Hand pp. 92 and 135. 
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The USSR has 
... installed second-generation air defence systems to protect its major air fields at Hanoi 
and the naval installation at Cam Ranh Bay. 
Advanced missile systems reportedly have been 
installed at Haiphong, Huong Khe, Vinh, Da Nang, 
Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa. 41 
In tandem with the supply of SA-6 SAM systems the Soviet 
Union most likely supplied an appropiate number of ZSU-23-4 
'Shilka' self-propelled AA guns, Soviet practice being to deploy 
four ZSU-23-4s with each battery of four SA-6 SAM launchers 
(that is, one for each launcher). 42 As Vietnam received at least 
two batteries of SA-6s it would not be unreasonable to assume, 
therefore., that it also received at least eight ZSU-23-4s 
(though this cannot be confirmed). The 'Shilkas' were 
designed to operate in conjunction with the SA-6s in order to 
prevent any attacking aircraft from getting through by flying 
low under the SA-6s' cover. 43 
Nowhere in the post-invasion period was the impact of Soviet 
arms transfers more dramatic than on Vietnam's naval and 
maritime capabilities. These expanded enormously in the 
years immediately following the invasion and, significantly, 
continued to expand with Soviet assistance up to the mid- 
40 This network had itself been strengthened considerably prior to the Chinese 
invasion with deliveries of large numbers of SA-2 SAM systems and missiles. Some of 
these were delivered or deployed a matter of days before the invasion occurred as 
part of Vietnam's last minute defensive preparations. See FEER, 16 February, 1979, 
p. 10. In view of Chinese claims to have put up to seven Vietnamese SAM sites out of 
action (the Chinese also claiming to have captured a number of 'SA-6' missiles) during 
the fighting, it is possible that some of the SA-3 systems, in particular, which 
Vietnam received actually went to plug gaps in the border defence network. See 
SWB 8 March 1979 FE/6061/A3/15. 
41 Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union p. 197. In his earlier article, Pike also 
referred to the fact that Soviet 'Badger' bombers at Vietnamese air fields were 
protected by a "new air defence system employing the SAM-3. " Pike, The USSR And 
Vietnam p. 1166. 
42 See Christopher F. Foss, Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the World (Shepperton: 
Ian Allan, 1982), p-200. 
43 The effectiveness of the SA-6-'Shilka' combination was, it has been widely 
recognised, amply demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur war. See, for example, 
R. G. Lee et al., Land Warfare, Brassey's New Battlefield Weaj2ons Systems and 
Technology Series into the 21st Century. Volume 5, Guided Weapons, (3rd ed. ), 
(London: Brassey's, 1998), p-206- 
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1980s which was some time after supplies in other areas had 
more or less dried up. As with the other arms transfers, the 
supply of warships was meant to fulfil two purposes: first, to 
enable the PAVN Navy to defend both mainland Vietnam and 
Vietnamese claimed offshore islands in the South China Sea 
against any Chinese amphibious attack, and secondly, to 
enable the Vietnamese to perform 11certain naval functions that 
primarily serve the USSR, such as naval surveillance". 44 
More generally, the build-up of the Vietnamese navy - 
especially its ASW capability - can be seen as fitting in with the 
overall importance attached to maritime strategy by the Soviet 
Union under Admiral Gorshkov and, perhaps, analogous to 
the example of Cuba. 45 
During the period 1979-1983 the Vietnamese received a large 
number of fast attack and patrol craft directly transferred from 
the Soviet navy. These included eight of the 'Osa-11' class - 
"the most modern type in the Soviet navy" at the time46 - and 
some 48 (? ) SS-N-2B SSMs to arm them with. The 
Vietnamese also received three 'Polnochny' class LSMs 
(landing ship, medium) from the Soviet navy which were 
probably assigned to the PAVN Navy's'Kiet Brigade'which 
was tasked with the defence of "offshore islands and ... troop 
transport duties. "47 For airborne ASW operations, and 
maritime patrol, the Vietnamese were provided with both Ka- 
25 helicopters and Be-12'Chaikas'. The 'Chaikas' may 
eventually have been armed with AS-7 anti-submarine missiles 
delivered between 1983 and 1985. Post-1983, the Vietnamese 
were provided with additional FACs - this time 'Turya' class 
hydrofoils - and three more 'Petya 11' frigates for ASW (two 
already having been provided in 1978). 
44 Pike, PAVN p. 257. 
45 The argument here is that a strong Vietnamese navy (like Cuban naval forces in the 
Caribbean) would divert the attentions of US' forces in times of tension. See Wettern, 
op. cit. p. 14. For a brief overview of Soviet maritime strategy under Gorshkov see 
Bryan Ranft, "Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov", in Geoffrey Til(, 
- Mari-time 
Strategy And The Nuclear Age (2nd ed. ), (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 68-74. 
46 Douglas Pike, "Vietnam, a modern Sparta", (The Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific 
Region, No 2), Pacific Defence Reporter April 1983, p. 35. 
47 Pike, PAY N--, p. 112. 
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In terms of the extent to which these transfers of Soviet arms in all the various categories facilitated the PAVN's ability to keep up with the process of military technological progression, 
the 'Osa-11' fast attack craft were a notable exception. 
Generally, and this has been widely commented upon, Vietnam did not receive state-of-the-art equipment. 48 The majority of the weapons which the Soviet Union transferred to the PAVN 
were of an older vintage and were either no longer in frontline 
service with the Soviet armed forces, or, were in the process of being replaced. In other words, they were cast-offs. It is 
interesting to note in this regard that although Vietnam was 
an important 'socialist country' in the USSR's overall Third 
World strategy, it did not receive the same sorts of leading- 
edge weapons (for example, MiG-23s, T-72/80s, and SA-5/8s) 
iAtich were transferred to "major customers" such as Iraq and ' 49 ria When very advanced weapons were apparently 
sý ppi ied - notably the MiG-23s - these actually remained 
under "tight Soviet control. "50 
After 1984 there were very few supplies of major weapons to 
Vietnam. By 1984, in fact, the Soviet-Vietnamese strategic 
relationship was beginning to unravel as the USSR 
increasingly sought to normalise its relationship with China. 
It was notable that in the trail of the Vietnamese Defence 
Minister Van Tien Dung's visit to Moscow in July in order to 
seek further Soviet military aid in view of Chinese pressure 
along the northern border, there was "no indication that the 
Soviets ... started to send any extra military hardware". 51 By 1985, moreover, the Vietnamese no longer feared a major 
Chinese attack as the PRC had apparently decided that they 
48 See Chanda, op. cit. p. 397; McGregor, op. cit. p. 68; Neuman, Military Assistance 
in Recent Wars p-33; and Sauvageot, ol2. cit. p. 34. One of the reasons for this may 
have been that the Soviets actually played down technology in the conduct of war, 
and especially in 'local wars' in the Third World. The experience of these having 
led Soviet theorists to the conclusion "that a technological advantage in weaponry 
does not automatically bring victory. " Menon, op. cit. p. 64. It was also apparent in 
any case that even the older equipment which the USSR provided still surpassed the 
technological level of much of that possessed by the PLA (an observation which 
McGregor makes too). 
49 Menon, op. cit. p-191. 
50 Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars p. 33. This point has also been made 
by Menon in respect of other Third World client states. See Menon, op. cit. p. 194. 
51 FEER, 2 August, 1984, p-24. This was despite the new Soviet President Chernenko's 
condemnation of Chinese border attacks. 
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could not afford to mount a major offensive against Vietnam, 
particularly in view of the difficulty of establishing military (especially air) superiority. 52 
Nowhere was the apparent end of the strategic relationship 
more evident - and thus of the influence of the Soviet Union on 
Vietnamese arms acquistions - than at the time of the various 
clashes between Vietnam and China in and around the 
disputed Spratly Islands in 1988.53 Although the Vietnamese 
apparently "did not ask for Soviet military support" after the 
March attack, "Vietnamese leaders nevertheless were 
'shocked'by what they viewed as Soviet complacency. "54 
Soviet support was limited to "providing satellite and signals 
intelligence on Chinese ship movements. "55 The last major 
weapons to be provided may have been two 'Matka' class FAC 
in 1989. A year later, all Soviet military assistance to Vietnam 
was ended. 
Thailand 
For Thailand, the two pressures of technological progression 
and the role of extra-regional powers have to be seen in the 
context of the external threat posed by Vietnam. In effect, 
therefore, they are supplementary pressures: the primary 
impetus for the expansion and modernisation of the Thai 
armed forces during the Second Cold War period being 
provided by Vietnamese activity in Cambodia. 
The later importance of China notwithstanding,, the two 
pressures are inextricably linked for Thailand in terms of its 
long-standing security relationship with the United States. 56 
52 See FEER 30 May, 1985, p. 15. 
53 The most notable of these was on the 14th March when Vietnamese vessels were 
attacked by the Chinese. See SWB, 17 March 1988 FE/0102 A3/1- 
54 FEER 9 June, 1988, pp. 16-17. 
55 Ibid. p. 17. The Soviets may also have provided assistance in the sense of helping 
to keep the PAVN Navy operational by providing spares for its FACs and Patrol 
Craft (and reactivating some of the older frigates): other parts of the PAVN not 
faring so well in terms of the provision of spares. See Clare Hollingworth, "To 
forestall economic collapse, Vietnam will pull out of Cambodia", Pacific Defence 
Reporter May 1988, p. 14. 
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Indeed, this relationship can be attributed with having a 
special impact on Thai arms procurement - it predisposed the Thais towards the acquisition of advanced American weapons. 
This predisposition was a consequence of the socialisation of 
many senior Thai military officers into American strategic 
culture as a result of joint operations during the Vietnam war 
era, plus joint exercises and participation in US training and 
education programmes over many years. 57 Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra goes as far as to say that Thailand's focus on 
conventional warfare, derived from the US influence on Thai 
doctrine and training, has meant "that the RTG's [Royal Thai 
Government's] arms procurement decisions have [had] an 
American -influenced logic of their own, independent of the 
Thais' threat perceptions. "58 Mak makes essentially the same 
point about the Thais being "biased towards conventional, 
high-tech equipment" as a result of American influence, but 
argues that during the 1980s there was a dovetailing of "[flhe 
'Vietnamese threat' with the in-built biases of the Thai 
military. "59 
just as Vietnam's need for extra-regional power support to 
ensure its security in advance of its invasion of Cambodia led 
to it developing close ties with the Soviet Union, Vietnam's 
invasion meant Thailand required external "sources of 
56 The foundations of this relationship lay in the provisions of the 1954 Manila Pact 
establishing the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and in the 1962 Rusk-Thanat 
Communique. For details of these, and the interpretations of them, see Randolph, pp. 
cit., pp. 29-30 and 41-42. The 1962 communique, Randolph contends, was very 
important as it "constituted on a defiacto basis, an indirect bilateral defence 
agreement between Thailand and the United States. " Ibid. p. 42. 
For an overview of the US-Thai security relationship during the Cold War - 
particularly its development aspect - see Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United 
States: development, security, and foreign aid, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), pp. 20-30.15 
57 A comparison could be made here - one 
iot 
meant to be deliberately unflattering - 
with the American influence on the devel+ment of the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam during the 1960s. See Kolko, op. cit. pp. 234-235. 
58 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op. cit. p. 105. 
59 Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation p. 83. Tim Huxley contends that the Thais 
used the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a "justification" for obtaining advanced 
weapons: weapons which had a "symbolic significance" of their own for Thailand. 
Huxley, The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81 p. 31 The Vietnamese 
invasion, therefore, could be regarded as providing both a need and a pretext for 
Thailand to acquire advanced, conventional weapons. 
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countervailing power" to ensure its security afterit. 60 For 
Thailand, the crucial - if not the most immediately forthcoming 
- source of external military support was the United States. 
The Vietnamese invasion, therefore, effectively revitalised the 
Thai-US security relationship which had been more or less 
moribund since the Thais had requested the withdrawal of US forces from Thailand in the aftermath of the second Indo- 
China war. 
In the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia Thailand 
sought a firm statement from the US that an attack on 
Thailand would constitute an attack on America's "vital 
interests"., rather than the mere reaffirmation of the continued 
existence of the Manila Pact (and presumably the Rusk-Thant 
communiquetoo). 61 Thailand, however, did not want US 
forces redeployed to Thai bases but, instead, US assistance in 
enabling it to defend itself. Indeed, it was this self-help 
approach which was to be at the centre of the Thai-US security 
relationship during the Second Cold War. Concomitantly - 
and in addition to the indirect influence which the US still 
exerted on Thai arms procurement - the main US influence on 
Thai arms acquisitions during this period was exerted through 
the provision of increased Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
credits which assisted Thailand in procuring the weapons it 
required, and through expediting the delivery of weapons to 
Thailand at times of crisis. 62 
Initially, at least, and certainly in comparison with that 
provided to strategically important states in the Middle East in 
the wake of the fall of the Shah of Iran, for instance, US 
security assistance to Thailand seemed rather limited. In 
response to Prime Minister Kriangsak's visit to the US in 
60 Michael Leifer, ASEAN And The Security Of South-East Asia (London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 11. 
61. FEER, 7 March, 1980, p. 27. 
62 FMS credits are extended by the Department of Defense to foreign governments for 
the purchase of US government or commercial defence articles, services and design and 
construction services. States can also receive defence materiel and services on a grant 
aid basis under the US Military Assistance Program (MAP). See ForeigLI Military 
Sales, Foreign Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts. As Of September 30, 
1994 (Deputy for Financial Mangement Comptroller, Defense Security Assistance 
Agency), pp. iv-v. For an overview of the institutional framework of US arms transfer 
programmes in the 1980s, see Brzoska and OhIson, op. cit. pp. 49-52. 
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February 1979 there was a "modest" increase in FMS credits from US$30m to $36m and the agreement to expedite 
equipment which Thailand had already ordered. 63 
Significantly, however, as we have already seen, the 
Americans turned down the Thais request for advanced 
weapons such as the M60A3 MBT and the F-16A. The 
rationale for refusing to supply these weapons to Thailand - particularly the F-16As - appeared to be based on calculations 
about their utility to Thailand and, arguably, about Thailand's 
place in overall US strategic calculations. 
The supply of F-16As to Thailand, it was thought, would be of 
limited utility because of the RTAF's lack of absorptive capacity 
for such advanced aircraft. It would also be detrimental for 
Thai development projects (deemed to be of considerable 
importance because of the ongoing CPT insurgency) as the 
expenses incurred in purchasing them would require the 
diversion of funds away from development expenditure. 64 
Moreover, the introduction of such advanced weapons into 
the SE Asian region would go against US arms transfer 
controls outlined under PD-13. Even after the virtual 
abandonment of Carter's arms transfer controls in 1980 there 
were still clear American efforts to limit, or restrict, the 
supplies of advanced weapons to regional states during the 
1980s in order to avoid a destabilising arms race in SE Asia. 65 
In global terms, at the beginning of the Second Cold War 
period, SE Asia - and, therefore, Thailand - also seemed to be 
of marginal importance to the United States and certainly very 
much secondary to the Middle East. It was notable in this 
respect that in 1979 the US was prepared to supply Israel with 
weapons such as M60A3 tanks and 'Sidewinder'AIM-9L air- 
to-air missiles which "were among the most advanced 
weapons in the US inventory' '66, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
also obtaining M60s. 67 The supply of advanced weapons to 
63 Randolph, oj2. cit. p. 215. 
64 See FEER 2 February, 1984, p. 32. 
65 Discussion with Dr. Leonard Sebastian and Mr. Daljit Singh at the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, May 1998. 
66 Spear, Qp. cit., p. 147. 
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such vital states, at the same time as continuing efforts to 
maintain a ceiling on arms transfers, meant "that the burden of 
the ceiling policy fell upon arms transfers to those countries 
considered less strategically important and to whom arms 
transfers could be refused or delayed without necessarily 
harming US interests. "68 
In June 1980 (as we have already seen) the US responded with 
some ur ency to the first major Vietnamese incursion into Thai 9 
territory by expediting the delivery of a number of weapons 
including scarce M48A5s MBTs. The higher level of priority 
accorded to Thailand which was implied by these deliveries 
can be seen in the context of the generally more robust 
American policy towards the challenge posed by the Soviet 
Union in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan -a policy 
which was encapsulated for the Persian Gulf region in the so- 
called 'Carter doctrine' of January 1980.69 
Although, as Randolph notes, the incoming Reagan 
administration in 1981 did not actually herald a fundamental 
change in US policy towards SE Asia in general, and Thailand 
in particular, it did display a firmer commitment to SE Asian 
security and to assisting Thailand. 70 The US arms transfer 
policy (as outlined in July 1981) now rested on the "same 
philosophy as the US rearmament programme did: basic US 
interests ... were challenged by the USSR and this threatened 
stability in many regions vital to the USA. "71 In terms of SE 
Asia, the subsequent US defence review of 1982 made it clear 
that the region faced the combined threat of: 
Vietnamese expansionism directed against Thailand 
and the Soviet naval threat to the lines of 
communication for US forces from the West Coast of 
67 See Libid. pp. 146 and 148. 
68 Ibid. p. 151. 
69 This doctrine was aimed at challenging the Soviet Union and protecting US 
strategic interests in the Gulf in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan. It saw 
renewed emphasis attached to security assistance programmmes with an expansion of 
FMS credits in return for access to bases. See ibid. p. 150- 
70 Randolph describes the change as a "perceptual one". Randolph, op. cit. p. 223- 
71 Brzoska and OhIson, op. cit p. 58. 
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the US through Japan, the Philippines and the Straits 
of Malacca to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. 72 
From America's perspective the atmosphere of heightened 
tension in Indo-China in 1981 meant that Thailand (and the 
other ASEAN states) needed to have American commitment 
and credibility visibly demonstrated to them. 73 One way of doing this was to substantially increase Thailand's FMS 
credits. Accordingly, therefore, Thailand's FMS credits were 
increased from US$53.4m in 1981 to $74.7m in 1982 and up to 
$94m in 1984.74 This increased FMS assistance meant that 
Thailand was more easily able to afford to acquire the US 
weapons it needed to build-up its armed forces - in line with 
the idea of the self-help approach - to the point at which they 
could buy valuable time for external support to arrive in the 
event of a major Vietnamese invasion. 75 The process of 
building up the Thai armed forces' capability to resist a 
Vietnamese attack, and demonstrating US commitment to 
Thailand, was also to be aided by the expansion of US-Thai 
military exercises which occurred after 1981.76 
The pattern of increased US financial and training assistance 
in the build-up of the Thai armed forces, in response to the 
threat posed by Vietnam, was slowly matched by a reduction in 
America's reluctance to provide Thailand with advanced 
weapons. After initially refusing to supply Thailand with 
'Redeye'SAMs the US agreed to supply these in 1982, and in 
response to the Vietnamese incursion in 1983 it was prepared 
to expedite deliveries of more 'Redeyes' plus new model M- 
198 155mm howitzers "drawn directly from United States 
military inventories. "77 Most notably, Thailand's December 
1983 request for approval to purchase F-16As was 
conditionally approved by the US administration in 1984 
72 FEER 18 June, 1982, p-10. 
73 Randolph cites the comments of Michael Armacost, the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to this effect. Randolph, op. cit. p. 224- 
74 See ibid. pp. 224-225. 
75 Randolph cites Richard Armitage's comments to this effect. Ibid. p. 225- 
76 See ibid. p. 228. 
77 Ibid. p. 226. 
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subject to a final review by Thailand of the other options 
available. Given that there was a need to demonstrate a clear 
commitment to Thailand (at a time when the Thais were increasingly regarding the sale as a symbol of the strength of 
the security relationship) and to help the RTAF counter an 
expanded and modernised VPAF, the Reagan administration 
was prepared to expand the list of "special exemptions" to the 
country ban on advanced fighter sales to include Thailand 
(along with Indonesia and Singapore). 78 Thailand's ability to 
afford the aircraft -a traditional US concern - was also 
assisted by the fact the the US was to provide easier FMS 
credit terms for Thailand. These would extend the grace 
period from five to ten years and the repayment period from 
seven to twenty years. 79 Final Congressional approval for the 
sale (as was discussed in the external threats chapter) was 
obtained in 1985 in a climate of increased tension along the 
Thai-Cambodian border. 
The intensity of the cross-border fighting in 1985 - which had 
again seen the US expedite deliveries of equipment to 
Thailand - and the heightened sense of concern in the US about 
the Vietnamese threat to Thailand also led to the formalisation 
of American logistical assistance to Thailand in a 
memorandum of understanding signed between the Thai 
Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulanond, and the US Secretary of 
Defense, Casper Weinberger, in October that year. In essence, 
this formalised the "[b]ilateral logistical planning [which had] 
... been undertaken with the objective of improving the Thai logistical system and aiding overall Thai armed forces 
modernization. "80 The memorandum also made sure that the 
Thais would have guaranteed ready access to American 
equipment in times of acute need as equipment ordered for 
delivery later could be dispatched at once: 
78 Richardson, F-16As for Thailand p. 52. The decision was also motivated by the 
resistance shown by Thailand (and others) to the 'intermediate' export fighter, or FX, 
the US was offering and thus by the potential loss of sales to other suppliers. 
Thailand had a choice of either the F-16/J79 or the F-20 'Tigershark' export fighter. 
See Ibid. 
79 These easier credit terms were meant to help Thailand buy the 40 M48 MBTs which 
the US had made available to it in 1984. See FEER 26 April, 1984, p. 17. Richardson 
also notes the significance of these terms for Thailand's purchase of F-16As. 
Richardson, The F-16 for South-East Asia p. 18. 
80 Randolph, op. cit. p-228. 
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Under the agreement, Thailand ... [became] one of only a handful of countries with access to the Special 
Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), which was 
established ... [in 1982] to create a stockpile of long- lead items in the US arsenal that [we]re commonly 
required by allied countrieS. 81 
As events turned out, however, Thailand did not have to make 
recourse to the Special Defense Acquisition Fund nor, indeed, 
to the US-Thai 'war reserve weapons stockpile' which was 
agreed upon in 1987.82 By 1987, the short-term Vietnamese 
threat to Thailand had begun to diminish. More importantly, 
perhaps, the role of the US as an extra-regional power 
influencing Thailand's arms acquisitions had begun to diminish 
too, with China instead having a greater impact. 83 An 
important consequence of the greater influence of China was a 
lessening of the impact of the process of technological 
progression on Thai arms acquisitions. 
Although a de facto military alliance between China and 
Thailand had been developing since the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia, it was not until China provided a number of 
Type 69 MBTs and Type 59/1 130mm towed guns to Thailand 
as grant aid in the midst of the 1985 cross-border fighting, that 
it had any influence on Thai arms acquisitions at all. These 
weapons, although of only marginal practical utility, had a 
high symbolic value as a further demonstration of China's 
commitment to Thailand's security. They may also have been 
intended to act as samples of Chinese wares for the Chinese 
also mooted the possibility of a more major deal for MBTs, 
APCs and artillery pieces around this time. 84 V\Thilst this deal 
did not actually eventuate until 1987, it was clear that the 
Thais were not unreceptive to the idea of procuring Chinese 
81 FEER 17 October, 1985, p. 42. 
82 For details of this see FEER 24 April, 1986, pp. 44-45 and 22 January, 1987, p-6. 
83 It was notable that after peaking in 1986 the US scrapped Thailand's FMS credits 
for 1987, although there was an increase in grant aid by way of a partial 
compensation. See FEER 19 February, 1987, p. 27. 
84 See FEER 19 March, 1987, p-16. 
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arms as there had been a limited move towards the 
diversification of arms suppliers after 1982.85 
The imperative for diversification was all too evident in the 
light of the circumstances prevailing in 1987 when Thailand 
was faced with a reduction in US security assistance at the 
same time as the defence budget was no longer increasing. In 
these circumstances (and in view of the attractiveness of the 
deal on offer), if Thailand was to proceed with the planned 
modernisation of the army it was necessary for it to take up the 
Chinese offer which had been made earlier. In 1987, 
therefore, Thailand reached an agreement to procure Chinese 
MBTs, APCs and MRLs. In accordance with China's desire to 
demonstrate its continuing commitment to Thailand and to 
further its own interests in SE Asia through its relationship 
with the latter,, these weapons were provided at so-called 
"friendship" prices and included generous repayment terms. 86 
This arms deal with China not only represented a clear shift 
away from dependence on the US as a supplier, but also a 
marked departure from the previous high-tech focus of Thai 
arms procurement. The technological level of the Chinese 
arms was certainly lower than many of the weapons in the 
Thai armed forces inventory although, significantly, still 
"sufficient to meet Thailand's basic needs". 87 A second order 
for Chinese MBTs and APCs in 1988 suggested a reinforcement 
of these trends, although the United States still remained an 
important supplier of the advanced weapons systems (for 
example, -the AH- IG helicopters and 'TOW-2' anti-tank 
missilesýwhich the Thai armed forces continued to have a 
prediledion-for. - 
Singapore 
85 One motivating factor for this, it has been suggested, was that the younger officers 
who were moving into procurement positions wanted Thailand to become less 
dependent on the United States. See FEER, 19 February, 1987, p. 27. It may also 
have 
been motivated by that almost perennial feature of Thai procurement - corruption. 
86 The Type 69-11 MBTs were reported to have been provided at a fraction (one tenth) 
of their normal market price and Thailand was given a 10-year grace period 
before 
repayments were due to commence. See FEER 19 March, 1987, p. 16. 
87 FEER 8 December, 1988, p. 34. 
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For Singapore, the need to keep up with the process of 
technological progression has effectively been incorporated 
into its defence strategy. It has been incorporated through the 
desire to have a technological edge over its regional rivals and 
to make up for its relatively limited manpower through a 
reliance on hardware. Singapore, in fact, can be regarded as 
something of a 'special case' in its desire to keep abreast of the 
latest military technology. 88 
Although it is almost an article of faith in Singapore that the 
SAF's employment of "modern equipment" improves its 
"defence capability", this did not mean that high-tech 
equipment was purchased "every year". 89 Singapore was also 
prepared to acquire less sophisticated, second-hand,, kit with a 
view to enhancing its effectiveness through the acquisition of 
'force multipliers' - "equipment enabling other systems to 
perform more effectively" (for example, the E-2Cs) - and 
through upgrades-90 Indeed, Singapore had a policy of 
upgrading its weapons where it made sense to do so in order 
to extend their operational lives and, in some cases, improve 
their performance also. In so doing, it it was possible to defer 
expenditure on new, and more expensive, replacements. The 
most notable examples of this policy were the upgrading of the 
RSAF's A-4'Skyhawks' into re-engined and more powerful 
'Super Skyhawks', and the refurbishment of the AMX-13 light 
tanks. 
The decision to upgrade the A-4s was taken in 1984 and was 
based on the rationale that it was more cost effective to further 
the modernisation of the RSAF through upgrading rather than 
by acquiring new aircraft: the cost of a new F-5 was in the 
region of US$10m whereas the cost of upgrading an A-4 was 
only US$3m. By fitting the old A-4 with a new General 
Electric F404 engine it was possible to increase its climb rate by 
35% and its acceleration by 40%, making it comparable to the 
F-5. The first 'Super Skyhawk' went into service in March 
88 Discussion with Dr. Leonard Sebastian and Mr. Daljit Singh at the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, May 1998. 
89 Defence of Singapore, p. 28. 
90 Karp, p. 349. 
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1989.91 The refurbishment of the AMX-13s resulted from a 
1984 study which was initiated by the fact that they were on the 
verge of obsolescence. This study found that upgrading an 
AMX-13 would cost less than a fifth of that of a new tank and 
work began on improvements to them in 1985. The 
refurbished AMX-13 SMls were commissioned in June 1988 
and were equipped with new diesel engines which increased 
both their speed and endurance. 92 
Singapore's ability to upgrade weapons such as the A-4 and 
the AMX-13 was facilitated by its defence industry: an industry 
which was itself part of the overall 'Total Defence' strategy of 
the island state. Under this strategy it was recognised that 
Singapore needed a "defence industrial capability to meet 
ordnance, maintenance and supply needs" in order that the 
SAF could be self-reliant in any extended campaign. 93 
Moreover, Singpore's various defence industries - which 
operate under the umbrella of 'Singapore Technologies' - were 
"essential to the operation, maintenance, and upgrading of the 
military hardware in the armed forces. "94 In addition to 
helping to achieve a degree of self-reliance and facilitating 
upgrading (plus aiding the civil industrial sector)95 the local 
defence industry helped Singapore keep up with the process of 
technological progression through its production of selective 
(and often specially tailored) weapons. This was most 
obviously apparent with the locally designed and produced 
FH-88 155mm howitzer which the Ministry of Defence decided 
to develop in 1983.96 
91 See Straits Times, 1 April, 1988, p. 25 and 2 March, 1989, p-2 
92 See Straits Times, 8 July, 1988, p-22. 
93 Defence of Singapore p. 21. 
94 Ibid., p. 52. The various elements of Singapore Technologies are listed on p-53. For 
an analysis of the development and capabilities of Singapore's defence industry, see 
Michael Richardson, "Singapore's defence industry", Pacific Defence Rep. orter May 
1983, pp. 69-75. 
95 In this respect, for example, Chin Kin Wah has observed that Singapore's defence 
companies "contribute to skills tansfer to the civilian sector". Chin, Singapore: 
Threat Perception and Defence Spending, p. 215. More broadly, it has been noted that 
the SAF in general is "designed to have a synergetic relationship with the civilian 
economy, particularly in the operation and maintenance of high technology and in 
weapon production. " FEER 13 January, 1983, p. 28. 
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The role of extra-regional powers had a minimal effect on 
Singapore's arms acquisitions during the Second Cold War 
period. Their influence was essentially confined to providing 
examples of leading edge technology and aids to the 
development of Singapore's defence industry on a commercial 
basis through arrangements for local assembly and technology 
transfer (such as occurred with the S-21 1s and 'Super Pumas', 
for example) - Except for the FPDA (and this had no impact on Singapore's arms acquisitl5-ns), 97Singapore had no formal 
arrangements with extra-regional powers in the way that 
Vietnam and Thailand had. Singapore, however, by virtue of 
its "de facto" security relationship with theUS98 - one based on American strategic calculations about Singapore's importance 
and Singapore's own foreign policy of involving Western 
powers in SE Asia - did receive at least favourable treatment 
in terms of US arms transfer policy. Though neither an 'allied' 
state, nor a recipient of US security assistance, Singapore was 
certainly a regional state which the US was willing to assist in 
developing its own defence capabilites and was prepared to 
allow to receive some of the most advanced technology 
(notably the E-2Cs and F-16As). 
Indonesia 
Indonesia - like Thailand and Singapore - clearly recognised 
the value of modern equipment for improving the efficacy of its 
combat forces and sought to modernise them through the 
replacement of obsolescent weapons. However, because of its 
strategic culture, the absence of any forseeable external 
military threat, and the lack of resources, it did not place the 
96 For details of the thinking behind the decision to develop the FH-88 and on the 
requirements which it had to meet, see Straits Times 24 November, 1988, p-16- The 
FH-88s represented a considerable improvement over the SAF's older M-114A1 and M- 
68 howitzers. 
97 Even the announcement in December 1986 of the eventual withdrawal of the New 
Zealand infantry battalion did not have an impact because Singapore was 
sufficiently strong by then to treat this decision with equanimity. See FEER 8 
January, 1987, pp. 15-16. 
98 This term was used by the Far Eastern Economic Review in describing how 
Singapore's offer of facilities to the US in August 1989 'formalised' an existing 
relationship. FEER 31 August, 1989, p-9. The arrangements under this existing 
relationship saw Singapore provide the "US Navy and Air Force [with] repair and 
staging rights. " Ibid. p-10- 
( 
C 
II 
_p. 
170 
same sort of premium on keeping up with the process of 
technological progresion during the Second Cold War period. Instead, Indonesia adopted a minimalist approach only 
seeking to acquire selected items of high-tech equipment. 
The selective acquisition of high-tech weapons, it was thought, 
would serve "as a means for the maintenance of the necessary 
military skills [within ABRI] as well as a means to monitor 
advances in technology. "99 Furthermore, by developing a 
nucleus of capability in some of the most advanced weapons, 
Indonesia would be fulfilling a perceived need for "contingency 
preparedness" in the event that circumstances should change 
and an external threat should emerge sooner than 
anticipated. 100 By having this nucleus of capability it would 
readily "permit expansion of the arsenal as needed later. "101 
The most notable example of the application of this thinking 
was the decision to acquire a single squadron of F-16s. 
Indeed, Murdani has commented that these aircraft "were not 
really meant for operational defence of the country as much as 
they were to keep up with technology and train its people in 
high technology. "102 This thinking was also apparent to some 
extent in the orders for 'Rapier' AD missile systems (see 
Chapter III). 
Another factor underlying the development of a nucleus of 
capability in certain crucial areas was Indonesia's desire to 
avoid a repetition of the experience in the 1960s when because 
of a shortage of ground crew (and pilots too) the expansion of 
the Air Force led to a reliance on Soviet technical support. 103 
99 Speech by General Murdani on his assumption of the post of Commander-in-Chief 
of ABRI, cited Singh, op. cit. p. 146. 
100 FEER 24 October, 1985, p. 24. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Murdani's response to an interview question about Indonesian arms acquisitions. 
Singh, op. cit. pp. 118-119. The F-16s significance in this respect was also evident in 
the fact that they were regarded "as a technological bridge towards the fourth 
generation of fighter aircraft. " General Murdani, cited Libid. p. 146. 
The pattern of procuring selected high-tech equipment to enable personnel to keep up 
to date with the latest technology had also been evident in the order for two West 
German T-209 submarines for the navy in 1977. See FEER 20 April, 1979, p. 32. 
103 See FEER 14 February, 1985, p. 33 and 24 October, 1985, p. 24. 
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Additionally, some of the problems associated with obtaining 
spare parts for Soviet supplied aircraft made Indonesia 
acutely aware of the perils of relying on a single supplier and 
meant that there was a policy thereafter to diversify sources of 
SUpply. 104 
The desire to diversify sources of supply was not confined to 
Indonesia, of course. What was unique, however, was that 
Indonesia took the desire to avoid dependence on supplier 
states to its logical conclusion (in line with the self-help 
approach to national security encapsulated in its strategy of 
national resilience) by seeking to become self-sufficient for 
arms acquisitions. In other words, Indonesia consciously 
sought to obviate the influence of extra-regional powers on its 
arms acquisitons: "[slelf-sufficiency in the production and 
maintenance of defence weapons systems is a long held 
aspiration of defence policy designed to reduce the leverage 
external powers can exert. " 105 Ideally, therefore, ABRI's 
equipment requirements were "mainly expected [to come] from 
national resources, particularly from the group of strategic 
industries. " 106 
If self-sufficiency was the ideal, however, it still remained 
largely an aspiration during the Second Cold War. The limited 
capacity of the strategic industries to produce major weapons 
for ABRI meant that the bulk of Indonesia's weapons 
acquisitions had to be sourced from abroad. Where possible, 
though, Indonesia did seek to enter into agreements which 
would enable local assembly, offset arrangements and 
technology transfer to both help develop its own 
manufacturing capability and reduceCoStS. 107 The strategic 
104 See Karp, op. cit. p. 347. Karp also notes that this experience led Indonesia to 
keep "major arms purchases much smaller, tailoring purchases to clear requirements". 
Ibid. 
105 Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy p-19. In addition to the motivation provided 
by the experience with the USSR in the 1960s, the more recent case of the US refusing 
to supply weapons designed for the OV-10s "because of the East Timor issue" also 
exercised the minds of Indonesian defence planners. Ibid. 
106 General Murdani, cited Singh, op. cit. p. 147. 
107 This was most apparent in the case of the F-16 purchase in which Indonesia 
earned 17% of the cost of the deal through an offset arrangement with the 
manufacturer General Dynamics. See FEER, 25 September, 1986, p. 30. 
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industries could also Provide for the "maintenance, 
refurbishment and upgrading" of weapons systems. 108 
Although the goal of self-sufficiency remained some way off during the Second Cold War period, the role of extra-regional 
powers still had a very limited influence on Indonesia's arms 
acquisitions. It was, however, discernible nonetheless. 
Rather like Singapore, Indonesia also had a close, long- 
standing, but informal, security relationship with the United 
States. The basis for this relationship, it has been contended, lay in the support the US provided to Suharto in crushing the 
PKI in the aftermath of the events of October 1965.109 The 
security relationship between them, however, was far less 
public than that in the case of Singapore. It tended to be 
mainly kept quiet because of Indonesian sensibilities about it 
appearing to conflict with its support for the exclusion of 
extra-regional powers from SE Asia. In practical terms the 
security relationship saw the US provide Indonesia with FMS 
credits for the purchase of American military equipment, whilst 
Indonesia granted the right of passage for US ships and, 
especially important, SSBNs (submarine,, strategic ballistic 
nuclear) through its waters-110 Indonesia was able to utilise 
these FMS credits (of which it was the next largest recipient in 
the region after Thailand and the Philippines) to pay for the 
M-101 howitzers it ordered in 1981 and to meet some of the 
costs of the F-16 purchase. 
Indonesia also received military aid under Australia's Defence 
Co-operation Programme which was established in the 1960s 
to aid regional states develop their defence capabilites. Under 
108 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia p. 37. For an extended analysis of the strategic 
industries and Indonesian defence production see A. Hasnan Habib, "Indonesia's 
Defence Industry: Its Role, Mission, and Set-Up", in Jeshurun, Arms And Defence In 
Southeast Asia. 
109 See Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p-19. 
110 See FEER 20 January, 1983, p. 23. Taylor notes the significance of the Ombai- 
Wetar straits for the US Navy's SSBNs in the context of US policy towards Indonesia 
after the invasion and annexation of East Timor. Taylor, ol2. cit. pp. 168-169. 
Evidence of Indonesia's general "strategic importance" to the US can be found in the 
fact that despite its "poor human rights" record (human rights being an element of the 
arms transfer controls under PD-13) there was no reduction in Indonesia's security 
assistance or transfers during the Carter administration. Spear, op. cit. p. 172. 
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/111 this programme - which in Indonesia's case focussed on . -,, i maritime patrol capabilities - Indonesia received six ex-RAN 'Attack' class patrol boats to help it protect its maritime 
resources. "' 
Malaysia and Burma 
For Malaysia and, more especially, Burma, the pressures of 
technological progression and the role of extra-regional 
powers had little or no influence on the acquisition of major 
weapons. With the exception of Malaysia's acquisition of two 
Type FS-1500 frigates (and 'Exocet' SSMs to arm them with) 
which were important for its maritime strategy,, there were no 
significant acquisitions of high-tech equipment by either state. 
By and large, therefore, and this was discussed in the context 
of the need to maintain existing capabilities, the extent of the 
influence of the process of technological progression was 
confined to replacement of obsolescent equipment. There was 
no major effort by either state to keep up with the general 
process or to develop defence industries which could facilitate 
upgrading and thus help to ameliorate the technological 
imperative. 
Although a lack or resources was also a consideration, the 
primary reason for this state of affairs was that both states' 
arms acquisitions were heavily influenced by the internal 
security dimension. Thus, there was a focus on the acquistion 
of predominantly low-tech weaponry for counter-insurgency 
operations'12 - notably armoured vehicles in the case of 
Malaysia - rather than on the area of air defence, for example, 
which required advanced combat aircraft and missile systems. 
With respect to Malaysian air defence capabilities, it is possible 
that in addition to the apparent lack of concern about any 
threat from the VPAF (though this in itself may have been 
affected by the following point) Australia's continuing 
111 During the 1980s Australia also helped with the development of a maintenance 
support system for the 'Nomads' which Indonesia had received as grant aid in the 
1970s, and had also purchased six of in 1981-1982. See FEER 10 February, 1983 p-15 
and 21 July, 1983, p. 40. The programme was effectively suspended in 1986 after 
friction over a critical article of Suharto and his family in an Australian newspaper. 
112 This point is also made by Karp in respect of Malaysian arms purchases. Karp, 
op. cit. p. 347. 
174 
contribution to Malaysia's air defences for much of the Second Cold War may have militated against Malaysian arms 
acquisitions in this area. Although the importance of the 
FPDA and the associated Australian presence in Malaysia was 
played down by many'13,, it is arguable that the IADS operating 
under the FPDA "provided an air defence umbrella" for 
Malaysia and thus "made it less imperative for Malaysia to 
acquire significant air defence capabilities" of its own. 114 It is 
significant in this context,, perhaps., that in 1988 - by which time the permanent RAAF presence at Butterworth had ended with 
the withdrawal of the remaining 'Mirages'115-Malaysia was 
considering the acquisition of weapons under the MoU with 
Britain to bolster its air defence system . 
Apart from Malaysia's relationship with Australia, which had 
an essentially negative impact on Malaysian arms acquisitions 
during most of the period under consideration, no other 
external relationships influenced Malaysian arms acquisitions 
in the manner of the US relationship with Singapore and 
Indonesia. Malaysia was not considered strategically 
important to the United States and received little security 
assistance in the form of FMS credits, nor, until the 1988 MoU, 
113 Alagappa, for example, contends that "Malaysia does not place much reliance on 
the FPDA". Alagappa, gp. cit. p. 186. And one source in Kuala Lumpur was reported 
as saying that the RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) aircraft at Butterworth did 
"not do a great deal to ... enhance overall defence preparedness" (although they did 
enable Malaysia to focus its attention on the South China Sea). FEER 7 June, 1984, 
p. 28. 
114 Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation p. 135. The IADS based at Butterworth, and 
staffed by personnel from all five members of the FPDA, provided co-ordinated radar 
coverage of Malaysian and Singaporean air space and control of aircraft at 
Butterworth and Tengah in Singapore. The RAAF had two squadrons of 'Mirage' 
fighters (36 aircraft) based at Butterworth of which six-eight would be on rotational 
deployment to Singapore. See FEER, 12 May, 1978, pp. 20-21 and 7 November, 1980, 
p. 20; and Michael O'Connor, To Live In Peace (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1985), p. 144. 
115 The permanent 'Mirage' deployment was replaced by the rotational deployment 
from Australia of F/A-18s and F-111s. See FEER 10 March, 1988, pp. 33-34 and The 
Defence of Australia 1987 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1987), p. 7. 
The idea of rotational deployment was first mooted in 1982 when it was becoming 
increasingly evident that it would not be possible to extend the presence of the ageing 
'Mirages' in Malaysia much beyond 1985. See FEER 20 August, 1982, pp. 15-16 and 
Michael Richardson, "The RAAF's role in South-East Asia", Pacific Defence 
Reporter October, 1982, pp. 47-50. 
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did Malaysia's security relationship with Britain have any 
major influence on its arms acquisitions. Not surprisingly, 
given its self-imposed isolation from the international system, Burma's arms acquisitions were not influenced by external 
powers. The only way in which they had any impact at all, 
was in terms of whether or not they would actually agree to 
sell Burma the few weapons it did want. 
In view of the secondary nature of the SE Asian 'arms 
dynamic' during the Second Cold War and the systemic impact 
of the process of technological progression on arms 
acquisitions, it is not surprising that both pressures had, at the 
very least, an underlying influence on all the states concerned. 
In the case of Malaysia and Burma this took shape in their 
need to maintain and improve capabilities through the 
replacement of obsolescent equipment (as was discussed in the 
context of the requirements of defence policy and strategy), 
rather than through any strong desire to acquire state-of-the- 
art weapons. They were also mainly unaffected by the wider 
impact that extra-regional powers had on the other states' 
arms acquisitions. 
Because of the linkage between the regional and international 
security complexes which was brought about by Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia - and the wider competition between 
the superpowers that existed during the period and, indeed, 
shaped it - the arms acquisitions of those states which were 
considered of strategic importance to either of the 
superpowers clearly bear the imprint of external influence. 
This was most obvious in the instance of Vietnam. It was also 
obvious too in Thailand and, to a lesser extent, in Singapore 
and Indonesia. All these three states also show the way in 
which the technological imperative operated on arms 
acquisitions by leading them to acquire at least some advanced 
weapons; to upgrade existing weapons where practicable; 
and, in Singapore and Indonesia, to develop their own defence 
industries. 
Finally, it was also apparent at times that both of these 
pressures could have a limiting effect too on arms acquisitions 
in one way or another. This could be the result of an external 
power's overall policy on arms transfers or a shift in policy 
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towards a particular state over time (as occurred with the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam), or, simply of the spiralling costs of 
the most advanced weapons. 
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Chapter VI Conclusion 
The 'arms dynamic' in SE Asia during the Second Cold War 
period for the six selected states - Burma, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - contained a 
wide range of pressures or factors which accounted for the 
states' acquisitions of a variety of major weapons. These 
pressures were derived, analytically, from both the three 
explanatory models contained within Buzan's theory of the 
'arms dynamic' - based on the experience of the superpowers 
- and from the work by SIPRI and others on the factors 
influencing arms acquisitions and defence expenditure in the 
developing world. The pressures examined comprised: 
external threat assessment; the requirements of defence policy 
and strategy; the internal security dimension; and 
technological progression and the role of extra-regional 
powers. 
At the outset it was also suggested that the role of the military 
might exert an influence on the various states' arms 
acquisitions. Such a suggestion was based on two possible 
arguments. First, the military in each of the states would 
exert the same sort of 'organizational pressure' to which 
Buzan refers in his analysis of the domestic structure model 
and which Thee describes thus: "Pressures exist from the 
military to pursue every technological option, and hence for 
more and better arms". ' Secondly, the political influence of 
the military in the various SE Asian states - whether as a 
component of the government or as a group which civilian 
governments felt obliged to indulge - would enable them to 
fulfil wish lists. 
It was noted at the beginning of the chapter on the internal 
security dimension, however, that the role of the military was 
only of marginal importance as one of the individual 
pressures in the SE Asian'arms dynamic '. Although a degree 
of organizational pressure undoubtedly existed - it would 
have been remarkable if it had not - this was always tempered 
by a realisation that the demands of national development 
took first priority and that any arms acquisitions should be 
affordable and appropriate to the prevailing strategic 
1 Thee, W---cit pp. 49-50. Indeed, as he notes with regard to the comments of 
Marvin 
L Goldberger, it is their role to do so. DLid,. p. 50. 
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situation. This, for example, was virtually a guiding principle in Indonesia. 
Indeed, in the case of Indonesia, it is highly significant that the 
period when arms acquisitions were at their greatest (1979- 
1982) coincided with the expansion of the economy fuelled by 
an increase in the revenues from oil exports. 2 The converse 
effect was also evident, of course, as arms acquisitions 
moderated after 1982 in the wake of a fall in oil export 
earnings which led to "current account deficits, government 
budget deficits, and increased foreign borrowing" for 
Indonesia. 3 The same sort of negative resource-based effects 
were also apparent in Malaysia after 1981 and in Singapore 
and Thailand (though to a lesser extent) in the mid-1980s. 
They were a perennial feature of Burma's situation and 
would have been of Vietnam's too had it not been for the 
military assistance which it received from the Soviet Union. 
Irrespective of the impact on pressure from the military, it can 
be concluded that the availability of resources was highly 
significant in facilitating, or enabling, the acquisition of major 
weapons by many of the states. If the resources were not 
available, then acquisitions were either scaled-down 
(Thailand's purchase of F-16s); deferred (Malaysia's purchase 
of medium artillery); or cancelled altogether (Malaysia's 
acquisition of MBTs). 
The availability or lack of resources inevitably affected the 
extent to which the military's political role influenced the 
acquisition of weapons too. This was certainly the case in 
Burma where, despite its control of the levers of political 
power, dire economic circumstances heavily circumscribed the 
Tatmadaw's arms acquisitions. The Indonesian experience 
has been considered above. Moreover, in the case of ABRI, it 
2 Harold Crouch, amongst others, drew attention to this correlation. See FEER 14, 
February, 1985, p. 33. 
3 Andrew L. Ross, "Growth, Debt, and Military Spending in Southeast Asia", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 11, No. 4, March 1990, p. 257. This had an obvious 
knock-on effect on military spending which decreased dramatically in 1983 and 
averaged an "annual rate [of decrease] of 3.4 per cent from 1982 to 1987. " BLi_d__-, p-258. 
The economic downturn in Indonesia would also have affected ABRI's'off-budget' 
financing which had seen it obtain additional funding from military run business 
activities. 
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is doubtful that even in the light of its integral role in the 
Indonesian government it was able to use this to much effect 
as far as arms purchases were concerned. All major arms 
procurement decisions ultimately had to be sanctioned by 
President Suharto, who was by no means always predisposed 
to aid his former comrades and whose focus was on national 
development. 4 There is also no readily available evidence 
that the Thai military's extensive political role during most of 
the Second Cold War period enabled it to acquire weapons in 
excess of those which could be justified in terms of the overall 
requirements of defence policy and strategy in the light of the 
threat from Vietnam, or, which would result in an 
unacceptable burden being placed on the national budget. 
This is not to say, however, that elements of the Thai military 
were unable to influence the procurement of a certain make of 
weapon, once an overall capability requirement had been 
determined and agreed upon. 
The idea that a civilian government may have felt obliged in 
some way to respond to the military's desire for new weapons 
because of the important role which the military - as an 
institution of the state - played in the promotion of national 
security, also lacks validity. 5 There is no evidence in 
Singapore's case that the government there felt the need to! 
provide the SAF with new weapons to satisfy it as an 
institution. 6whilst in Malaysia, it has been argued, the 
government successfully resisted pressure from the military 
for new arms under the 5th Malaysia Plan (1986-90) after it 
had been virtually starved of them since the economic 
downturn in the early 1980s. 7 The "emphasis in the 5MP", 
4 Discussion with Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono at the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, January 1996. 
5 This idea is similar to Mak's argument on the role of ASEAN armed forces in 
defence modernisation. He contends that because of their role in "regime 
maintenance", governments have felt the need to, to some extent, respond to armed 
forces' aspirations during times of economic growth. Mak, ASEAN Defence 
Reorientation p. 21. He also makes the point, however, that it is hard to detect any 
general trends or correlation between military influence and defence expenditure 
and/or modernisation. DLid,. p. 19. 
6 Discussion with Dr. Leonard Sebastian and Mr. Daljit Singh at the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, May 1998. 
See Alagappa, op. cit. p. 189. 
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Alagappa notes, was "on consolidation and the optimization 
of existing capabilities and facilities. "8 
Bearing in mind Thee's comment that the "stimulants" to arms 
races (he uses the term in its broad sense) "will tend to 
combine, interact and overlap, even if at times one motive 
force may predominate 119 / it was certainly apparent., though, that the other pressures were - to varying degrees - all 
influential in the SE Asian'arms dynamic'. 
Burma, by dint of its circumstances and its foreign policy, was 
certainly a special case. Its exclusion from the forces 
operating within the SE Asian security complex, combined 
with its self-imposed isolation from the international system, 
meant that the external influences on its arms acquisitions 
were almost entirely absent. This tendency was undoubtedly 
reinforced by its chronic weakness as a state which, given the 
prevalence of the internal military security threats posed by 
the various insurgent groups,, meant it was preoccupied with 
the internal security dimension. Burma's very limited arms 
acquisitions (primarily artillery and counter-insurgency 
capable aircraft), therefore, were undoubtedly influenced by 
this pressure. The literally one-dimensional nature of the 
pressures leading Burma to acquire any arms at all also meant 
the one external influence which Burma was unable to isolate 
itself from - the process of technological obsolescence - must 
also be seen in the context of the internal security threat. In 
the absence of that threat, and given Burma's dire economic 
situation, it seems unlikely that it would have acquired any 
new weapons at all, even if its existing weapons were 
becoming inoperable. 
In one respect, Indonesia shared an important similarity with 
Burma. It was the only other state in which the internal 
security dimension exerted a significant and ongoing 
influence on arms acquisitions. Indonesia - as a consequence 
of its geographic make-up and its formative experiences - 
was predisposed to focus on internal security. The existence 
of internal military security threats, most notably in East 
Ibid. 
Thee, gp. cit, p. 101. 
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Timor but also in Irian Jaya too, reinforced this predisposition 
and necessitated the procurement of some major weapons (for example, armoured fighting vehicles, ground attack 
aircraft, transport helicopters and landing ships). Some of 
these weapons were required not only to prosecute counter- 
insurgency campaigns but, crucially, to enable ABRI to deploy 
its forces in the first place. The need for good air- and sealift 
capabilities was also regarded as essential in preparing ABRI 
to respond to any potential insurgencies which might arise, for responding to other types of internal security disturbance, 
and for its role in national development programmes such as 
transmigration. 
In Indonesia's case there was certainly a considerable overlap 
between the influence of the internal security dimension and 
the requirements of defence policy and strategy on its arms 
acquisitions. After all, elements of the territorial forces and 
the central forces' Kostrad were equipped for the task of 
responding to both internal security threats and the sorts of 
low-level external threat which Indonesia anticipated it 
might have to deal with. The same point is also applicable to 
those weapons procured to develop the strategic mobility 
required of the Rapid Reaction Strike Force. 
Where the influence of the requirements of defence policy and 
strategy was quite distinct, however, was in Indonesia's 
acquisition of warships and reconnaissance aircraft to protect 
the vast waters of the archipelago and their resources: in 
other words, to further a vital national interest. The general 
rise in the importance attached to maritime resources and 
security in the region during the Second Cold War was 
magnified in the case of Indonesia. This was due to the long- 
standing importance which it had attached to the maritime 
dimension in its security thinking and to the implications of 
the 1982 UNCLOS. The need to expand its capacity for 
protecting vital maritime interests also combined with the 
need to maintain existing naval capability by replacing many 
warships which had been acquired during a much earlier 
period of expansion. The same need to maintain an existing 
capability also influenced some air force acquisitions as 
Indonesia continued a modernisation programme which had 
begun in the mid-1970s. 
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Although Indonesia was keen to maintain and enhance 
existing capabilities by acquiring modern weapons, there was 
no widespread attempt to keep up with the process of 
technological progression. Instead, Indonesia acquired 
selected items of high-tech equipment in order to provide a 
nucleus of capability for ABRI which could be expanded if 
required. Significantly, the objective need for such 
acquisitions appeared to be signalled by developments within 
the region (or, rather, as they concerned its ASEAN 
neighbours). This demonstration effect was evident in 
Indonesia's purchase of air defence missiles and F-16 fighters. 
Such an effect seems to have been the only time when 
Indonesia's arms acquisitions displayed anything other than a 
largely autonomous characteristic. The impact of extra- 
regional powers, whilst observable, was fairly minimal. 
The internal security dimension also had a marked, but short- 
term, influence on Malaysia's arms acquistions. Indeed, it 
appeared to be the predominant factor operating in the period 
1979-1982 - when Malaysia's arms acquisitions were at their 
peak - as the MAF was equipped with new armoured vehicles 
and ground attack aircraft primarily for the purpose of 
conducting counter-insurgency operations against the CPM. 
Nonetheless, the influence of the internal security dimension 
also had to be seen in conjunction with the impact of the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. This heightened the 
perceived need for Malaysia to further its efforts to develop 
conventional warfare capabilities which it had already 
embarked on during the 1970s. 
Overlapping with the ongoing desire to develop these 
conventional capabilities was an increasing focus on the 
maritime dimension of security which saw Malaysia take 
steps to create an effective capability to protect its territorial 
waters and maritime resources and led to the purchase of 
warships and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. It is highly 
significant in the context of the virtual suspension of arms 
acquisitions between 1983 and 1988 that the major weapons 
which were purchased (OPVs and ASW helicopters) were for 
the purposes of enhancing this maritime capability. The role 
of technological progression and of the extra-regional 
powers had even less effect than in the case of Indonesia, 
although in seeking to maintain and develop its counter- 
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insurgency and conventional warfare capabilities Malaysia 
also had to respond to the problem posed by the technological 
obsolescence and inoperability of some of its existing weapons (notably training aircraft). 
Singapore's arms acquisitions during the Second Cold War 
displayed a much more constant pattern than Malyasia t S. 
This was the result of the more or less continuous 
predominance of the requirements of defence policy and 
strategy on procurement decisions. Although Singapore's 
strategic requirements began to include more of a maritime 
dimension towards the end of the period, they were otherwise 
very fixed. The enduring characterisitics of its small size, 
limited regular manpower and sense of wariness of its larger 
neighbours (Malaysia especially) meant that Singapore's 
defence policy and strategy placed a premium on maintaining 
a forward defence capacity based around hardware which 
was often technologically advanced by regional standards. 
During the Second Cold War, Singapore sought to further 
develop this forward defence capacity through the 
strenthening of its air defences (including acquisitions of 
fighters, AD missiles and guns, and AEW aircraft) and its 
ground forces capacity for mounting offensive operations into 
Malaysia (seen in the acquisitions of light tanks, APCs and 
transport helicopters). The moves to strengthen its air 
defences can also be seen in the context of Singapore's 
concerns about the potential threat posed by the growth in 
Soviet and Vietnamese air power. The Vietnamese invasion - 
and Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union - provided a 
general sense of unease for Singapore because of its negative 
impact on regional stability. 
Other than the fact that the invasion and the alliance 
provided an impetus to Singapore's ongoing modernisation 
programme, there was no other instance of Singapore 
reacting to regional military threats or developments. 
Instead, Singapore's policy was highly proactive. Singapore 
was usually the first state to plan to acquire the latest 
technology, even if it was not the first to actually introduce it. 
The role of technological progression was very important for 
Singapore's arms acquisitions and was effectively 
incorporated into its strategy,, the United States providing 
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ready access to the latest technology. Singapore, however, 
was also prepared to respond to this pressure through 
upgrading selected weapons: a policy which was certainly facilitated by its own defence industrial capabilities and 
which, in turn, helped further their development. 
Thailand's arms acquisitions bore the overwhelming imprint 
of the pressure of external threat assessment. This is not to 
say that it did not combine and overlap with several others, 
but that it was the predominant one for most of this period. 
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia affected Thailand 
most of all. Thailand had long had traditional security 
concerns about the balance of power in Indo-China and the 
Vietnamese invasion meant that a dangerous force interface 
with Vietnam now existed too. Although Thailand did not 
expect a major Vietnamese invasion, the actions of the 
Vietnamese in their efforts to overcome Khmer resistance 
meant that Thailand's territorial integrity came to be 
threatened. The actions of the PAVN meant that the Thais 
often had to resort to force of arms to uphold the security of 
their borders. 
What this meant, therefore, was that Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia provided an urgent impetus for the continuation 
and expansion of the modernisation programme which 
Thailand had already embarked upon. It also gave the 
programme a clear focus in terms of developing the most 
appropiate capabilities to respond to Vietnamese aggression. 
A clear pattern emerged of Thailand reacting to Vietnamese 
deployments in Cambodia and incursions into its territory. 
Given that the Thais were primarily reacting to incursions by 
Vietnamese ground forces (along with artillery 
bombardments), it is not surprising that the majority of the 
weapons which Thailand acquired (for example, MBTs, 
APCs, artillery, anti-tank missiles and transport helicopters) 
were to strengthen its land warfare capabilities. The Thais 
were also concerned about the growth in Vietnamese air 
power - and that of the Soviets in the region - and accordingly 
took steps to bolster their air defence capabilities too through 
the acquisition of SAMs and more fighter aircraft - notably 
the F-16s. 
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The F-16s, in particular, were symbolic of the Thai armed forces' predilection for high-tech weaponry and thus of the 
underlying influence of the desire to keep up with the latest 
technology. They were also symbolic of the willingness of the 
Americans to supply Thailand with highly sophisticated 
weapons. The willingness of the United States to supply 
advanced weapons to Thailand, to provide rapid deliveries of 
weapons at times of crisis, and to provide considerable 
financial assistance to enable Thailand to pay for some of its 
weapons, was also an important factor underlying Thailand's 
arms acquisitions. In the latter stages of the period, as the 
need for a diversification of arms suppliers grew, the 
influence of another extra-regional power - China - could 
also be seen. 
The impact of other pressures such as Thailand's increasing 
concerns about maritime security (which led to the purchase 
of warships and maritime patrol aircraft) and the need to 
replace ageing equipment were also discernible. It is, 
however, necessary to see their effects in the context of 
Thailand's primary security concern - the threat from 
Vietnam. 
just two pressures dominated Vietnam's arms acquisitions - 
the requirements of defence policy and strategy and the role of 
extra-regional powers - and their influence was most marked 
in the period 1979-1981. Thereafter, their influence began to 
decline, indicating the extent to which the massive infusion of 
weapons during these early years had provided Vietnam with 
a sufficient capacity to meet its needs and of the changing 
policy of its patron, the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet 
Union, in fact, which had a crucial bearing on all Vietnam s 
arms acquisitions during the Second Cold War. 
For Vietnam, the significance of the requirements of defence 
policy and strategy lay in its Cambodian campaign. The L/ 
Vietnamese needed additional weapons (many having 
already been supplied for the purpose of mounting the 
invasion) to pursue their military campaign in Cambodia. 
This campaign was intended to crush resistance to the pro- 
Vietnamese regime which Hanoi had installed in Phnom Penh 
in fulfilment of its long-standing security policy towards Indo- 
China. To help its ally in this regard, the USSR supplied 
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Vietnam with a range of weapons including tanks, APCs, 
artillery, helicopters and transport aircraft. Although 
Vietnam's campaign in Cambodia did not ultimately end until 1989, after the last major offensive in 1985 no more weapons 
were acquired for this purpose. Moreover, Soviet policy had 
also shifted after 1982 towards encouraging Vietnam to 
disengage from Cambodia and thus no more weapons were 
forthcoming. 
In identifying the weapons which were supplied for 
operations in Cambodia at the time of the build-up, it was 
difficult to disentangle some of them from those acquired in 
order to strengthen Vietnam's defences against an anticipated 
repeat attack by Vietnam's main external opponent - China. It was the wide-ranging threat posed by the PLA which 
influenced the remainder of Vietnam's arms acquisitions and 
in response to it Vietnam was provided with a large number 
of Soviet fighter aircraft, plus SAMs, warships, maritime 
patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters. Although the threat 
from China might suggest that it was the influence of external 
threat assessment which was clearly at work here, it has been 
argued that because the Vietnamese response to that threat 
was contingent on the Soviet Union's willingness to supply 
weapons,, it was the influence of an extra-regional power 
which was of paramount importance. In effect, Vietnam was 
being supplied with such weapons because to do so was in 
accordance with - and furthered - Soviet strategy in the 
region. Once Soviet strategy began to change and move 
towards reaching an accomodation with China, despite the 
fact that the latter still remained at least a latent threat to 
Vietnam, the USSR was no longer so ready to arm Vietnam. 
In addition, the Soviet Union's worsening economic 
circumstances were also beginning to affect its largesse: it 
was the impending collapse of the USSR which ultimately 
brought about the end of all military assistance to Vietnam. 
Given this summary of the main influences on the various 
states arms acquisitions during the Second Cold War, it is 
easy to sympathise with Mak's comment on ASEAN defence 
modernisation that the factors are "unique to each ... 
country. "10 This, of course, would make it virtually 
10 Mak, ASEAN Defence Modernization p. 15. 
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impossible to identify any general pattern and thus to 
determine where the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' fitted on the 
normal-abnormal spectrum of behaviour. With due regard to 
the particular circumstances of each state, however, it is still 
possible to identify some general trends which can provide a 
pointer as to whether the dynamic corresponded more closely 
to one of maintenance or racing. 
In the main, over the whole period, internal security factors 
were of less importance than external ones. The internal 
security dimension as an independent factor (excepting 
Burma) was generally of little or at least diminshing 
significance. Despite the possible implications of the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the introduction of a 
Soviet military presence into the region, the influence of 
external threat assessment characterised by a highly 
competitive action-reaction process did not dominate the 
external dimension. The influence of external threat 
assessment was really only significant in the case of Thailand. 
What the invasion did do, however, was create a climate in 
which the need to further develop conventional warfare 
capabilities was strengthened. The dominant pressure, in 
fact " was that of the requirements of defence policy and , 
strategy which exerted an important influence in one way or 
another on all the states arms acquisitions. There was a 
continuous need for states to acquire weapons so as to 
maintain existing capabilities and to uphold vital national 
interests and., on occasion, there was also a need to respond to 
regional military developments. The responses to these 
developments sometimes indicated that a very low-level of 
military competition and inter-action was present. 
The need to maintain existing capabilities, to uphold (often 
expanding) national interests,, and to respond to a variety of 
regional military developments, occurred in an environment 
in which the rate of technological progression was increasing 
and there was a greater willingness by extra-regional powers 
to supply and help with the purchase of more advanced 
weapons. All this meant that the Second Cold War saw an 
increase in the range and sophistication of the major weapons 
possessed by all the states except Burma. From this general 
description and the general trends identified, the question 
arises of whether the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' during the 
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Second Cold War corresponded more closely to maintenance 
or racing. 
Returning to Gray's theoretical approach to arms races, he 
disaggregates his 'minimal condition' and identifies four 
"basic conditions" which "must [all] be present for there to be 
any valid assertion that a particular relationship is an arms 
race. "" These four conditions are as follows: "there must be 
two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism"; "they 
must structure their armed forces with attention to the 
probabale effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a 
deterrent to, the other arms race participants"; "they must 
compete in terms of quantity (men,, weapons) and/or quality 
(men weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment)"; and 
"there must be rapid increases in quantity and/or 
improvements in quality. "12 
It is readily apparent from the analysis presented here that 
these conditions did not prevail - either overall or in terms of 
particular dyadic or sub-group relationships - and that the SE 
Asian'arms dynamic' did not, under these conditions, 
constitute an arms race. 13 Even applying the much less rigid 
criteria put forward by, for example, Acharya, it is impossible 
to describe what occurred in SE Asia as an arms race. 14 This 
view is not controversial and is supported by others who have 
commented on the overall nature of the arms procurement 
pattern which prevailed in SE Asia in the 1980s. Alagappa 
and Sopiee, for example, contend that "in every arms race so 
far, instances can be found of very specific responses to 
11 Gray, The Arms Race PhenomenoLi, p. 41. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Mak also cites Gray's conditions in discussing the idea of an "intra-ASEAN arms 
race", but rather loosely suggests that the "classic arms race label" could be applied 
"to Phase I of the ASEAN conventional arms build-up of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, since elements of insecurity and antagonism could be identified among at least 
some ASEAN countries, in particular Thailand and Malaysia, as a result of the 
perceived Vietnamese threat during that period. " Mak, ASEAN Defence 
Modernization pp-141-142. 
14 Acharya highlights the elements of inter-state interaction and competition which 
must exist in an arms race. Thus, in an arms race, inter-state security concerns 
outweigh either domestic ones or those derived from changed regional circumstances 
which affect all regional states. Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War 
Southeast Asia? p-5. 
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equally specific identified actions or anticipated actions on the 
part of the arms race rival. These conditions clearly do not 
obtain in South-East Asia. "15 Although Thailand did react to Vietnam's deployment and utilisation of weapons in 
Cambodia, and an element of the action-reaction variable of timing was apparent on the Thai side, there was no mutual 
competition or antagonism between them and no response on 
the part of Vietnam. The absence of an arms race between 
Thailand and Vietnam has also been widely commented 
upon. 16 It is also difficult to place the SE Asian'arms 
dynamic' at the point on the spectrum indicated by Buzan and 
Herring's new term of "arms competition" - "something 
rather less than an arms race, but rather more than the 
maintenance of the military status quo' '17 - because of the very low-level of competitive inter-action which occurred. __1 
As the SE Asian'arms dynamic'during the Second Cold War 
was not at,, or near, the racing end of the spectrum, then it 
must have been at, or at least near to,, the maintenance end. 
In other words, the pattern of behaviour displayed was more 
normal than abnormal. This begs the question, of course, of 
what was normal behaviour for the region. It is arguable 
that there was no discernibly 'normal' pattern of behaviour 
prior to the 1970s in any case. It was only during this decade 
that some of the states actually began to acquire major 
conventional weapons in response to a variety of stimulants 
both internal and external to the region. These stimulants 
included the withdrawals of British and US forces; the 
communist takeovers in Indo-China; and the fact that there 
was a general 'procurement cycle' operative in the early 1970s 
which saw Third World states seeking to replace obsolescent 
weapons "because of the demonstration effect on other 
regions of the supply of sophisticated weapons to the Middle 
East. "18 
15 Mutthiah Alagappa and Noordin Sopiee, "Problems and prospects for arms control 
in South-East Asia", in OhIson, op. cit. p. 194 
16 See, for example, Alagappa and Sopiee, op. cit. p. 194, and Denoon, ol2. cit. p. 67. 
Denoon discusses this issue in terms of the ASEAN 3 (Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore) and the absence of a Vietnamese reaction to the "precautionary action" 
which they took in response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. 
17 Buzan and Herring, oj2. cit. p. 80. 
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If normal behaviour in the recent past constituted the 
acquisition of limited numbers of major conventional 
weapons (some of which were advanced), then given the wide 
range, significant numbers and technological sophistication of 
the major weapons acquired during the Second Cold War, it 
can be contended that the SE Asian 'arms dynamic' during this 
period was one of accelerated maintenance. By the end of the 
Second Cold War, therefore, the dynamic had established a 
new military status quo at a higher level of armament. 
18 Brzoska and OhIson, op. cit. p. 128. 
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Appendix The Dynamic's Outcomes 
The following tables detail the outcomes of the SE Asian 
'arms dynamic' during the Second Cold War in terms of the 
major weapons acquired by Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In accordance with the 
historical boundaries of the overall thesis, the data provided 
on arms acquisitions covers those major weapons ordered 
and acquired during the period 1979-1989. The nature of 
arms acquisitions, however, in particular the existence of time 
lags between ordering and delivery and the often lengthy 
nature of the delivery process itself, means that the start and 
stop dates of 1979 and 1989 require clarification in terms of 
inclusions and exclusions. 
The start date of 1979 means that the tables include all orders 
placed (and licences granted) from January 1979 onwards: 
that is, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 
December 1978. The tables exclude any orders placed (and 
licences granted) prior to January 1979, although the 
deliveries of that equipment may have occurred during the 
1979-1989 period. In the case of Indonesia, for example, a 
licence was granted in 1975 for the domestic production of 
'Aviocar' transport aircraft, with subsequent deliveries to the 
armed forces occurring during 1979-1989. The'Aviocars', 
therefore, are excluded from the tables. 
The establishment of a clear cut-off point at the end of 1989 is 
especially problematic. Deliveries resulting from earlier 
orders placed (and licences granted) may still have been 
ongoing, and acquisitions resulting from orders placed (and 
licences granted) in 1989 may have occurred after the end of 
the year. To get round these problems the following 
inclusions and exclusions will apply. First, for deliveries 
which were ongoing in 1989 the Total Acquired column will 
include the figures for all those weapons which were acquired 
up to the end of the year,, with the Notes making due reference 
to this. Secondly, those orders placed (and licences granted) 
in 1989 itself will be excluded unless any arms were actually 
delivered before the end of the year (in which case the first 
criterion will apply). Finally,, any orders placed (and licences 
granted) prior to 1989 but for which no deliveries occurred 
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before the end of the year (for example, the case of the CN- 
235 transport aircraft in Indonesia) are obviously excluded. 
Finally, in the way of an explanatory introduction to the 
tables, it is necessary to make one or two comments on the 
data. The data is compiled from a wide range of open 
sources (these are listed at the end of the tables) in order to 
ensure a higher degree of accuracy than is possible in those 
works which rely on a single source. ' Utilising a range of 
sources enables not only the cross-checking of dates of 
delivery and of totals acquired (which are often problematic), 
but also enables more information to be provided about each 
weapon ordered. This is particularly important in terms of 
identifying their intended use; whether they are new, second- 
hand, or, the result of licensed production; any changes to the 
specifications after the order was placed; the nature of the 
contract., or arrangement, under which they were supplied; 
and, indeed, whether they are actually 'new' acquisitions, or 
merely replacements. All of these issues are of significance in 
terms of the discussion about the salience of the various 
individual pressures or factors. Of course, given the sensitive 
nature of arms acquistions in general, and the lack of readily 
available information on Burma and Vietnam especially, even 
employing a wide range of sources does not ensure complete 
accuracy. Where details are either not known, or, where an 
element of doubt exists, it is clearly indicated. 
1 Mak, for example, in his tables on 'ASEAN Conventional Arms Purchases', relies 
solely on various editions of the SIPRI Yearbook and, as he himself acknowledges, 
has made no effort "to correct inaccuracies or inconsistencies for the sake of 
standardisation. " Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation p. 175. 
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From the data on each state's major weapons acquisitions during the Second Cold War, it is possible to identify a number of general trends in the SE Asian arms dynamic's outcomes. 
With the obvious exception of Burma (which acquired only a very limited number of weapons for the purposes of counter- insurgency operations), all the states acquired weapons in 
most of the categories. This was part of an evident attempt to develop fairly broad conventional warfare capabilities, if 
not actually 'balanced', across the board, capabilities. In 
some cases, an obvious emphasis was given to certain 
capabilities: for example, air defence in Singapore; maritime defence and amphibious lift in Indonesia; and ground warfare in Thailand. These emphases clearly reflect the priorities of defence procurement policy in those states. 
Notably absent in terms of procurement was the acquisition of 
any submarines. 2 Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, 
however, all acquired ASW helicopters and several of the 
warships which they purchased had an ASW capability (for 
example, Indonesia's Type 12 and Vietnam's 'Petya 11' class 
frigates). The acquisition of ASW capabilities was clearly 
directed at sub-surface threats from extra-regional powers. 
The lack of any efforts to develop a sub-surface warfare 
capability was undoubtedly connected to the 'coastal' role - 
one essentially limited to operations within territorial waters 
- which each state's navy had been tasked with. 3 There was 
no attempt to develop the capability for longer range naval 
power projection which would have required the acquisition 
of logistic support vessels, for example. Only Malaysia 
acquired a limited number of these. 
Taking those categories in which weapons were acquired as a 
whole,, most states acquired a mix of new, second-hand, and 
(excepting Burma and Vietnam) locally produced weapons. 
There wa certainly a marked tendency in many 
instances owever, towards the acquisition of second-hand 
2 Indonesia possessed a limited submarine capability, however, as a result of its 
order for two German Type 209s in 1977. 
3A 'coastal' role sees navies focussing on "protecting maritime resources, exercising 
jurisdiction and maintaining order". Till, ol2. cit p. 17. 
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(often refurbished) arms. Such arms were usually transferred from the supplier state's own armed forces, or from reserve 
stocks, through both defence co-operation programmes and special grant arrangements. The acquisition of second-hand 
equipment frequently occured when states were acquiring 
additional numbers of a type purchased new some years 
previously. This was particularly evident in the case of 
combat aircraft. 
The trend towards the acquisition of refurbished, second- hand, weapons, appears to be inter-linked with another 
preference displayed by many of the states; that of upgrading 
existing weapons holdings. Many states clearly preferred the 
option of upgrading, rather than purchasing new weapons, 
when practicable. This could be described as a policy of 
participating in the general process of technological 
innovation, or at least deferring obsolescence, through limited 
technological advances. 4 
Where states opted for technologically sophisticated, leading- 
edge, weapons, then it mainly occurred in the categories of 
missiles and launchers and combat aircraft: that is, in those 
categories which are subject to the greatest rates of 
technological innovation. In the case of combat aircraft these 
acquisitions of technologically sophisticated weapons were 
often part of a package which included offsets for, and 
technology transfer to, the recipient states. 
The orders for F-16 fighter aircraft by Indonesia, Singapore 
and Thailand in the mid-80s (the F-16 then seeming to 
symbolise the leading-edge of weapons technology) have led 
to the suggestion that this constituted a 'significant' increase 
in the 'sophistication' of the SE arms dynamic's outcomes. 5 It 
is arguable, though, that the level of sophistication had 
4 Buzan makes a similar point with regard to the purchase of second-hand weapons 
by following states: they "will make do with the offerings on the second-hand 
market, keeping pace with the forward qualitative movement of the leading edge, 
but only at some distance behind it. " Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies, 
p. 39. 
5 Brzoska and OhIson contend that the introduction of the F-16 (along with the M1G- 
23 - though this was not actually introduced by a regional state) meant 
that the 
"level of sophistication was ... significantly raised 
by the mid-80s". Brzoska and 
OhIson, pp. cit,, p-28. 
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actually begun to increase somewhat in the early 1980s with the introduction of several types of advanced missile into the 
region which states had not hitherto possessed. Singapore, for example, acquired its first air-to-surface missiles ('Mavericks') in 1981 and Thailand acquired its first surface- 
to-air missiles ('Blowpipes') in 1982. 
Irrespective of the actual point in the 1980s at which a much higher level of sophistication began to emerge in the SE Asian 
'arms dynamic', it is evident that the outcomes of that 
dynamic clearly reflected the desire of all the states (Burma, 
again, mostly excepted) to follow the process of technological 
innovation. The way in which states followed this process 
was either through upgrading existing capabilities, the 
purchase of new, technologically advanced weapons, or 
through incremental technological advances resulting from 
the receipt of the supplier state's obsolescent equipment. 
Where acquisitions have resulted from the licensed 
production of weapons by the states themselves, or from 
entirely indigenous design and production, then those 
weapons have, in the main, been of a less sophisticated 
nature. This clearly reflects, and reinforces, the designation 
of these states as part-producers. The licensed production of 
weapons also usually occurred in those categories where 
there were obvious links with the civil sector: for example, 
transport helicopters and training aircraft. 
Finally, with regard to general trends, there are those 
relating to the supplier states and the arms they provided to 
the states under consideration. As Vietnam was wholly 
dependent on a single supplier, the Soviet Union, and Burma 
was supplied with very few weapons at all, they are 
necessarily excluded from the following analysis. 6 The 
remaining states saw weapons supplied by a wide range of 
countries, though some trends are fairly evident. 
With the exceptions of China's provision of tanks and artillery 
to Thailand and Yugoslavia's supply of a training frigate to 
Indonesia, all the suppliers were non-communist states. In 
6 Burma is, however, worth mentioning in this context as it was the only state to 
receive weapons (rocket launchers) from suppliers whose identity cannot 
be confirmed. 
Despite the general sensitivity of arms sales, and the secrecy surrounding them on 
occasion, it was these sales which were the only ones where a supplier could not 
be 
readily identified or confirmed. 
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the main they were North American and European ones, but they also included pro-Western states such as Australia, Israel 
and South Korea. 
Overall, across all weapon categories, the US was clearly the 
major supplier. It was pre-eminent in supplies of combat 
aircraft and other very sophisticated weapons systems (for 
example, AEW aircraft), though markedly less so in terms of 
warships. Thailand showed the greatest reliance on American equipment with Malaysia at the other extreme. The US was followed by France and Britain - after America 
and the Soviet Union the other major international arms 
exporters during the 1980s - who supplied weapons in most 
categories. Britain and France, however, were not dominant 
in any category or in any one country in particular. The other 
- relatively minor - suppliers exported weapons in one or 
more specialised areas: 7Switzerland supplied training 
aircraft; Italy supplied training aircraft and jet trainers; West 
Germany supplied training aircraft and warships; and the 
Netherlands supplied transport aircraft and warships. 
It was these smaller arms exporters who were generally more 
prepared than the major exporters (with the exception of 
France) to offer licensed production arrangements. Among 
them, however, only Australia transferred equipment under a 
defence co-operation programe which was a clear indication 
that its relations with the recipients differed substantially 
from those of the other smaller exporters. 
Lastly, there were a few instances of the inter-state supply of 
weapons between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand. These instances mainly concerned the supply of 
fairly old equipment first provided by an external supplier 
(for example, Malaysia received second-hand French 
'Alouette 111' transport helicopters from Singapore), rather 
than locally produced equipment, which again indicated the 
part-producer status of these stateS. 8 
7 This is in keeping with the pattern identified by Brzoska and OhIson with regard 
to those smaller members of NATO who have "sizeable" arms industnes. These 
countries have "specialized in one or several areas within the field of arms 
production in which they have traditionally been producers or have acquired 
expertise". Brzoska and OhIson, op. cit. p. 95. 
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8 An exception was Malaysia's purchase of a single Indonesian produced'Puma' 
transport helicopter for evaluation. Thailand may also have acquired three NC-212 
transport aircraft built by Indonesia. 
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